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ABSTRACT
Between 1800 and 1850, the United States built a continental empire that stretched from
the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific Ocean. As scholars have come to realize over the past three
decades, this expansion was not a peaceful movement of American settlers into virgin
wilderness. Instead, it involved the conquest and subjugation of diverse peoples in Louisiana,
Florida and the northern provinces of Mexico, and forced the United States to interact
aggressively with the European empires of Great Britain, France, Spain, and eventually Mexico.
My work helps to explain how Americans in the early republic reconciled this militant expansion
with their professed democratic and republican values. By studying the rhetoric of American
expansion, I found their justifications rooted in the unexpected person of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Americans often saw similarities between continental expansion in the old and new worlds.
Both the United States and Bonaparte’s France started as republics, and both actively expanded
beyond their borders during the first decades of the nineteenth-century. Even after the expansion
of Bonaparte’s France was halted prematurely after the battle of Waterloo in 1815, Americans
continued to use him debate the merits of an imperial republic. In other words, they asked if a
nation could retain its republican principles and still engage in continental conquest. In the early
era of American expansion—between about 1800 and 1820, Napoleon served as a bogeyman, a
negative example, which first expansionists and then anti-expansionists both used to justify their
positions. But by the 1820s, as more sympathetic material flooded American print culture, his
image changed. By the end of the Mexican American War in 1848, Bonaparte had been elevated
into the perfect prototype for Americans to follow in their quest for continental domination.
Bonaparte had largely become a positive symbol of military and national greatness.

v

CHATPER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE AMERICAN PROTEUS
In 1797, the most popular article regarding the new republican hero of France was the
extract of a letter that ran in newspapers from New Hampshire to Georgia. Though we cannot be
certain, it was probably read by tens of thousands of Americans anxious for news from war-torn
Europe. In this article, a “gentleman” in Paris identified only as “C” wrote excitedly to his friend
in Philadelphia. “C” explained that he had enclosed two copies of the latest portrait of General
Napoleon Bonaparte and then provided what he knew was stunning, and what he hoped was
joyful news. Napoleon was not, as first reported, from the French held island of Corsica. No,
said “C,” the promising general was, in fact, an American from Middletown, Connecticut!
Bonaparte was an assumed name; his given family name was Shaler. 1
The Philadelphia newspaper where this story first appeared added that this was
“doubtful.” Regardless, the story was reprinted up and down the eastern seaboard and according
to at least one newspaper, it produced, “no small degree of curiosity.” Only several months later
did a few retractions start to appear. These, however, never came close to rivaling the number of
times the story had been printed. Even the retractions that did make it into print were
disappointed rather than apologetic in tone. The New Jersey Journal took an entire column to
carefully explain that while the original letter from Paris had been authentic, Americans
unfortunately could not, in fact, “claim the honor of having produced the great Buonaparte.” 2

“Buonaparte,” The Argus (New York, NY), December 29, 1796; also see titles of the same headline in, The
Philadelphia Gazette (Philadelphia, PA), December 31, 1796; The Federal Gazette (Baltimore, MD), January 3,
1796; The Centinel of Freedom (Newark, NJ), January 4, 1797; The New Jersey Journal (Elizabethtown, NJ),
January 4, 1797; The Connecticut Courant (Hartford, CT), January 9, 1797; The Connecticut Journal (New Haven,
CT), January 11, 1797; The Political Gazette (Newburyport, MA), January 13, 1797; Woods Newark Gazette
(Newark, NJ), January 18, 1797; other commentary on the letter can be found in, Loudon’s Register (New York,
NY), February 1, 1797.
2
Ibid; “Buonaparte from the Albany Register,” The New Jersey Journal (Elizabethtown, NJ), February 8, 1797,
similar edited articles were printed in The Argus (New York, NY), February 3, 1797; and The Weekly Oracle (New
London, CT), February 18, 1797.
1
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As this story shows, even early in Napoleon’s career, Americans could make the general
turned consul turned emperor into whatever they wanted him to be—even an American from
Connecticut. And they did. Napoleon’s name—which Americans could not even agree how to
spell—and his image appeared in paintings, books, cartoons, wax museums, speeches, toasts,
busts, pillows, cake decorations, and hundreds of other items from the late 1790s to his death in
1821.3 Even after his death, Bonaparte lived on. Some of this was simple hero worship; some
was that morbid fascination with the lives of the rich and famous which continues in our own
day. Often enough, Napoleon was used consciously as rhetorical device to define certain
American qualities, which may sound odd to modern Americans who think of our identity as
inherently unique. Napoleon was equally a symbol of military genius and political tyranny,
depending on how politically-motivated Americans appropriated his image to address a wide
range of issues during the antebellum period.
In this work, I am going to explain how Americans refashioned Napoleon to fit their
ideas about national expansion and empire between about 1800 and 1850. In a simplistic way,
Americans often saw similarities between continental expansion in the old and new worlds.
Both the United States and Bonaparte’s France were republics (or at least started that way), and
both actively expanded beyond their borders during the first decades of the nineteenth-century.
Even after the expansion of Bonaparte’s France was halted prematurely after the battle of
Waterloo in 1815, Americans continued to use him debate the merits of an imperial republic. In
other words, they asked if a nation could retain its republican principles and still engage in

3

This was not entirely their fault. The original Corsican version of the name was Napoleone Buonaparte, but once
the general attached himself to the French Revolution he Frenchified the name to Napoleon Bonaparte. Then, after
he took the title of emperor, he (like most monarchs) began to refer to himself by only the first name. All three
versions of the name were used by Americans well into the 1820s. For simplicity, in my work I will use either
Napoleon or Bonaparte.

2

continental conquest. In the early era of American expansion—between about 1800 and 1820,
Napoleon served as a bogeyman, a negative example, which first expansionists and then antiexpansionists both used to justify their positions. But by the 1820s, as more sympathetic
material flooded American print culture, his image changed. By the end of the Mexican
American War in 1848, as Americans acquired what would become the states of California,
Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, parts of Colorado and Wyoming, Americans had elevated
Bonaparte into the perfect prototype for Americans to follow in their quest for continental
domination. Remarkably, Bonaparte had largely become a positive symbol of military and
national greatness.
Few modern scholars have noticed, let alone carefully analyzed the significance of
Bonaparte’s symbolism. Scholars have probably dismissed the pervasive use of his imagery as
so obvious that they have dismissed it as empty rhetoric. There are, however, a new generation
of historians who have begun to address this gaping chasm in the scholarship. The work and
methodology of Rachel Hope Cleves is probably closest to my own. In her The Reign of Terror
in America, she tied the violent American imagery and rhetoric of the French Revolutionary
Terror to the emergence of anti-slavery rhetoric in New England during the 1820s. Cleves’s
work provides an excellent example of how key word searches in electronic databases can
produce impressive results. My own work builds on her methodology but shifts the focus
thematically and chronologically. Where Cleves looked at violence done to individuals—the
violence done to slaves by their owners, for example—my own work looks at the role of
collective national violence, or the threat of it, aimed at other nation states. 4

4

Rachel Hope Cleves, The Reign of Terror in America: Visions of Violence from Anti-Jacobinism to Anti-Slavery
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

3

It has almost become cliché for historians to tell their readers that their topic is
understudied. I have no such luxury. Trying to explain how the Americans of the early republic
reconciled aggressive geographic expansion with their professed beliefs in republicanism and
democracy has occupied historians for over a century. 5 In general, historians have focused on
two main causes. The first was ideological. Historians have adopted the term, “manifest
destiny” to describe a peculiar American sense of quasi-religious duty to spread liberal
democracy across the continent—and, depending on whom you asked, across the world.
Traditionally, historians dated this concept to the Jacksonian period, but in the 1990s, historians
like Frank Owsley and Gene Smith began to argue that the roots of this ideology could be found
in the actions of the Jefferson administration. Anders Stephanson even argued that an American
sense of “choseness” linked to expansion could be found as far back as the Puritan migration to
the North America in the seventeenth century. Whenever it started, the key element is that
manifest destiny is an inherently aggressive offensive ideology. 6
Other historians see expansion as motivated less by ideology and more by fear stemming
from national security concerns. They suggest that American expansion is best seen as a
defensive measure designed to protect liberal democracy. In The American Union and the
Problem of Neighborhood, for example, James Lewis suggests that as the Spanish empire in the
new world collapsed, Americans justified their expansion into the chaotic borderlands between

A good introduction to the topic is Mary Ann Heiss, “The Evolution of the Imperial Idea and the U.S. National
Identity,” Diplomatic History 26, no. 4 (Fall, 2002), 511-540.
6
Manifest Destiny as a historical concept first appeared in Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny: A Study of
Nationalistic Expansion in American History (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1935); and
Weinberg’s conclusions were largely corroborated by Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American
History: A Reinterpretation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963); Frank Owsley and Gene Smith,
Filibusters and Expansionists: Jeffersonian Manifest Destiny 1800-1821 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama
Press, 1997); Anders Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1995); for another “long view” of ideology in American foreign policy see Walter McDougall, Promised
Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).
5

4

1783 and 1829 by defining it as a national security interest. Similarly, Thomas Hietala argued
that American fears over domestic and economic instability stimulated the aggressive expansion
of the late Jacksonian period. Another example of this is Richard Anderson’s explanation of the
long history of American foreign policy in Empire for Liberty. Like Anders Stephanson,
Immerman argued that the roots of American expansion could be traced back to its colonial
beginnings, but where Stephanson saw Americans acting out of an aggressive, offensive
ideology, Immerman saw Americans acting aggressively, and often unwisely, to defend an ever
expanding geographic area from perceived threats to “liberty.” 7
Two problems continue to hamper our understanding of early American expansion. First
is compartmentalization. In 2007, Sandra Gustafson lamented what she saw as the split between
historians of the Jeffersonian period and those of the Jacksonian period and suggested that the
split hid important connections between American democracy and American Imperialism. A
quick glance at works on early American expansion shows that historians have indeed missed the
importance of continuity by focusing on distinct historical periods instead of taking a longer
view of the antebellum era. Many scholars have exaggerated the meaning of the peaceful
acquisition of Louisiana in 1803 as the defining moment of Jeffersonian diplomacy and
expansion, while using the Mexican American War to paint the Jacksonian era as a period of
greater military aggression. What is missing here is the continuation of ideology that bridged the
two periods that drew heavily on European ideas and practices of empire-building.8

7

James E. Lewis Jr., The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse
of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Thomas Hietala,
Manifest Design: American Exceptionalism and Empire, revised ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003);
Richard H. Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul
Wolfowitz (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
8
Sandra Gustafson “Democracy and Empire,” American Quarterly 59 no.1 (March, 2007), 107-133.

5

The second problem is one of focus. The last forty years have seen an odd divergence in
early expansionist studies. On one hand, some historians continue to focus heavily on presidents
and policymakers at the highest levels of government. This is understandable since many of
those most interested in American imperialism are diplomatic historians who traditionally deal
with treaties and national strategy. On the other hand, since the 1980s, an increasing number of
historians have focused their efforts on giving voice and agency to those in the borderlands
whose lives were most changed by national policy: native peoples, Spanish creoles, local
officials, African slaves, and Mexican citizens, for example. This new emphasis is a necessary
corrective. Men and women living in these contested areas were not merely pawns in the
diplomatic gamesmanship of policymakers in Madrid, Paris, or Washington. What is also needed
is greater attention to how public opinion was shaped–and played a crucial role in both defending
and criticizing expansionist policies. For example, why did Americans rally around President
Polk’s war policy which necessitated the invasion of a sovereign republic? Polk needed an army
of volunteers, which meant that support for conquest already was widely accepted in the
American public. How that imperialist ideology was framed in newspapers and print culture is a
vital part of process of expansion. 9

For examples of good recent bio-diplomatic histories of American expansion see Peter Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire:
The Language of American Nationhood (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2000); Robert W.
Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990); J.C.A Stagg, Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American
Frontier (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009); Charles Edel, Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and
the Grand Strategy of the Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); and Robert Merry, A
Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (New
York: Simon and Schuster 2010); for relevant examples of the work that highlights the agency of those on the
borders see, Anne Hyde, Empires, Nations and Families: A New History of the North American West, 1800-1860
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2011); Peter J. Kastor, “’Motives of Particular Urgency’: Local
Diplomacy in Louisiana,” William and Mary Quarterly 58, no. 4 (October 2001), 819-848; Julien Vernet, Strangers
on their Native Soil: Opposition to United States Governance in Louisiana’s New Orleans Territory (Jackson, MS:
University of Mississippi Press, 2013); Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects,
Irish Rebels, and Indian Allies (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2010); Timothy Henderson, A Glorious Defeat: Mexico
and its War with the United States (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
9

6

Study of the anti-expansionist currents in American society is a more recent phenomenon
and thus less developed. Unfortunately, it is somewhat hampered by the same periodization and
lens foci that make histories of early American expansion less than complete. Those historians
who study anti-imperialism generally focus on it as a reactionary anti-war movement and not as
a deeply rooted ideology. Thus, while we have historical snapshots of Whig anti-war
movements during the Mexican War and Federalist anti-war movements during the War of 1812,
there is no study that links the ideology of these two movements together or that connects them
to the anti-expansionist ideas that surrounded the Louisiana Purchase. 10
This is why the symbolism and rhetoric attached to Napoleon is so important. His
shifting image revealed how average Americans thought about expansion and ties the two
periods of early American expansion together. As a trope of military expansion, he forced
commentators to more carefully define the principles of republicanism, the legitimacy of using
military force, and the concentration of power in the executive branch. Using Napoleon made
public critics clarify the distinctions between wars for conquest and defensive wars and to think
more clearly about expansion based on treaties, natural limits (territorial or continental
boundaries), and national security concerns. It also bears noting that the individuals who
comprised the American reading public were not automatons who mindlessly opposed or
supported every policy of Jefferson, Madison, or Polk, either out of spite or partisan loyalties.

The best modern work on anti-Imperialism is Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton, Empire’s Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism
from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), though this collection
of essays includes only one chapter that covers the antebellum period; several good monographs exist on antiimperialism after 1898, but one of the problems of developing coherent theories of early anti-imperialism is that the
comprehensive works tend to be collections of independent essays, see for example, Samuel Eliot Ellison, Frederick
Merk and Frederick Freidel, Dissent in Three American Wars (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970);
also see John Schroeder, Mr. Polk’s War: American Opposition and Dissent (Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1973); Michael Morrison, “New Territory vs. No Territory: The Whig Party and the Politics of
Western Expansion,” Western Historical Quarterly 23, no. 1 (February, 1992), 25-51; Amy S. Greenberg, A Wicked
War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln, and the 1846 Invasion of Mexico (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2012).
10

7

Then, as now, their knowledge was always limited and their opinions were never totally
objective. It was quite common for elected officials to write for the newspapers during the early
republic, and often disguise themselves by using pseudonyms. The word of print was fractious
and never a level playing field. But writing for the reading public required a different pose than
arguing in halls of Congress. It did create a forum for rational debate, even if this was
imperfectly achieved.
The chief benefit of my own work is in its ability to project a much-needed sense of
thematic and chronological continuity into debates over American expansion between the
Louisiana Purchase and the end of Mexican War. I demonstrate that there was both continuity
and change in the American understanding of expansion during the first half of the nineteenth
century. In part, I demonstrate that the artificial division between expansion to 1820 and after
1820 has merit. Pro and anti-expansionist arguments based on national security that proven quite
effective during the Louisiana Purchase and the War of 1812 lost much of their power after
1815. I suggest that a large reason for this was that after 1815, the chief symbol upon which this
rhetoric was built—Napoleon—could no longer be made into a viable national security threat.
Yet, Napoleon’s symbolic place in the American rhetoric of expansion continued through 1850,
albeit in a different form and with different results.
The other value of my work is that it brings into focus the expansionist (and antiexpansionist) views of a surprisingly neglected group: middle-class Americans from the core of
the United States. As a decentralized democratic republic with a laughably small military,
American national policy had to correspond to the will of the white, male electorate to be
effective. The editor of the New Hampshire Patriot perceptively wrote of expansion in 1832,
“no physical force can carry [the government’s] mandates into effect, for if the people approve

8

them they will be obeyed.” However, if the American public did not approve of their
government’s actions, “they will not fight against their own consciences, their own convictions
of right, to enforce what they deem unjust.” American military commanders confronted this
democratic and local resistance during the War of 1812 when militia sometimes refused to cross
the Canadian border. In fact, the process of debating in the newspapers both contributed to the
growth of nationalism and exposed its fragile reach across a country where state and regional
identification was often more important to average citizens. 11
I also show that the traditional “anti-war” label for anti-expansionists needs greater
nuance. A few of those who I study could fit the traditional “anti-war” model and opposed all
war for its human and economic waste as well as for what they saw as the inevitable immoral (or
unwise) geographic expansion that went with it. However, this was a rare position. Others were
vigorously opposed to offensive wars of “conquest” while supporting “defensive” wars and the
means to fight them. Another subgroup was genuinely opposed to all expansion beyond the
“natural limits” of the United States no matter the means. There were even those who opposed
expansion via treaty and who saw military conquest as the only legitimate means of expansion.
Of course, there was much gray area within each of these positions as well. It also bears noting
that these men and women did not mindlessly oppose every policy of Jefferson, Madison, or
Polk out of spite. They were reasonable citizens who had genuine concerns about the actions of
their nation.
To explain how I do this, a short introduction to my methodology is in order. Anyone
who takes the time to scan my bibliography will note that I have used published sources almost
exclusively and this deserves some explanation. Americans were a remarkably literate society

11

New Hampshire Patriot (Concord, NH), March 19, 1832.
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by 1800 and became increasingly so as the nineteenth century wore on. Pamphlets, newspapers,
books and magazines circulated widely and I work from the assumption that these both
accurately reflected and helped to shape public opinion. 12 Americans used these printed sources
to learn everything they could about Napoleon. On the Niagara frontier during the first decade
of the nineteenth century, young Eber Howe remembered the excitement generated by the
postman bringing the local paper and “with what avidity the family circle would gather round to
hear my father read the wonderful doings of that great human butcher, [Napoleon Bonaparte].”
By 1830 even modest families living on the fringes of American settlement usually owned a
bible, a hymnbook, an almanac and biographies of Washington and Bonaparte. Families that
could not afford books accessed the life of Napoleon through libraries. According to literary
historian Scott Casper, Americans checked-out biographies of the French general more than any
other type of book during the mid-nineteenth century.13
Because of the American print obsession with Napoleon, researching his impact on
American discourse is more like a feast than a famine. For example, running the name
“Bonaparte” through the Readex America’s Historical Newspapers database between 1800 and
1850 will return over 3,000,000 hits; and these results only cover the newspapers!14 In order to
turn these results into usable data, I was forced use rely on keyword proximity searches. For
example, asking the database to only retrieve results that include both “Bonaparte” AND
“Louisiana” brings the total number of hits down to a somewhat more manageable level. In

12

I make this unsurprising assumption based primarily on the work of, Jeffrey Pasley, The Tyranny of Printers:
Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2002); and
Trish Loughran, The Republic in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation Building (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2009).
13
Quoted in Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2001), 100; Scott Casper, Constructing American Lives: Biography and Culture in
Nineteenth Century America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 27, 81-82.
14
By way of comparison, Rachel Hope Cleves noted 50,451 hits in the same database doing similar work on the
impact of the French Revolutionary Terror in the American mind—see Cleves, The Reign of Terror in America, 283.
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general, I searched for Napoleon’s names and the geographic areas that Americans were
interested in annexing. However, as I continued my research, I was able to include important
“code words” that virtually all Americans associated with Napoleon—“sister republics,”
“usurper,” and “ambition” among others. Using this approach probably does mean that a few
pieces of data slipped through the cracks, but after analyzing over 1,000,000 newspaper articles
in conjunction with dozens of biographies, pamphlets and other printed material, I am reasonably
certain that I understand the structure of how Americans used Napoleon in their debates over
expansion.
A final note on my methodology: critics have been suspicious about the usefulness of
symbols and rhetoric in reconstructing the past for many years. Public rhetoric, in particular,
seems particularly difficult to take at face value. In his monograph, Ideology and U.S. Foreign
Policy, historian Michael Hunt addressed this issue. “The cynical,” he wrote, “would contend
that carefully staged public appeals are occasions not for frank and nuanced expression, but for
cant intended to fool the gullible and mask true intentions.” Yet, he pointed out, for public
rhetoric to be effective at all, it must appeal to “values and concerns widely shared and easily
understood by its audience.” In my work, I have done my best to ensure that the printed material
I use had a wide circulation, or at least reflects larger trends in late eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury print culture. Rhetoric needs to taken seriously as a source for defining the boundaries
of American discourse on expansion. It was the glue that bound Americans together as a nation,
because rhetoric provides a common vocabulary for defining national identity. Ultimately, this
is the fundamental truth that undergirds my entire work.15

15

This paragraph is heavily paraphrased from Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, reprint ed. (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 15-16.
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Americans first became aware of the Corsican-born general around mid-1796 in the wake
of his appointment to command the Republican Army of Italy. Within weeks, newspapers were
full of his exciting dispatches from the front lines. By the end of the year, one Federalist
newspaper from Baltimore noted with some concern the degree to which “the public mind in
America is wrought up to a high state of anxiety” over Napoleon’s series of stunning victories
against the Austrian empire in Italy. 16
The victorious general almost immediately became a political football in American
debates about the just conduct of republics. Jeffersonian Republicans—who tended to be
sympathetic the principles if not always the means of the French Revolution—hailed Napoleon
as a brilliant general whose victories spread the promise of liberty to those oppressed by despotic
European monarchies. As part of the traditional Independence Day toasts made by the New
York Democratic society in 1797, twenty-two cheers were made in support of “Gen. Buonaparte
and the brave officers and soldiers of the French armies,” who were engaged in “securing the
liberty, peace and happiness of mankind.” Tellingly, in the same series of toasts, the memory of
the July 4, 1776 only received six cheers. 17
While Republicans cheered as newspapers brought new reports of Bonaparte’s victories
in Italy, the opposing party in power, the Federalists, urged caution. They were never
comfortable with the violent social anarchy caused by the revolution in France and liked it even
less when it spilled over the French borders. One Federalist newspaper sarcastically asked what
the difference between the Goths and Napoleon’s Army of Italy was. The editor provided the
answer using italics to emphasize his point: “The ancient conquerors were despotic princes—the

“November 11,” The Federal Gazette (Baltimore, MD), November 16, 1796.
The Diary or Loudon’s Register (New York, NY), July 6, 1797; Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, Madison
and Jefferson (New York: Random House, 2010), 253-257; also see Joseph Shulim, “Jefferson views Napoleon,”
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 60, no. 2 (April, 1952), 288-304.
16
17
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modern conquerors of Italy are despotic republicans.” At the heart of the Federalist unease was
concern over whether it was legitimate for republics to conquer their neighbors, even in the name
of liberty. In many ways, this question has been at the heart of American foreign policy ever
since.18
In 1798, Bonaparte and his army were ordered to pacify Egypt to prepare the way for an
eventual invasion of British India. Commentators then and now have suggested that the real
reason the French Directory—the five-man executive council that ended the Terror and ran
Revolutionary France with some semblance of order from 1795-1799—sent Bonaparte to the
fringes of the Ottoman Empire was to get the increasingly popular (and thus increasingly
dangerous) general away from France. The campaign was only marginally successful from a
military perspective, but it did help Napoleon in at least one way. It meant that his American
reputation was not tarnished by the souring of Franco-American relations that occurred in the
wake of the XYZ Affair and the Quasi-War (1798-1800).19 American public anger at the French
demand for tribute and the ensuing naval skirmish was overwhelmingly aimed at the French
Directory and central government instead of Bonaparte.
Thus, for many Americans, it came as a relief when Napoleon abandoned his army in
Egypt, returned to France, and engineered a coup that toppled the hated Directory. In its place,
Bonaparte established a government of three consuls with himself as First Consul. Shortly after
assuming office, Napoleon adopted a more conciliatory diplomatic stance toward the United
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States, which led to the Convention of 1800 that ended the naval war in September of that year.
Yet, even with the war over, maritime disputes between the two nations continued for the next
fifteen years. More troubling to at least some Americans though was the nagging sense that with
the ascension of Bonaparte, France had become a Republic in name only. While some diehard
Jeffersonians continued to hope that Bonaparte’s near dictatorial powers would be only
temporary, most Americans expressed relief that they were separated from the First Consul by
the Atlantic Ocean and wondered where his ambition would take him next. 20
Though Americans did not know his plans yet, Napoleon did. He had his sights on
Louisiana—a territory roughly defined as the area dominated by Mississippi River and its
tributaries west to the Rocky Mountains. Louisiana was no stranger to the byzantine world of
imperial politics by the time the Bonaparte turned his gaze there at the end of the eighteenth
century. Spanish conquistadores were the first Europeans to traverse the gulf coasts of Florida
and Louisiana. Several disastrous expeditions in search of gold—most famously by Hernado
DeSoto in 1541—led the Spanish government to lose interest in Louisiana and focus their
attentions on the fabulously wealthy silver mines of New Mexico. The Spanish, however, did
maintain a tenuous hold on Florida, which, by their reckoning, ran the length of the gulf coast to
the Mississippi. They did this mainly to keep other covetous empires out of the area in order to
protect Spanish shipping. Meanwhile, the French moved into the Mississippi valley from their
possessions in Canada. In 1682, the French adventurer Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle
officially claimed (and named) the territory for Louis XIV, but the colony never prospered. For
almost a century it struggled. With far more prosperous islands in the Caribbean attracting most
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of the willing French settlers, only a handful of disgruntled “undesirable” persons from France
made Louisiana their home—usually they had no choice in the matter. In addition, their
existence was constantly threatened by hostile relations with vastly more numerous native
peoples that actively courted the African slave population as allies. In the end, the French did
manage to fortify the mouth of the Mississippi River at New Orleans and set up numerous fur
trading posts around the junction of the Ohio and the Mississippi rivers.21
The first half of the eighteenth century saw a series of imperial wars between France and
England that continued with only short pauses until 1765. In the last of these wars, known in
Europe as the Seven Years War, Louisiana again became an imperial football. As the tide of the
war turned against the French, they sought the support of the neutral Spanish by promising to
cede the territory of Louisiana. Spain, concerned about the possibility of an energetic AngloAmerican empire bordering their wealthy provinces in Mexico, took the bait and entered the war
on behalf of the French. However, Spain proved to be a less than valuable ally and France was
soon forced to sue for peace. The final settlement of the Treaty of Paris (1763) redefined the
imperial map of the Americas. France lost all of her possessions in continental North America—
Canada to Great Britain, and Louisiana went (as promised) to Spain. For her part in supporting
the French, Spain lost East and West Florida to the British. 22
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Yet, the imperial roulette game was not yet over. Within a dozen years of the Treaty of
Paris, the British imperial bureaucracy pushed her thirteen original mainland North American
colonies into open revolt. Seeking allies, the infant American republic sought recognition and
support from Britain’s old enemies of France and Spain. Looking to avenge their embarrassment
at the hands of the British during the Seven Years War, both powers eventually entered the war
on the side of the Americans, though Spain was particularly cautious about overtly supporting a
nation that they realized would be their major rival in North America. Looking to their own
interests, Spain took advantage of weakened British power in the gulf coast region to reassert
their control of the Floridas and, most importantly, New Orleans. Another Treaty of Paris (1783)
ended this civil war which had expanded into an international conflict with the British colonies
achieving their independence. The treaty defined the new nation’s boundaries as all territory
west to the middle of the Mississippi River, south of Canada and north of Florida, though the
exact northern boundary of Spanish Florida was left unclear. 23
The Mississippi River and its tributaries loomed large in the minds of the newly
independent Americans. In an age when the only way to transport goods to market economically
was via water routes, Americans living west of the Appalachian Mountains depended upon the
free flow of cargo down the Ohio to the Mississippi then through New Orleans to the Gulf of
Mexico. Realizing this, the Spanish exerted economic pressure on the western regions of the
United States by closing the port of New Orleans shortly after the conclusion of the American
Revolution. They also quietly supported the occasional separatist movements that sprang up
among the western territories by holding out the promise of free navigation along the Mississippi

23

The Treaty of Paris and Associated Documents, 1783, The Avalon Project online, (http://avalon.law.yale.edu);
DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana, 34-39.

16

to any areas willing to submit to Spanish authority. The American Confederation government
sought a diplomatic solution to the problem, but failure to secure the basic right of frontiersmen
to use the port of New Orleans caused enough outrage amongst southerners and westerners to
derail ratification of Jay-Gardoqui Treaty (and almost the Constitution) in 1786. The two powers
continued to warily eye each other as American settlers swarmed into territory claimed by Spain
as northern Florida. 24
Ten years later, however, the situation changed with the outbreak of the French
Revolutionary Wars in Europe. Perceiving that the United States was growing closer to Great
Britain under Federalist Party rule, Spain, as an ally of revolutionary France, came to the
bargaining table. Westerners rejoiced when the United States finally concluded Pinckney’s
Treaty with Spain in 1795. This treaty, also known as the Treaty of San Lorenzo, clarified the
boundary between the United States and Florida as the 31 st parallel of latitude—which
essentially acknowledged the fact that the United States had de facto control of the northern parts
of what the Spanish claimed as Florida. Both nations agreed to allow each other unimpeded
access to the Mississippi. The treaty also provided Americans a “right of deposit” in New
Orleans, which allowed Americans to transport and store their goods in New Orleans without
having to pay a duty to the Spanish empire. 25
Though the French gave up Louisiana at the end of the Seven Years War, they never lost
sight of their imperial ambitions. In 1793, the French ambassador, Citizen Genêt, received
instructions from the Girondin government to “germinate the principles of liberty and
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independence” in Louisiana and then find a way to transfer the independent territory to France.
Genêt took this to mean that his government wanted him to wage a war of liberation and began
recruiting an army of western Americans to do the job. This scheme fell apart when Genêt fell
afoul of the American government and was recalled to France. The Directory, laid plans to
reestablish France’s hold on Louisiana through more diplomatic means. They quietly opened
negations with Spain for the retrocession of Louisiana, but for several years the Spanish
government proved remarkably intractable on the issue. As we will see, however, Bonaparte
would not be dissuaded so easily. 26
What follows is broken into four chapters aligned geographically around a very broadly
defined Louisiana. In chapter one, I cover how Napoleon entered the American lexicon of
expansion during Mississippi Crisis of 1802-03, which resulted in the Louisiana Purchase. I
show that the American public saw Bonaparte as negative symbol, in which both pro and antiexpansionists used to define their own positions and attack their opponents’ positions. At this
time, all parties agreed on one point: Napoleon’s approach to expansion was one best not
followed by an independent republic. Chapter two discusses how Americans used the rhetoric of
Napoleon in the aftermath of the Louisiana Purchase, which in its early years was treated as
colonial possession.
Chapter three illustrates how Federalists used Napoleon to create an effective, nationwide
anti-expansionist (though not anti-war) argument by linking aggressive expansion in East and
West Florida to the War of 1812. Lastly, in my final chapter, I demonstrate how Americans both
celebrated Napoleon as a democratic military genius while claiming to despise his ambitious
politics. The Janus-faced image was solidified by the avalanche of Napoleonic printed material

26

DeConde, This Affair of Louisiana, 75-89.

18

that appeared in the United States beginning in the 1820s. And, as I contend, helped to lay
popular support for the Mexican-American War, which was the most aggressive display of
imperial expansion in the antebellum period. I conclude with some cursory observations of why
the highly-charged rhetoric about Napoleon fell off steeply during the Civil War.

19

CHAPTER 2 ANCIENT LIMITS AND NATURAL BOUNDARIES: THE MISSISSIPPI
CRISIS
During the first few months of 1803, an anonymous author published a long pamphlet
sporting the delightfully grandiose title, “An Address to the Government of the United States on
the Cession of the Louisiana Territory to the French and on the Late Breach of Treaty by the
Spaniards, including the Translation of a Memorial on the War of St. Domingo, and the
Cessation of the Mississippi to France.” The author—who was the novelist Charles Brockden
Brown—claimed to have translated a secret memorandum from a “French Counseller of State”
to the First Consul of the Republic, Napoleon Bonaparte. In the “translated” document, the
supposed diplomat argued persuasively that Bonaparte ought to immediately occupy the
Louisiana Territory, which had recently been begrudgingly ceded to him by his Spanish allies.
Translation of the “memorandum” completed, Brown made an appeal to his own government.
With French military occupation of the territory apparently inevitable, he argued for an
American military occupation of Louisiana before the French could officially take possession of
the area. Yes, he admitted, this would mean a foreign war waged against Spain under dubious
pretexts, and it would eventually require that the inhabitants of the conquered territory to be held
in a state of vassalage. Yet, he argued, the danger of allowing Bonaparte to militarize the
western boundary of the United States was worth all these consequences. Brown had to know
that his means would have sounded downright Napoleoneque to his readers, indeed, he
practically demanded the comparison. Incredibly enough, however, Brown was only one of
many voices calling for a preemptive military invasion of Louisiana. 27
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Every story has a beginning. In the case of American expansion this beginning was
Louisiana—a territory loosely defined by the Mississippi River and its tributaries that stretched
west to the Rocky Mountains. When through a remarkable set of international circumstances
Napoleon Bonaparte sought to sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States in 1803, it was
the first opportunity for the embryonic nation to burst through the boundaries defined by the
Treaty of Paris in 1783. Yet, the road to what most Americans remember as the greatest land
deal in United States history was not a simple one. It involved fear and hyper-partisan political
bickering that almost developed into America’s first foreign war involving land forces. This
chapter closely examines the emergence of Napoleonic rhetoric—specifically the idea of ancient
limits and natural borders—during the Mississippi Crisis of 1800-1803.
Compared to the Louisiana Purchase that followed, the Mississippi Crisis has received
scant attention from historians. For most of the twentieth century, the diplomatic and political
historians who gave it any serious thought used the episode as a barometer for judging the
Jefferson administration’s foreign policy acumen. More recently, however, a few historians have
placed the Mississippi Crisis into the larger context of early American expansion in the Spanish
borderlands. Two schools of thought have emerged. One argues that American policy in the
region stemmed from an ideology of what Frank Owsley and Gene Smith called “proto-manifest
destiny” in their 1997 book, Filibusters and Expansionists. According to this interpretation, the
American government regularly acted in a deliberate and aggressive manner toward its Spanish
neighbors and the Mississippi Crisis was simply a precursor to more aggressive action in the
region later. “The entire episode,” they write, “demonstrated that Jefferson strongly supported
westward expansion and that he understood the Mississippi River’s importance to its
development.” Such militant acts, say these historians, fit comfortably into what later

21

generations would call the ideology of Manifest Destiny—the unashamed conquest of territory
from a neighbor unable to resist. 28
Other historians have argued that it is anachronistic to see the Mississippi Crisis in terms
of Manifest Destiny. Instead, these historians argue that American policy was actually dictated
by national security concerns and thus ultimately defensive in nature. In James Lewis’s 1998
work, The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood, for example, Lewis argues that
the American response to the Mississippi Crisis, “always reflected a concern with the effect on
French control over the river on the integrity of the union.” Even more recently, Donald
Heidenreich completed a detailed political examination of the crisis in which he concluded that,
it should be understood primarily as “a young republic’s quest for national security.”
Heidenreich took Lewis’s argument one step further and argued that the national security
concern was so prevalent in the politics of early American expansion that Jeffersonians and
Federalists put aside their party differences and reached a “consensus” on the necessity of
possessing Louisiana.29
While the basic story of the Mississippi Crisis is well established, by placing the rhetoric
of Napoleon into the crisis, my own work complicates the existing narrative. First, it clearly
shows that a portion of the American public—if perhaps not the Jefferson administration—saw
the crisis as a referendum on the just application of military power and not solely as a diplomatic
event. Second, it demonstrates that while the Lewis, Heidenreich interpretation of seeing the
crisis in terms of a national security issue is correct it is ultimately too simple. In the first case,
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the rhetoric aggressive expansionists used changed over time and reflected the American public’s
discomfort with militant expansion. In the second place, while there was a general agreement
between most Americans of all political stripes that the United States needed possession of at
least a part of Louisiana to protect its national security, there was no consensus on how this was
to be accomplished, what portion of Louisiana was a vital national security interest, or even
where the boundaries of Louisiana lay.
The Mississippi Crisis introduced Bonaparte as a negative symbol in American debates
over expansion. Pro-expansionists argued that the military threat of a Napoleonic Louisiana
justified a preemptive strike that would expand the United States to its natural boundaries—or at
least prevent France from returning to her ancient limits. To be in favor of aggressive expansion,
Americans had to believe that French control of the Mississippi River was a legitimate national
security concern. At the same time, an ideological anti-expansionist argument began to form
around the idea that military expansion would make the United States no better than imperial
France. Anti-expansionist rhetoric was most effective when authors demonstrated the
uncomfortable similarities between the military expansion of the United States and that of
Napoleon. Fundamentally, both groups shared the assumption that aggressive militant expansion
in the mode of Bonaparte was illegitimate. This common understanding forced proexpansionists to explain why their own views were based on national security interests and not
simply overt and unprovoked military expansion.
When Napoleon overthrew the Directory in 1799 and established the three-man
Consulate government with himself as First Consul, he inherited a long-established French desire
to rebuild their western empire. As early as 1793 the Girondin government attempted to
destabilize Spanish Louisiana by subterfuge through the machinations of Citizen Genêt. A few
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years later, the Directory opened diplomatic talks with Spain with the goal of convincing the
Bourbon government to return Louisiana. The Spanish proved intractable and the Directory
government fell before anything came of the negotiations. When Napoleon came to power, he
quietly redoubled pressure on his ally Spain to retrocede Louisiana to France in exchange for
territory in Italy. Under enormous political and military pressure, Spain backed down. Not
unhappy to be rid of the financial drain on their economy and happy to use France as a buffer
between New Mexico and the United States, the Spanish government secretly acceded to
Napoleon’s demands in October 1800 after securing a verbal agreement that the French consul
would allow no third party to possess Louisiana. Well aware of the firestorm that the
retrocession would cause in the United States, both powers attempted to keep the deal secret until
Bonaparte had the ability to solidify his control of the province.30
Eager to realize his dream of recreating a North American empire, Napoleon concluded
his wars in Europe—at least temporarily. The Peace of Lunéville pacified Austria in February
1801; then, eight months later, he ended hostilities with the British in the Peace of Amiens. The
result of these treaties was a much enlarged French state—mostly at the expense of Austria. It
also freed France from fear of the British navy. In January 1802, Americans read that a large
French expeditionary force under the command of Napoleon’s brother in law, Charles Leclerc,
was on its way to North America to assert the First Consul’s control over his western empire.
This action confirmed the worst fears of many Americans—especially the more Franco-phobic
Federalists. Rumors of the Spanish retrocession of Louisiana to France had been circulating in
diplomatic circles since the end of March and in the American press since at least June, but the
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sailing of the French fleet for the Americas left no doubt in the mind of the American public that
they would have a new neighbor on their western border. 31
Even before Bonaparte’s fleet sailed, the Jefferson administration was working to resolve
the developing crisis. Thomas Jefferson and his followers embraced a transcontinental American
empire of connected republics. 32 While the decaying Spanish empire held Louisiana, most
assumed that their imperial holdings in North America would, in the course of time, simply fall
into the lap of the United States as Americans settlers moved farther west and either imparted
republican values to the inhabitants or came to dominate the area simply through sheer numbers.
Bonaparte’s increasingly autocratic and powerful France threatened that vision by re-inserting
the most militant nation in Europe onto the American continent. The administration reacted with
hostility when rumors of the retrocession were all but confirmed by their European diplomats in
May 1801. When questioned, however, the French chargé de affairs in Washington coyly
refused to acknowledge that any transfer had taken place. Besides, he told the administration,
even if it had, it would not concern the United States—unless, of course, she intended to expand
past the boundaries established by the Treaty of Paris.33
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Stymied, Secretary of State James Madison sent a long set of instructions to the new
Minister to France, Robert Livingston in September. The president, he said, wanted Livingston
to confirm if the retrocession had taken place, and if so, what the extent of it was. Specifically,
the president wanted to know if Florida was included in the deal. Furthermore, he added, if the
French were in possession of Louisiana and Florida, Livingston was instructed to persuade the
French to sell New Orleans and the Floridas—and if they were not, then convince the French to
pressure their Spanish allies to sell those strategic points. The delicate diplomatic negotiations
that followed took over a year and have been well chronicled in other places. Jefferson was
willing to wait—at least for a while—but not all of his countrymen were so patient. 34
By 1801, the Federalist Party was a minority party in most places in the nation, but they
were still an extremely vocal opposition. Many were outraged by news of the retrocession and
demanded a strong response from Jefferson’s administration. In general, Federalists were less
concerned about the ideological empire of republicanism that animated Jefferson. Where
Republicans looked west to what Jefferson called an “Empire of Liberty,” Federalists looked east
to protect a commercial empire of merchants and bankers. They were focused on building a
nation state that would be taken seriously by European powers. The Genêt mission, the XYZ
Affair and the raiding of American commerce showed the Federalists exactly how little the
belligerents thought of a divided and militarily weak nation that hugged the eastern seaboard of
North America. The major theme of early Federalist opposition to the retrocession was outrage
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that the French sought to check American expansion—essentially an affront to American honor
and greatness.35
In June, several Federalist papers announced that France had, “exerted her diplomatic
skill to seize Louisiana, Florida and Canada, and enlisted her GENETS to enlist men in our
backcountry to occupy them.” To the American reader at all familiar with geography, French
control of those three key territories would make further American expansion impossible. This
was nothing new, the article explained to its readers. As early as 1783 the paper noted, France
was, “adverse to our aggrandizement.” While this article explicitly tied France to the future of
American expansion, it stopped short of directly employing Napoleonic rhetoric to make its
points, instead choosing to use the specter of Citizen Genêt. This began to change as Americans
began to discuss the ramifications of the Peace of Amiens and place their own empire within the
context of the Napoleonic one. 36
When considering the American perception of the French Revolution’s ideological
undertones most historians have focused on the Federalist fear of radical Jacobin ideas infecting
the United States from within rather than on French territorial ambitions. Rachel Hope Cleves in
The Reign of Terror in America, writes that the Revolution’s “pervasive and persistent images of
bloodshed deeply affected American beliefs about the legitimacy of violence within American
politics and society,” and she credits these images with encouraging American abhorrence to
violence in domestic issues like slavery. In The Age of Federalism, Stanley Elkins and Erik
McKitrick contended that “the real drama of the French Revolution in America…was one not of
foreign policy but of domestic partisanship.” Emphasizing partisan divisions obscures where
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two parties were in agreement: both feared French territorial aspirations in North America,
especially after Napoleon’s successes in the wars of the First and Second Coalitions
demonstrated that the French armies not only could win battles, but win wars, and occupy
foreign territory.37
Americans greeted the outbreak of European peace in 1802 with mixed feelings. Many
were thankful that the end of war would allow the free flow of American goods to their favored
trading partners. Some idealistically welcomed the end of bloodshed and anarchy. Others were
more wary. In a widely reprinted series of articles titled, “Reflections on the Peace,” the author
attempted to explain how peace would affect the nation. He concluded with what he saw as the
most dangerous part of the peace, the European acceptance of the retrocession of Louisiana to
France. “If this key to our western country should be placed in the keeping of so powerful, so
enterprising, so adroit a nation” the author warned, Americans should “anticipate evils of
enormous magnitude, and of the most mischievous tendency.” This article shows a gradual shift
toward the rhetorical use of Bonaparte in discussions of American expansion. Though the article
uses the word “nation,” the words used to describe the French nation were ones generally
associated with Bonaparte by the end of 1802. One newspaper described Napoleon as “powerful
as any sovereign in Europe.” Another claimed that he was “active, enterprising, [and] able.” 38
As the First Consul consolidated his power, Americans increasingly associated his
personal character with the character of France. The American Minister to France, Robert
Livingston, for example, complained that in France, “One man is everything.” It is worth noting
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that in the political cartoons of the day, the United States is usually represented as the female
figure, Columbia, Great Britain the rotund character, John Bull, while France is Bonaparte
himself. Thus, when the author of “Reflections on the Peace” worried about a “powerful,”
“enterprising” and “adroit” nation on the western border of the United States, he was really
casting American expansion in terms of Napoleon. This trend accelerated and become more
explicit as Americans grappled with difficult questions raised by the Peace of Amiens. 39
Peace in Europe began a new chapter in American discussion over territorial expansion.
In a second article, the author of “Reflections on the Peace” commented on the extension of the
French state. If Bonaparte were to establish a legitimate constitution, “adapted to the character
and circumstances of the nation…[his] acquisitions would form the basis of substantial and
durable greatness.” Otherwise, the author concluded, the new territories would “flit away like
the painted forms on a magic lantern.” A permanent and stable form of national expansion was
only possible as long as a just government prevailed. The author failed to comment on whether
this would also be true in the case of a French Louisiana—perhaps he was even hoping that
Louisiana would “flit” away from the clutches of an unjust Bonaparte. 40
The Treaty of Lunéville and Peace of Amiens also brought the idea of “natural
boundaries” to the front of American discourse about expansion. The enlightenment concept of
national borders being defined by reason and nature (mountain ranges, oceans, and rivers for
example) became part of the French discourse during the halcyon days of Louis XIV, though
French military reverses during the eighteenth century called the idea into question. As early as
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1793, the French revolutionary leader Danton revived the idea. It was Napoleon Bonaparte,
however, who finally made these limits a reality through his dramatic victories over the
Austrians in the Wars of the First and Second Coalitions (1792-98 and 1799-1802). The Treaty
of Lunéville extended the borders of France to the Rhine, and created French client states in
Northern Italy, Holland, and Switzerland. 41
These were not new concepts to Americans. They lived in a world system governed by
the system of international law envisioned by Emmerich Vattel—a Swiss political philosopher
who published his immensely influential diplomatic treatise, The Law of Nations in 1758. Vattel
argued that peaceful relations between nations relied on maintaining a balance of relative power
between theoretically equal independent states as a response to the threat of a naturally despotic
“universal monarchy.” Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, when Vattel wrote of a “Universal
Monarchy,” he was thinking of the Charles V or the Louis XIV. After 1800, Americans
increasingly associated the threat of “universal monarchy” with Napoleon. Daniel Lang and
Peter and Nicholas Onuf have demonstrated convincingly that the American political class took
Vattel’s balance of power theories to heart. Indeed, they contend that virtually all of their major
political and diplomatic decisions between at least 1776 and 1815 reflected the Vattelian
worldview.42
Yet, the popular expansionist rhetoric that developed during the Mississippi Crisis
demonstrates that the while the middling classes of American society might not have understood
the intricacies of Vattel, they understood his basic premises. One problem with Vattel’s
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worldview, however, was that he never explained how to measure state power. This led to
Americans of all classes and political stripes disagreeing on exactly what constituted a natural
boundary. The Peace of Amiens and the rise of Napoleon showed a new threat to the European
balance of power and provided Americans with a new development that fleshing out the limits of
legitimate expansion.
Americans took note of the new, extended, French borders, but reactions were mixed. An
editorial from South Carolina happily commented that Bonaparte had no further cause for war as
France had reached her “natural limits.” The author (and the French government) defined these
limits as that territory bounded by “the Rhine, the Pyrannese [Pyrenees], the Alps, the
Mediterranean and the Atlantic.” For this author, peace was contingent on a nation extending to
its natural boundaries—a clear nod to the Vattelian worldview. It was good and natural for an
empire to extend to the boundaries defined by nature because once accomplished, this would
prevent the need for further conflict by preserving the appropriate balance of power. 43
Other Americans were not so sure. One wrote a satirical commentary on the peace
negotiations. The author likened the carving up of Europe to a family dinner and painted a vivid
word picture of the scene that ensued. Bonaparte, as the most successful power broker, sat at the
head of the table and ate first. The whole European family knew him as a “monstrous pie eater.”
After all, at the “banquet of Campo Formio, whole Italian fricassees and all the Flanders’ bacon
liked not to have satisfied him.” 44 His enormous appetite was compounded by his apparent
fasting of late in Egypt. The author warned the Russian emperor, who sat across from the First
Consul, to keep a wary eye, lest Bonaparte “claim a little more than his share.” This observer
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raised the issue of “appetites,” something that might not be contained by natural boundaries.
Nations might be greedy, driven by other impulses, beyond the enlightened principle of balance
of power. In this way, Bonaparte (as a symbol) seemed to giving the logic behind expansion a
more human psychology. 45
As early as 1802, pro-expansionists were invoking the name of Napoleon and the idea of
natural boundaries within the context of Louisiana. One of the first and most eloquent arguments
was made by David Humphreys (1752-1818).46 In many ways it should come as no surprise that
Humphreys introduced these tropes to the American discourse on expansion. In 1802,
Humphreys was fifty-two and had amassed an impressive and long record of public service.
Born in Connecticut, he graduated from Yale with distinguished honors at the age of nineteen.
During the War for Independence he proved an able soldier, rose to the rank of colonel, and
became one of George Washington’s most trusted aides. After the war, the Confederation
Congress appointed Humphries to serve on a delegation sent to broker commercial treaties in
Europe in France and Great Britain. Intent on shaping public opinion, he attempted to write a
biography of George Washington. This project was cut short by his appointment as the
American minister to Portugal in 1791 and then Spain in 1796. Humphreys was on hand in
Europe to witness the dramatic expansion of France and the crumbling of Spanish power at the
hands of Napoleon. His military and diplomatic experiences made him sensitive to the emerging
geopolitical developments on the continent. Thinking about the role of Washington in the
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American Revolution probably led Humphries to measure major historical developments through
the lens of “great men” and their opposite, dangerous dictators.47
After witnessing the opening of the Napoleonic Wars, Humphreys returned to New
England to raise merino sheep. Yet, the old soldier still found time to write. In January 1802, he
penned an incredibly popular article which ran in several widely-read New York and New
England papers under the pseudonym Coriolanus. Coriolanus warned his readers that with the
accession of Bonaparte the geopolitical situation had dramatically changed. All of the First
Consul’s military and diplomatic maneuvering demonstrated a policy of expanding France to its
“ancient limits.” In other words, said Coriolanus, Napoleon intended to repossess all of the
territories lost by the French monarchy in previous wars. As evidence, Coriolanus pointed to the
French repossession of Guiana with “expanded and almost limitless boundaries.” He also noted
French occupation of the Rhine valley and the transalpine regions of Italy. Humphries
demonstrates a subtle shift in American thought on expansion with this essay. Instead of leading
France to her divinely appointed and thus legitimate “natural” boundaries, Napoleon was
ambitiously expanding beyond this sphere to France’s “ancient” boundaries. With this
established, he then turned his attention to Louisiana. 48
“In the possession of Spain,” he observed, “Louisiana was a clearly defined territory.”
Under the “all grasping hand” of the First Consul, however, “its limits are undefined.” A survey
of history, he argued, showed that if Napoleon continued his policy of extending France to its
“ancient limits” then he would apply the same principle to North America. Humphries predicted
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that with control of these areas, Napoleon would soon detach the trans-Appalachian region from
the union by promising the western settlers free passage along the Mississippi. After painting
this dire picture, Humphries provided the remedy. He recommended that a force of western
militia move down the Mississippi to preemptively seize a Spanish territory along the river
before Napoleon could officially take control of it. This, would demonstrate to Napoleon and the
world that if the “conqueror of Europe” sought to interfere with “just career of a free and
enlightened people,” Americans would assert their rights. Exactly what “rights” Napoleon was
infringing upon Humphries hinted at in the last part of the article. 49
Coriolanus ended his bellicose essay with a strident defense of American-led
imperialism. “All empire,” he noted, “is traveling from east to west.” Thus, he postulated,
empire would achieve its greatest height in the United States. There would soon come a time, he
continued, when America would include vast peoples and lands west of the Mississippi. That
river, he contended, was “never designed as the western boundary of the union.” God had never
intended the “best part of his earth” to be populated by subjects of a French “usurper.” America,
in other words, had no natural boundaries such as those of France. God himself had designed the
American nation to be different than Napoleon’s France. In time, Coriolanus predicted, all
European held dominions in the Americas would become part of an immense, “free and
sovereign empire.” An American empire, he imagined, that would “unfold the doors of liberty”
to millions yet unborn. His decidedly pro-expansionist position defied natural and ancient
boundaries, instead relying on divine Providence to justify the United States imperial
ambitions.50
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The classical name, Coriolanus, also invoked Bonapartian overtones that the nineteenth
century audience would have recognized immediately. In both Plutarch’s biography and the
Shakespearean play, the tragic character of Coriolanus is a brave and successful republican
general who becomes embroiled in Roman politics. When he opposes democratic reforms in the
Roman Senate, he is tried by the plebeian rabble and exiled from Rome. Angered and
overwhelmed by pride he joins forces with the barbarian enemies of the republic and leads them
in a successful military campaign to the gates of Rome. He is dissuaded from sacking the city by
tearful entreaties from his wife and his mother. In some versions of the story, he is eventually
assassinated.51
Two things about this story would have stood out to an American reader in 1802. First,
they would have recognized the story of Coriolanus as a cautionary tale against the excesses of
democracy. This was a powerful message to broadcast at a time when Federalists felt that they
had been thrown out of power by Jefferson’s democratic mob of Jacobins. Second, they would
have seen the story as a warning against the dangers of ambitious pride. Certainly they would
have noticed the similarities between Coriolanus and Bonaparte. Both men proved successful
republican generals and were extraordinarily ambitious politicians. On the surface, both men
appeared principled, but not far beneath the surface lurked bloodthirsty ambition. In essence,
simply by choosing the pseudonym, Coriolanus, the author was asking his audience to consider
the dangerous consequences of Bonaparte’s overreaching ambition in Louisiana.
On the surface, Coriolanus’s essay clearly supports the arguments of those historians like
Frank Owsley and Gene Smith who suggest that that an aggressive Manifest Destiny ideology
guided American expansion from the very beginning. The essay has obvious overtones of an
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irresistible, divinely sanctioned, westward movement of Americans across the continent at the
expense of those too weak to resist. The Coriolanus essay still must be read in the context of the
other arguments circulating in 1802 and 1803. Popular though it may have been, the Coriolanus
argument was an easy target for anti-expansionists, and those in favor of boundless expansion
found that they had to refine their arguments to make them more palatable to the American
public.52
Concerns about Louisiana increased during 1802. What had changed was a new French
military presence in the Caribbean. In January, the army that left Europe in the wake of the
Peace of Amiens suddenly landed in the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue,
considered the jewel of the old French colonial system in North America. It produced that most
valuable commodity of sugar and the price of this luxury was an oppressive slave system. A
bloody slave uprising began in 1791, which toppled the white regime; after several chaotic years
of civil war, the rebels established a new power structure under the charismatic leadership of
Toussaint L’Ouverture.
At first, the Federalist Adams administration continued to trade with island as a way to
economically punish France during the Quasi-War. This included shipments of firearms and
ammunition—a fact not lost on the French government or Napoleon. But, fearful that the
revolutionary ideology of the slave rebellion might travel to the United States, the Jefferson
administration refused to recognize the Haitian government. At first, Jefferson and his secretary
of state James Madison wanted England, France, and the United State to work together to
overturn the new Haitian state. They were even willing to tolerate France’s efforts to use
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military force to bring Saint-Domingue back into the French orbit. Such cooperation quickly
evaporated as Americans worried that Napoleon would move next into Louisiana. Bringing
Saint-Domingue back into the French orbit was the key to the reestablishment of Bonaparte’s
empire. In fact, Napoleon largely saw Louisiana simply as a granary for his far more precious
Caribbean colony. At first, things seemed to go quite well. Taking advantage of internal
divisions amongst the black leadership, the French commander (and Napoleon’s brother in law)
Charles Leclerc made steady progress in the reconquest of the island. By the end of May 1802,
he had crushed what resistance did develop and arrested L’Ouverture. With Saint-Domingue
seemingly back under French control, most Americans anticipated that French expeditionary
force’s next move would be north to New Orleans.53
Also troubling to pro-expansionists was the publication and wide circulation of an article
from Bonaparte mouthpiece, Gazette de France in June. According to the article, “the idea of reattaching Louisiana to the domain of France is perhaps, of all political conceptions, the wisest
and most important.” Noting the rapid population and economic growth of the American
republic the Gazette asserted that a European barrier was needed to prevent the expansion of a
people “whom nature has promised the empire of half the world.” If unchecked, the author
opined, Americans would soon spread from “the North to the South, cover Mexico, the WestIndies [and] Canada.” Spain was too weak to prevent Americans from spilling over of their
“present limits.” Here, the article stated unequivocally that a French colony that could provide an
effective barrier to American expansion. 54
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Read within the context of American assumptions about natural borders, the torrent of
bellicose editorials that followed the publication of this article should come as no surprise. Most
Americans would have agreed with the Gazette’s dim assessment about the ability of Spain to
hem in American expansion. That was the point, of course. Under Spain, the colony was
sparsely populated and weakly held—James Madison likened Spanish rule to that of an old
woman. Under the Jeffersonian theory of natural expansion, private American citizens would
simply move in to fill the vacuum left by the decrepit and effeminate Spain and come to
dominate the area through natural increase. For those Americans of a Jeffersonian persuasion,
this had the twin attraction of being “peaceful” expansion—as opposed to conquest, and not
expanding the power of the national government. To many Americans, the Gazette (presumably
with the nod of Napoleon) was suggesting that France impede the legitimate, peaceful process of
American expansion to its natural boundaries. This threat of a barrier was also interpreted as a
challenge, raising the possibility of a war with France.55
The words in the Gazette article combined with the presence of a French army only a few
hundred miles from New Orleans in Saint-Domingue made Bonaparte’s threat to American
expansion very real. Then in October 1802, the headstrong Spanish Intendant of New Orleans
exacerbated an already tense situation when he revoked the American right of deposit promised
by the Pinckney Treaty of 1795. 56 With western commerce chocked off, easterners began to
wonder how long residents of Kentucky and Tennessee would remain in a union if their
navigational and economic rights were endangered. Suspicious Americans immediately (but
incorrectly) saw the nefarious hand of Bonaparte behind the port closure and a plot to detach the
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frontier states from the eastern seaboard. Though Bonaparte had nothing to do with the port
closure, the fears of these Americans were not entirely without merit. In early 1803, for
example, Francis Flournoy, a Kentucky farmer writing under the penname “A Western
American,” suggested ominously that “the interests of France, Spain and Western America
would go hand in hand.” When Americans looked west, they increasingly saw Bonaparte and
his legions not only preventing the expansion of their empire, but dismembering it. 57
The furiousness of the debate over American expansion that occurred in the wake of the
publication of the Gazette de France article and the closure of New Orleans was astonishing. In
December, the original Coriolanus letter was reprinted in various newspapers across New
England. It was soon followed by two others that were so popular the editor of New York’s
Morning Chronicle had to make excuses when he could not publish them fast enough to keep up
with demand. By mid-January 1803, eager readers were buying a pamphlet of the collected
letters of Coriolanus for 50 cents at their local bookstore. 58
At this point, the anti-expansionists finally entered the public debate. Taking aim directly
at Coriolanus, one anti-expansionist fired back in explicitly Bonapartian terms in the January 13
edition of The American Citizen. The author began by commending Coriolanus for his “fine
painting of the universal domination at which the first Consul aspires.” He applauded
Coriolanus’s harsh rebuke of Napoleon’s “aggrandizement” at the expense of “independent
empires.” Coriolanus was no doubt correct, the author continued, when he claimed that the
peace and prosperity of nations depended on their ability to “remain satisfied within their limits.”
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However, the author continued, it was just as important for the United States to constrain its
expansion to the natural boundary provided by the Mississippi as it was for France to remain on
the south of the Rhine. 59
Coriolanus had “marked out a path for the United States,” wrote the American Citizen,
“which he censures when trodden by the First Consul.” After all, when Coriolanus described the
American empire as containing “millions of souls west of the Mississippi,” asked the author,
what was he contemplating other than a war of conquest in the manner of the Bonaparte? The
author was particularly disturbed by Coriolanus’s justification for such a war. First was
Coriolanus vague notion that since all empire traveled from East to West, the seat of the greatest
empire would undoubtedly be in the United States. What was this, asked the author, other than a
Bonapartian ploy to justify American seizure of New Orleans and the Floridas? More
concerning, to the American Citizen, however, was Coriolanus’s suggestion that the God of
nature had never intended the Mississippi to be the western boundary of the United States. How
was this different, he asked, than the French insistence that the Rhine, and then the Netherlands
was their own divinely appointed boundary? The author then turned his gaze back to the
Americas. Where exactly, he wondered, did Coriolanus see the boundaries of the United States?
The mines of Mexico? The Isthmus of Panama? Cape Horn? The author finished his essay with
a final biting comparison. The Coriolanus essay had envisioned the empire of the United States
throwing open the “doors of liberty” to those whom it conquered. The American Citizen
concluded sarcastically, “Just so, Bonaparte went to Egypt to unfold the doors of liberty and
happiness to the Turk; and, if we believe him, his benign incursion was perfectly in conformity
to the God of nature.” The American Citizen article demonstrated just how flexible Bonapartian
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language was in the hands of a skilled author and unsheathed a potent rhetorical weapon in the
arsenal of anti-expansionists.60
Despite the sentiments expressed in the American Citizen, many Americans were gravely
concerned about the prospect of French influence in Louisiana. To them, it appeared that
America would be subjected to the same ravages that Europe had endured during the Wars of the
French Revolution. Based on the Gazette de France article, many expected Napoleon to use his
soldiers in Saint-Domingue to eventually set up a military colony in Louisiana as a buffer to
American expansion. Few, however, believed that the restless veterans would remain content in
the “bogs and marshes of the seaboard.” One Massachusetts writer in The American Oracle used
history as a guide. French conduct over the past thirteen years, he suggested, indicated that it
would only be a matter of time before Bonaparte would find some excuse to encroach on
American territory. “What pretense,” asked the writer rhetorically, had Bonaparte to “destroy
several free republics” in Europe?61
Others worried less about open warfare and more about the economic and political
pressure that Napoleon could bring to bear when in possession of Louisiana. An article first
published in the ubiquitous American Citizen worried that by shutting down trade on the
Mississippi, Napoleon could pursue a “subtle policy” by which he could induce westerners to
“shake off their allegiance and become subjects of the ‘Great Nation.’” Like the Coriolanus
essay, this article was originally published in mid-1802, but was republished in heated rhetoric of
early 1803. This author did not fear open warfare with Bonaparte, but he did fear the proximity
of a nation so “dreaded for its subtle intrigues.” In some ways, this pro-expansionist rhetoric was
a subtle change from the writings of Coriolanus. For Coriolanus, the United States had been
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exceptional—a nation uniquely free from the boundaries that constrained the politics of Europe.
The expansionist rhetoric that developed over the spring of 1803, on the other hand, painted the
American republic as fragile and subject to the same dangers that Europe had endured at the
hands of Bonaparte.62
With this rhetoric of fear came new concerns about how the French interpreted their
“natural” boundaries in the Americas. Prior to the Louisiana retrocession, Americans had largely
assumed that it was beneficial for empires to spread to their limits. Coriolanus had expressed
concern about Bonaparte’s policy of expanding France to its “ancient” limits, but that, after all,
was a deviation from what was natural. In the winter and spring of 1803, newspapers began
running articles that highlighted this fear. For example, several widely circulated pieces
reprinted an old article from a 1797 edition of the New York Journal in which the author had
expressed the belief that it was “the right of Republics to correct the errors of their former
Kings.” The 1797 author had made this comment within the context of French expansion in
Europe. With the French poised to occupy Louisiana, however, the article was used as a cudgel.
“I have no French maps,” an author identifying himself as “Sidney” wrote sarcastically, “nor can
I, at this moment, precisely ascertain the limits of the former claims of the French Kings.”
However, Sidney continued, he was certain that those claims “included nearly one half the
present territory of the United States.” After reading the same 1797 article and noting that the
original author believed that France had been unjustly deprived of Canada, A.B.C. wondered
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“how far the United States would be affected, if the First Consul of the French Republic should
apply a prompt corrective of the procedure.”63
With undefined boundaries in the Americas, an article published in a London paper
attracted extensive comment from the editor of the Virginia Gazette. The London article
purported to quote from a French travel narrative in which the author maintained that, “the
natural limits of Louisiana extend to the sources of the Mississippi and Missouri.”
Understandably, this caused the editor a great deal of consternation since describing the natural
limits of Louisiana in this manner indicated that Kentucky and Tennessee were both part of
Bonaparte’s claim to Louisiana. According to the Gazette, the London article then suggested
that Bonaparte would undoubtedly interpret the Spanish retrocession as including the “utmost
extent of [Louisiana’s] natural limits.” These articles grew out the new concern that Bonaparte
was bringing the problems of Europe to the shores of North America and caused many
Americans to demand a forceful response. 64
The meeting of the seventh Congress in late 1802 brought vigorous debates about
expansion—American and French—to the American capitol. The American public followed
many of these debates through their newspapers. Federalist pro-expansionists demanded military
action to resolve the Mississippi crisis that echoed ideas already simmering in many parts of the
country. One of the first of the outspoken critics was forty-one-year-old Senator James Ross of
Pennsylvania. By February 1803, the former lawyer had served in congress for almost a decade,
and had served as President pro-tempore of the Senate during the fifth Congress. In what would
be one of his last acts as a public official, Ross introduced resolutions that authorized the
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President to call out as many as 50,000 militia from Mississippi and neighboring territories to
seize New Orleans from the Spanish; he also called for the appropriation of appropriation of five
million dollars to finance this military expedition. Ross defended his measures as a defensive
necessity brought about by Bonaparte. He warned that after negotiation with the First Consul
inevitably failed, westerners would never forget who allowed such a “powerful and ambitious”
despot to take control of the West and would likely strike the best deal they could with Napoleon
at the expense of their eastern brothers. Perhaps, he continued, they might even seize the
territory themselves and then establish a separate nation. 65
Ross was not only thinking about the present. He was also concerned about the future of
the United States. In his mind, nations had to have defensible frontiers and the Spanish had
provided the United States a golden opportunity to legitimately seize what had been denied her.
“The possession of the country on the east bank of the Mississippi,” he told his colleagues, “will
give a compactness, an irresistible strength to the United States.” Owning this real estate would
render the nation dreaded in “all future wars,” and force European governments to treat the
United States with more respect than ever before. It is interesting to note that the word “natural”
does not appear in Ross’s speech—or at least in the newspaper versions that remain today. For
Ross, expansion was a simply a matter of military expediency and pragmatism. 66
New York Senator Gouverneur Morris advocated adoption of the Ross resolutions in a
popular speech that made its way into numerous newspapers. Morris was no light-weight in
politics and when he spoke, his constituents listened. He had served in the New York provincial
congress, the Continental Congress, briefly as an officer in the New York militia and drafted the
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preamble to the Constitution. He had also served as minister to France during the initial chaos of
the French Revolution. Morris was less concerned with future wars and more with what he saw
as current political reality. Dealing with Bonaparte, he argued, required strong action. As a
usurper, Bonaparte’s legitimacy was tied to military success. “Impelled by imperious
circumstances, he rules in Europe,” Morris explained, “and he will rule here also unless you set a
bound[ary] to his power.” Bonaparte’s France had to expand or wither, he argued. Bonaparte
had nowhere left to expand in Europe, therefore he had to expand in the Americas. French
control of strategic coastal locations like New Orleans and Florida was “dangerous to other
nations, but fatal to us.” Thus, for Morris, American expansion was a pragmatic response to the
future threats to national security. 67
Yet, like Coriolanus had before him, Morris conceived of Florida and New Orleans as a
“natural and necessary part of our Empire.” With this established, Morris turned back to the
means of obtaining them. Morris wondered at Jefferson’s attempt at diplomatically resolving the
crisis. “On what grounds do you mean to treat?” he asked his colleagues rhetorically. Napoleon,
he pointed out to the Congress, “wants power. You have no power. He wants dominion. You
have no dominion.” No, he argued, when dealing with such men as Napoleon, the only question
worth asking was, “how many battalions have they?” Despite the “pacific nature” of the United
States, expansion to Morris was a defensive necessity driven by the character of Napoleon. 68
Pro-expansionist Americans repeated the basic argument of pragmatic, militaristic
expansion throughout the spring and into the summer of 1803. One particularly popular piece
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purported to be an extract of a letter from a “gentleman at Natchez.” He bristled at what he saw
as the disrespect the “reptile Spaniards” showed toward Americans in New Orleans and
denounced the president’s insistence on going through all the “ceremonies and etiquette of the
courts of…Bonaparte.” He, like Morris, saw expansion in pragmatic means justified by the very
real military danger of Napoleon. “I say start and [drive] them with the spring flood, and then
negotiate” he wrote. “We can now get the whole province without the loss of one drop of
blood.” “Let the French get here,” he warned, “’twill be otherwise.” Not only did this
“gentlemen” took a pragmatic view of expansion, but he also provided a pragmatic view military
of the relative military balance between the French, the Spanish, and the Americans. 69
In another article, and author writing as “Pericles” warned that because Bonaparte sought
to expand France to its “ancient limits,” his policy demonstrated a “manifest and great danger” to
the union. “Pericles” was almost certainly the head of the Federalist party, Alexander Hamilton.
The Pericles article is particularly instructive. Hamilton, unlike most Federalists, had once been
sympathetic to Napoleon. As late as April 1801 he gave a widely reprinted speech in which he
eloquently defended Bonaparte’s coup by arguing that the radical excesses of the Jacobins could
only be held in check by the strong arm of the First Consul. But that was 1801, and by 1803 the
times and the geopolitical landscape had changed. He, like Morris and the “gentleman” from
Natchez counseled seizing Florida and New Orleans in order to negotiate with Bonaparte from a
position of strength. He warned that Bonaparte would never negotiate to sell New Orleans or
Florida, and therefore Americans would have to fight for it in any case. Taking New Orleans
from the Spanish before Bonaparte’s veterans arrived from Saint-Domingue and fortified the
place only made sense. In the end, according to many pro-expansionist Americans, a

69

“Extract of a Letter,” New York Gazette (New York, NY), March 4, 1803.

46

preemptive, defensive strike in the name of empire would cost less American blood, treasure and
honor in the long run. 70
There were differences between what these militant expansionists saw as the ultimate
goal of a military strike on Louisiana. Ross, for example—the ultimate pragmatist—only wanted
to fight for New Orleans and the east bank of the Mississippi. Pericles and Morris, on the other
hand, saw all of Florida as within the natural boundaries of the United States. Underlying all
their arguments was a fear that Bonaparte’s occupation of Louisiana would bring the intrigue and
warfare of Napoleonic Europe to the Americas. During the Wars of the French Revolution,
alliances shifted with dizzyingly regularity and secret deals (such as that which led to the
Louisiana retrocession) were frighteningly commonplace. In addition, 1802-3 saw Napoleon
completely redraw the map of Europe for the first of several times during his reign. Americans
watched nervously as the Piedmont was unceremoniously annexed to France so that Napoleon’s
Great Republic could control the vital passes through the Swiss Alps. Farther north, the ancient
Holy Roman Empire was broken up and reorganized in a manner that supported Bonaparte’s
national aims. With such breathtaking changes occurring to the borders of Europe, it seems little
wonder that Federalist expansionists tended to worry that having Bonaparte as a western
neighbor would break up the American union entirely. 71
Few Americans made this fear as explicitly plain as an author purporting to speak for
“Ten Thousand Freemen of Connecticut,” in March of 1803. 72 Let Bonaparte set up a military
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colony in Louisiana, he warned, “and one of two things must invariably take place.” In one case,
under economic and military pressure from Bonaparte, the western states would shift their
allegiance from the eastern United States and become mere colonies of France. Eventually an
economic rivalry would lead to an “interminable war with the eastern states.” If this first
scenario did not come to pass, then the author expected the west to seize New Orleans without
the sanction of the United States government and thus drag the United States into a war with
France that it was ill-prepared for. The threat from Bonaparte’s navy would compel the United
States into an alliance with Great Britain and thus trigger a Napoleonic war of cataclysmic
proportions on the North American continent. The reason the threat of Bonaparte held so much
power over so many Americans in 1803 was that they were familiar with the results of a decade
of revolutionary warfare and intrigue in Europe. 73
Such pragmatic concerns illustrate that anti-expansionists had forced pro-expansionists to
refine their arguments by 1803. Coriolanus had argued for aggressive military expansion backed
by a divine mandate to spread republicanism across the continent. Pericles and Ross took a
different approach, arguing that American expansion was a national security concern. This does
endorse one theme in the existing scholarship. James Lewis and Donald Heidenreich have
concluded that the Mississippi Crisis must be understood primarily as “a young republic’s quest
for national security.” Federalists, too, put aside party politics and reached a “consensus” on the
necessity of possessing Louisiana. 74
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The formulation of a bipartisan “consensus” in response to the crisis is too simple,
however. In general, Americans did agree on the necessity of obtaining New Orleans, though
not necessarily all of Louisiana. The public debate in the newspapers revealed that crucial issues
were not settled. Not only was the amount of territory in question, but many disagreed over what
the natural boundaries of the United States actually were.
Administration allies valiantly attempted to push back against these fears, but the rhetoric
of Bonaparte was a slippery and often unconvincing symbol in the hands of Jeffersonians. An
author writing under the name “De Witt” penned a piece that originally appeared in the
Kentucky Guardian of Freedom, but was picked up in several other eastern papers. The United
States had little to fear from Bonaparte’s control of Louisiana he argued. After all, the value of
Louisiana was in its commerce, and therefore “attempts then on the part of France to interrupt
the peace of this country would be attended with the destruction of that commerce to promote
which is the object of Louisiana.” In other words, out of self-interest Bonaparte could be
expected to maintain good relations with the United States. 75
In any case, continued De Witt, it was folly to look to the French Revolutionary Wars for
examples of what to expect from Bonaparte. Instead, Americans ought to look to their own
history. During the War for Independence, he explained, Americans had prevailed without a
head of state, a currency, or a central government that could establish either. Now that the
United States had these things, any attempt by Bonaparte to subjugate America would certainly
end in disaster De Witt concluded. A French army that chose to attack along the Mississippi
would have its supplies cut off. It would be subjected to attacks by small bands of Americans
who would cause havoc then quickly melt away into the wilds of the western forests. In
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describing this hypothetical conflict, De Witt was actually not far off from the wars that did
ultimately undo Napoleon in Spain and Russia, however, in 1802, few agreed that a conflict with
Napoleon could devolve into such a state.76
This was simply too easy of a target to pass up. The retired, but still feisty Federalist
Fisher Ames took De Witt to task for his complacent attitude. The former Massachusetts
representative sneered at the naïve suggestion that United States could expect any special
treatment from Bonaparte because we were a “sister republic.” Not long ago, Ames wrote,
“Europe had many free republics,” but “alas! they are no more.” War had turned them all into
slaves of Bonaparte. In fact, he suggested that since Bonaparte had come to power, it seemed
that France had been paying special attention to republics. “She has considered them, not as
associates, but as victims.” Ames went down the sad list, “Venice she has sold to the emperor.
Holland she taxed openly for her own wants…From Switzerland she drained her youth to be
food for gunpowder.” No, Ames said, the United States had to be ready to defend itself against
its “sister republic.” America’s French sister was more of an assassin than a loving relative.
Under Bonaparte rule, to “depress, plunder, and destroy republics, has been the sure and
experienced consequence of French domination.” 77
Perhaps no one put all these fears together as coherently and creatively as Charles
Brockden Brown. Later regarded as one of America’s first great novelists, in 1803, Brown was a
marginally successful author and editor of two literary magazines. At the height of the
Mississippi Crisis, he anonymously authored a pamphlet on the crisis that was successful enough
to be republished in several editions throughout the United States. This pamphlet, sporting the
wonderfully long title, An Address to the Government of the United States on the Cession of
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Louisiana to the French and on the Late Breach of Treaty by the Spanish explicitly used the
specter of Bonaparte to discuss the problem of American expansion. Brown ingeniously restated
most of the points that pro-expansionists had made before, but he also assigned value judgments
to a “Napoleonic” vision of expansion, which gave the essay greater significance in developing a
subtler understanding of the influence of international politics on the American continent. 78
Most of the lengthy pamphlet purported to be the translation of a confidential
communiqué from a minor French diplomat to Napoleon on the subject of Louisiana. Brown
gave this letter a fake pedigree and set it within a fictionalized story of a stolen letter smuggled
into the United States by concerned citizens in Paris. It began with the assumption that Europe
would soon be dominated by Bonaparte and that it was time to consider the enlargement of
Bonaparte’s power in other places around the globe. The diplomat professed to be an
enthusiastic supporter of the empire, yet he was concerned about the means of extending French
influence. He was particularly distressed at what he saw as the wasting of valuable French lives
and treasure on costly military incursions. The conquest of Saint-Domingue was a case in point.
Was it prudent, he asked, for a nation to continue wasting valuable lives and money on the
conquest of a “fortified rock” containing a well disciplined and numerous populace that had
sworn to defend it to the death, when it had the opportunity to secure a wealthy province
containing a compliant population virtually unopposed? By framing the debate like this, Brown
tapped into an already well established perception that Americans had of Bonaparte—that he
carelessly threw away lives in his battlefield victories. 79
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One of the most common American critiques of Bonaparte in his early career was the
number of casualties he incurred. In 1798, the Otsego Herald identified Napoleon as that
“infamous general, commonly called The Butcher.” In 1801, the Virginia Argus noted of
Bonaparte’s wars, “the quantity of property and blood which have been expended...would have
been sufficient for founding a colony more populous and powerful than the United States
collectively.” The editor of the Argus made it plain that colonial expansion was preferable to the
bloody warfare of conquest. Thus, even though Napoleon won victories, Americans like Brown
argued that cost in blood that Napoleon was willing to pay for the expansion of France was
unworthy of a republic. Monarchs and despots threw away the lives of their subjects in vain
wars of ambition, but the free men of a republic deserved better. 80
Brown’s diplomat spent a great deal of time on the cost of conquest. Indeed, he spent
several pages explaining to the First Consul that the reason France had lost the initial race for
colonization to the British was because Louis XIV had spent too much blood and treasure on
European continental wars instead of on colonizing North America. According to the diplomat,
France’s “stupid rage of ambition could see nothing desirable but what our neighbors already
possessed.” “Imagine, then,” he encouraged Bonaparte, “that the thousands sent to perish under
the walls of a German fortress, the arms, the amunition [sic], the tools, the various apparatus
provided for such an expedition, had been sent to America.” The diplomat went on in words
strikingly similar to those of the Virginia Argus: “Had the minister Richlieu 81 applied one year’s
subsidy of Gustavus, or the treasures expended in one siege or one campaign in Flanders, in
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founding a settlement on the Delaware or Chesapeake all that part world which is now English,
would have been French.”82
Ultimately, that was the rub. Not only had bloody, ambitious conquest frittered away
valuable lives, it had cost the French most of their empire to the hated English in the end.
Brown’s diplomat bravely suggested to Napoleon that the British mode of expansion was worth
considering. How had they built their empire? Put simply, they had done nothing. They sent
“poor fugitives” into the empty wilderness of North America and left them alone. Left to their
own devices, according to Brown’s diplomat, these original English settlers had multiplied of
necessity and become a “numerous, civilized and powerful people.” The lesson in all this was
clear enough, “These miracles were not wrought by the sword. It was not wars and victories that
have added five millions of civilized men to the human race and the English name.” Wars and
victories he continued, “may rob millions of their happiness and independence; millions they
may easily destroy; but they cannot call into existence; they cannot compel to change their
language, manners, or religion.” War—or at least foolish, arbitrary conquest—was not an
effective means of expansion according to Brown’s diplomat. 83
While Brown’s diplomat spent pages providing abstract arguments for legitimate
expansion, his main concern was providing practical solutions for the extension of the French
empire. His first piece of advice to the First Consul was to call off the conquest of SaintDomingue. Far better, he argued, to give up dreams of a military conquest of the “fortified rock”
and draw the island into a profitable economic relationship with France. The former slaves
would be happy to ally with the society which had provided for their freedom, and would be
drawn into the French economic orbit, thus allowing France to reap the benefits of conquest
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without the cost. “We shall gain their gratitude, their friendship, and every benefit which one
nation can confer upon another,” the diplomat wrote to Bonaparte. “The products of the island,
the fruits of commerce, the luxury of millions, and the industry and subsistence of thousands of
our countrymen, we shall gain.” Echoing the theories of Thomas Paine, Brown’s diplomat
argued that economic alliance with a lesser power was a legitimate form of national expansion. 84
The diplomat’s second piece of advice to Bonaparte was the one that Brown hoped would
do the most to arouse his American audience. The diplomat suggested that the resources saved
from the conquest of Saint-Domingue should be spent on obtaining and re-colonizing Louisiana.
Of course, as the diplomat pointed out. It would not even really be “re-colonizing.” Louisiana
was already established and doing reasonably well with a population that was only one
generation removed from being French. The Spanish could pose little resistance. The weak he
Spanish militia and compliant population would make for an easy and profitable conquest.
Indeed, the diplomat suggested coyly, Louisiana would likely be a jumping off point for further
expansion in North America. The road to California and the mines of Mexico was “easy and
direct,” he insisted. “They are wholly defenseless. The frontier has neither forts, nor loyal
subjects. A detachment of a few thousands would find faithful guides, practicable roads, and no
opposition between the banks of the Mississippi and the gates of Mexico.” For the diplomat, this
final argument was crucial: expansion through conquest was legitimate only if it was done in the
national interest and increased rather decreased the wealth and power of the empire. 85
At this point, Brown broke back into his story. Lest anyone think that the diplomat’s
musings on the legitimacy of expansion through conquest and coercion were simply “French”
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militarism, Brown noted that, “It is evident that the author is a military enthusiast, but a passion
for arms does not blind him to the peaceable means of distinction; and his schemes of enlarging
power, by the multiplication of people, and by territories won from the waste[land], are not
unworthy of praise.” In other words, Brown was saying that the diplomat was not entirely wrong
in his assessment of the legitimate means of national expansion. Actually, there was not much
difference between Brown himself and his invented diplomat. The last pages of the pamphlet
Brown’s rousing call to action in his own voice. 86
“We have a right to the possession,” Brown told his readers bluntly. “The interests of the
human race demand from us the exertion of this right.” Brown was convinced that the national
government had for too long “looked on in apathy while European powers toss[ed] about
amongst themselves the property which God and nature have made ours.” “America is
ours…therefore Louisiana is ours.” Natural right to possession and national security went handin-hand for Brown. The United States in control of the territory meant peace whereas French
control meant war and the evils that attended armed conflict. To introduce a violent neighbor
like the French—a people who “measured their success on the ruin of their neighbors”—onto the
continent would invariably lead to an “insuperable mound” to American progress as well as sow
the seeds of “faction and rebellion.” It was as simple as that for Brown. He felt this so obvious
that he did not see the need to elaborate greatly on it. 87
With the stakes so high, what should be the response of the United States? Brown
admitted that under normal circumstances the United States would expand gradually by “erecting
new communities as fast as the increase of the increase of those settlements requires it, and
sheltering them all under the pacific wing of a Federal government.” These were not normal
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times. “Far be it from me to sanctify the claim of conquest,” he wrote, but that was exactly what
he demanded. Yes, he admitted, to dislodge Bonaparte from Louisiana would cost Americans
“some anxiety, some treasure, some lives.” In fact, he admitted that Americans would probably
not even be welcomed as liberators. Peace and national security demanded a rapid military
occupation of Louisiana, even if that meant having to “treat its present inhabitants as vassals.”
He argued that eventually the population of Louisiana would see American interests aligned with
their own and then, presumably, they could be integrated fully into the United States. This was
perhaps the most explicit defense of a Bonaparte-like conquest, occupation, and colonization of a
neighboring territory that any American was willing to proffer in 1803. 88
Writing in the winter and spring of 1803, Brown and other militant pro-expansionists
could not have known how radically the geopolitical situation had changed by April. For
months, Livingston had no luck in achieving Jefferson’s goals of obtaining New Orleans and
Florida for the United States. As Senator Morris had correctly assessed, the American
government possessed very little that interested the First Consul and American military might
was no match when compared to the French. What no one had counted on, however, was the
stunning reversal of fortune that beset the French expeditionary force in Saint-Domingue during
the second half of 1802. When the black and mulatto population found that Napoleon had given
secret orders to reestablish the old power structures (including slavery) on the island, they rose
up against the French occupiers in the summer of 1802. In the guerrilla war that followed both
sides seemed eager to outdo each other in terms of ghastly cruelty. Even more deadly than the
insurgency was the yellow fever epidemic that decimated the French army during the fall and
winter months. Despite the belated arrival of reinforcements in early 1803, it became
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increasingly clear that the survivors would not be able to bring the island back under French
control.89
As Bonaparte received the disastrous reports out of Saint-Domingue, he is supposed to
have growled, “Damn sugar, damn coffee, damn colonies.” Even if the quote is apocryphal, the
attitude it conveyed was not. Saint-Domingue was a lost cause and with it died Bonaparte’s
American dream. Though he was clearly disappointed, he quickly sought to turn the situation to
his favor. After all, Napoleon was nothing if not a pragmatist. Bonaparte knew that Americans
were already dominating the economic life in New Orleans and violently hostile to the idea of a
French neighbor.90 Bonaparte also had European concerns on his mind. He knew that another
war was imminent in Europe and that he needed quick cash more than he needed sugar.
Furthermore, Bonaparte reasoned that when war erupted in Europe the British navy would make
French control of North American colonies impossible, and that neutral American control of
Louisiana would be far better than surrendering the province to his British enemies. Offering
Louisiana to the United States had the benefit of drawing the Americans into the French orbit—
or at least away from Great Britain in the coming war. In early April, Bonaparte notified his
foreign minister and his closest advisors that he planned to sell the entire territory of Louisiana to
the United States.91
Between 1801 and 1803, the Mississippi Crisis introduced Napoleon into the American
debate over the legitimate means and limits of national expansion. His reshaping the borders of
Europe through the Treaty of Lunéville encouraged a discussion of natural boundaries in the
United States. His threatened occupation of Louisiana drove these debates into high gear.
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Jeffersonian expansionists worried that a powerful French presence would prevent the peaceful
expansion through natural increase. Federalist expansionists, on the other hand, were most
concerned that introducing the diplomatic intrigues of Europe into North America would cause
the breakdown of the union. Some expansionists sought a military solution to the crisis, but
others warned that a preemptive strike on New Orleans made the United States no better than the
increasingly despotic Bonaparte. The debates also demonstrated a reluctance on the part of
Americans to accept an unquestioned “Manifest Destiny” approach to expansion. Early calls for
a military response to the crisis were easily and effectively answered by anti-expansionists,
forcing pro-expansionists to make the crisis into a national security issue. Napoleon’s decision
to sell Louisiana in the spring of 1803 did not bring an end to the debate. It only made Bonaparte
a more entrenched symbol in American public discourse on continental expansion.
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CHAPTER 3 THE COSTS OF PEACEFUL EXPANSION: THE LOUISIANA
PURCHASE
On June 30, 1803, the Boston Independent Chronicle broke the news. Within a week,
reports had reached Charleston and by the end of July even those in the far reaches of Kentucky
knew. The First Consul of France had agreed to cede not only New Orleans, but the entire
territory of Louisiana to the United States. “This is a proud day for our nation,” gushed the
editor of one Federalist-leaning newspaper, “Louisiana is ours!” Yet, the treaty still had to be
ratified by the Senate and money for the purchase allocated by the House of Representatives.
Changing his tone dramatically, the editor urged caution on the part of the policy makers in
Washington. “Let them not be too hasty,” he warned. “Let us see with what stipulations the
cession of that country is clogged.” In particular, the editor wanted to know exactly what price
Bonaparte had extracted for his North American empire, and, just as important, how the cession
agreement would affect American foreign policy with regards to Europe. Certainly this was a
fair question in mid-1803. Printed next to this column was another that proclaimed the renewal
of war between Great Britain and Napoleon’s France.92
The occupation of Louisiana was neither easy nor uncontroversial. It raised a host of
basic questions about American expansion and administration of empire that the fledging
government of the United States was not immediately prepared to answer. In attempting to find
solutions to these problems, Americans continued to turn to the most ambitious imperialist they
knew: Napoleon Bonaparte. After Napoleon crowned himself emperor in December 1804, few
Americans were willing to openly express support for him (though there were still a few). Yet
they could not escape how successful he appeared to be at empire building. Between 1803 and
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1806, Napoleon steadily strengthened his imperial grip on Europe through a complex system of
direct rule, alliances and friendly proxy states. 93
Americans of all political stripes castigated Napoleon for his immoral imperial
aggrandizement while simultaneously trying to replicate his successes and learn from his
failures. By the end of 1806, Americans had largely accepted Napoleonic aggrandizement as the
moral and ideological stick by which to measure their own decisions about expansion. Based on
the example provided by Bonaparte, they agreed that military governments were unsavory and
that military occupation was undesirable. Even so, an increasing number of pro-expansion
Americans were willing to accept such aggressive imperial measures by their own government
despite the opposition characterizing such actions as Bonapartism. At first, the pro-treaty faction
responded to these attacks, but once the treaty passed, instead of continuing to counter attacks
point by point, pro-expansionists appropriated the language of Bonaparte and pointed to the
Louisiana Purchase as an example of how the allegedly peaceful, diplomatic expansion of the
United States into Louisiana was unlike the military expansion of Napoleon. In essence,
Americans became increasingly comfortable with their own ideology of military expansion and
administration when it was contrasted with that of Bonaparte.
The historiography of the Louisiana Purchase can perhaps best be seen as a tug-of-war
between eastward and westward looking historians. One side argues that it ought to be seen
from the perspective of the East—meaning a diplomatic and political struggle between the
United States and Europe. Those on the other side argue that it should be seen primarily from a
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Western viewpoint—in other words a process by which the United States either altered or was
altered by conditions in Louisiana. Like most other events of the early republic, the first
histories of the Louisiana Purchase were exclusively diplomatic and nationalistic in nature.
Henry Adams, great grandson of one president and grandson of another, penned the first
narrative history of the Purchase in his mammoth History of the United States during the
Administrations of Jefferson and Madison. In so doing, he set a standard that stood until the late
twentieth century. His analysis generated a basic political and diplomatic narrative that has yet
to be significantly revised. He also used the event as a measure of the Jefferson administration’s
diplomatic acumen—a technique that many historians of Jefferson have used since. Finally, he
argued that the political debate over the Purchase treaty fundamentally altered the American
understanding of the Constitution, by allowing for the creation of a much stronger central
government. This basic assertion has also been echoed by many scholars in various forms down
to the present.94
While Adams wrote of the Purchase from the perspective of the East, two of the early
twentieth century’s great historians, Frederick Jackson Turner and Eugene Bolton, saw the
Purchase as a phenomenon of the West. Turner saw American expansion in terms of settlers
filling an “empty” western frontier and touted this as the defining characteristic of American
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democracy. While Turner did not make the connection between Louisiana and the frontier
explicit, his disciples did. As late as the mid-1970s, John Keat and Marshall Sprague placed the
Purchase into a blatantly Turnerian teleological model that heralded the opening of the west as
the catalyst of American democracy. Turner had his critics, though. Most important of which
was Eugene Bolton. Bolton argued that American engagement with the Spanish borderlands was
a more accurate description of western expansion rather than Turner’s empty frontier thesis.
Historians at least partially influenced by Bolton have gained the upper hand in more recent
years. Diplomatic historians James Lewis and J.C.A Stagg, for example, both placed the
Louisiana Purchase within the troublesome context of Spanish American relations between 1780
and 1830. Their work, as does mine, sees the purchase as part of a larger diplomatic narrative
that included East and West Florida as well as Texas. It is important to note, however, that while
they disagreed on fundamental points, both the Turnerians and Boltonians saw Louisiana as an
event best described in terms of the West. 95
While the diplomatic and high-political stories of the Purchase continue to attract their
share of historians, the most innovative recent work has been done by historians like Peter Kastor
and Julien Vernet and tends to focus on how the incorporation of Louisiana into the union altered
the American nation. These historians also argue for a more western approach to Louisiana.
They suggest that our understanding of the Purchase cannot be limited to diplomatic negotiations
between Madrid, Paris and Washington. Louisiana was not simply an imperial football, they
suggest, but an amorphous geographic and demographic zone of contact and conflict between
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indigenous peoples, Anglo-Americans, French, Spanish, Africans and mulattos. All of these
groups struggled to take advantage of the new social and political reality as the American
government attempted to establish their claim on the territory. Thus, the peoples of Louisiana
were far from passive receptors of imperial edicts coming out of national capitals. They did
what they could to exert control over their own affairs and in some ways changed their imperial
rulers as much as those rulers attempted to change them. In The Nation’s Crucible, for example,
Peter Kastor argues that incorporating the diverse peoples of Louisiana into the United States
transformed and redefined what it meant to be an American citizen. 96
This chapter builds on the ideas that Kastor developed in The Nation’s Crucible. Where
he focused on the idea of citizenship and nationhood in the republic, I focus on how the purchase
and occupation of Louisiana changed the American ideology of military expansion. Ironically,
for someone claiming intellectual decent from Kastor, I do this by refocusing the lens of the
Louisiana Purchase back eastward rather than westward. Not because the stories of the
American and French political elite need another retelling, but because the overwhelming
majority of Americans of all political persuasions and socio-economic groups were absorbed by
the cataclysmic duel of European empires across the Atlantic Ocean. They worked what they
saw (or rather read) into their ideology of expansion and empire. Thus, I contend that to fully
understand what the Louisiana Purchase, and ultimately expansion itself, meant to Americans—
especially those not directly on the Louisiana frontier, we have to understand the ideological
framework they developed by looking east to Napoleon’s empire.
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It is critical to remember that the American military occupation of Louisiana took place
within the context of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. As the article quoted in the first paragraph
showed, Americans followed both events with equally great interest. Following the Peace of
Amiens in 1802, the French position in Europe was formidable. The extended French republic
stretched from the Rhine River in the north, through the annexed territories of Luxemburg,
Belgium and the Rhineland and across the Alps into Nice, Savoy and Piedmont. Beyond this,
Bonaparte dominated the foreign and domestic policies of a chain of “sister republics,” which
included the Netherlands and Switzerland, as well as the Italian, Ligurian (Genoese), and
Cisapline Republics. Bonaparte could also count on Spain as an ally (if a somewhat unwilling
one) as well as friendly relations with some of the powerful states in the eastern Holy Roman
Empire, most notably Bavaria. 97
While Napoleon strengthened his hand in Europe, his arch-rival Great Britain worked to
rally the anti-Bonapartist empires on the continent. The War of the Third Coalition (1803-1806)
broke out in May 1803 when Bonaparte aggressively backed Britain into an impossible
diplomatic position. Yet, while the Royal Navy ruled the seas, the British needed continental
alliances to be successful against the French Grande Armée. To paraphrase the memorable
words of Charles Esdaile: the British whale had gone to war with the French elephant. For most
of first the two years of the war, the two powers glowered at each other from opposite sides of
the English Channel. However, by mid-1805 the British—thanks largely to heavy-handed
foreign policy of Bonaparte—had cobbled together an anti-French alliance that included Austria,
Naples, Sweden, and, most surprisingly, Russia. The international stage was thus set for the
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opening round of a titanic clash of empires that would last with only short interruptions until
1815.98
While the great powers dueled for supremacy in Europe, the United States witnessed the
climax of their own bitter ideological struggle that had begun with the French Revolution in
1793. While Americans overwhelmingly shared an assumption that society should be based on a
basic Lockean liberal view of individual natural rights, they disagreed vehemently on exactly
what this meant and how society ought to implement this vision. Federalists generally looked
east toward Europe and sought to fashion the United States into a great commercial and
economic empire that would be respected by the world. They saw Great Britain as the best
example of a liberal imperial system that the world had yet seen—one that championed the
economic freedom of its citizens but had enough checks in the system to prevent it from
becoming a tyrannical despotism. When it came to expansion, Federalists envisioned a stable
central government that could efficiently administer its imperial holdings. For most Federalists,
physical expansion was part of an ideology of economic expansion—land simply for the sake of
it was useless, and could even be dangerous to the political unity of a republic. There had to be a
commercial purpose for the expansion. This explains why many were adamantly in favor of
possessing New Orleans, but either apathetic or hostile about possessing the entire Louisiana
territory.99
The violent social disorder occasioned by the revolution in France was anathema to the
Federalists. A popularly elected government that executed its citizens on a whim and deprived
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them of their property at will was merely despotism of the democratic mob—just as bad, if not
worse than the despotism of a monarch. Federalists were particularly troubled when the French
Revolutionary government made it explicit policy to spread the revolution—a policy never
disavowed by Napoleon. They looked askance at Americans congregating in Jacobin clubs all
over the new nation cheering every bloody success of Bonaparte. In every boatload of
immigrants that arrived in Philadelphia they imagined subversive French agents disembarking to
infect the American people with plots overthrow the central government that could only end in
disunion and the establishment of a revolutionary despotism. In response to these fears, a
Federalist controlled Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 which made it illegal
to print items judged to be of a seditious nature against the Federal government and gave the
President broad discretionary power to deport suspicious foreigners. This proved a gross
overreach of Federal authority, however, and cost the Federalists enough popular support to lose
the presidential election of 1800. 100
At the other end of the American political spectrum were the Jeffersonians. Just as the
Federalists, the Jeffersonians had no “party platform” as we would recognize it today. They did
have a set of ideological principles on expansion that set them in clear opposition to their
political rivals. They envisioned a sprawling agricultural empire of large and small commercial
farmers who tilled the fertile American soil far from the money and corruption of large cities.
The availability of cheap land and cheap labor in the form of slavery was absolutely critical to
this vision for the American future. Control of the Mississippi River was also vital to export
valuable agricultural products like tobacco and cotton to Europe. The preferred method of
expansion would be through peaceful conquest. In their imagination, American settlers simply
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would move into the vacuum left by a decaying empire—Spain usually—and through
demographic increase eventually come to dominate the region. Many Jeffersonians were not
even terribly concerned about the possibility of acquiring territory so quickly that it outpaced the
ability of the Federal government to effectively administer it. If the Trans-Appalachian region
eventually found that its interests were not being represented by the federal government, they
argued, let the population there form their own nation. After all, the new country would share
economic and kinship ties, an American form of government and a common language with the
United States. It seemed inconceivable that republics with so much in common could ever
become enemies. 101
The other governing principle of the Jeffersonians was the fear of centralized economic
and political power—which they associated with the corrupting influence of cities. In Great
Britain, they saw everything they hated: large metropolises containing a corrupt, moneyed elite
and a strong centralized bureaucracy. Better by far, they argued, was the popular—if chronically
unstable—French revolutionary government. Where Federalists mourned the loss of social
stabilizers such as the Catholic Church and the Bourbon Monarchy, Jeffersonians cheered the
abolition of what they saw as corrupt institutions that facilitated the concentration of wealth and
political power. Most tempered their enthusiasm somewhat when the revolution devolved into
the Terror; even so, many Jeffersonians saw France as less of an ideological threat than Britain.
After all, they argued, it seemed far more likely that the corruptions of the British system would
infect the United States through pro-British trade policies made by the Federalists such as the Jay
Treaty (1794) than through France—especially once she was removed from Louisiana. 102
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As much as some might have wished it during the Napoleonic Wars, Americans found
that they could not avoid Europe. The Federalist vision for the future required Americans to
become enmeshed in a highly profitable world of Atlantic trade whereas the Jeffersonian vision
had Americans literally bumping up against the still expansive, if decaying, European colonies in
the Americas—especially along the Gulf Coast and the lower Mississippi River. Every foreign
policy choice that the first four presidential administrations made was interpreted to benefit
either one or the other of the major belligerents. Ultimately, the question that faced the first
generation of Americans was whether the revolutionary disorder of France or the aristocratic
order Great Britain was more of an ideological threat to the infant United States. On this answer
would hang the future of American expansion during the first fifteen years of the nineteenthcentury.103
It is vital to recall that in 1803, Americans had no guide to establishing a successful
republican empire. When they opened their history books, they found that republics (especially
large ones) invariably became corrupt and degenerated into despotism. Madison’s famous
Federalist No. 10 tried to assure readers that an expansive republic was critical to maintaining
political balance in society. In 1803, however, this was simply theory, and there seemed to be
plenty of evidence to the contrary. After 1792, Americans had exactly one contemporary
republic to which they could compare themselves: France. There, with the rise of Bonaparte,
many saw confirmation of their worst fears about the sustainability of large republics. Before it
seemed possible (at least to the Jeffersonians) that France and the United States could stand as
twin bastions of liberalism, but by 1804, France seemed far more likely to infect those with
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whom she interacted with the contagion of despotism. When the opposition—both Federalists
and splinter factions of Jeffersonians—denounced the actions of their ideological enemies as
supporting Napoleon’s France, they were not simply using hyperbole to score political points.
They were arguing over, as one historian has put it eloquently, “the soul of the republic.” 104
By 1803, the Federalists were a divided and decidedly minority party. However, from
their urban strongholds in New England they provided an extremely vocal opposition to what
they saw as (borrowing a phrase usually associated with Napoleon in 1803) the Jeffersonian
“usurpation” of the national government. Per the terms of the Louisiana treaty, both
governments had to ratify the document within six months of receiving it. Though Congress was
out of session and not set to reconvene until November, Jefferson called for a special session
scheduled for October 17, 1803 to debate the treaty and allocate the money required to actually
purchase the territory. Though the odds were long against them, the anti-treaty Federalists
determined to not simply roll over. Through the summer and into the fall of 1803, they turned
their rhetorical guns on the Louisiana treaty through the newspapers. They used a wide variety
of arguments to protest adoption of the treaty, but as diverse as these arguments were, they all
ultimately revolved around ideological objections to how the United States dealt with Napoleon
Bonaparte.105
Probably the most common critique of the treaty was its cost. Anti-treaty Federalists
immediately expressed concern over the amount of money required to purchase Louisiana. The
price agreed upon was $15 million. This was astronomical sum for the fledgling United States,
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which, though in the midst of an economic boom thanks to the French Revolutionary Wars, had
only just emerged from under the debt previously owed to France for their assistance during the
American War for Independence. The hefty price-tag itself was not the anti-treaty faction’s main
complaint, though. Those who focused on the monetary aspects of the deal generally appeared
far more concerned with the ideological implications of the spending the money than on the sum
itself.
The best example of this position ran in a series of five widely reprinted articles
originally published in Boston’s Columbian Centinel by an author writing under the pseudonym,
Fabricius. In his essays, Fabricius expressed disbelief that the United States would pay an
exorbitant sum for what he saw as a vindication of American rights. He professed to have no
problem paying to protect the economic interests of westerners. “Let us cheerfully spend our
blood and money for them,” he wrote. “It is right that we should do it when necessary, without
inquiring or regarding HOW MUCH.” It did not follow that the Louisiana Purchase “was a fit
end or a right mean to be chosen” when protecting American national security. After all, he
continued, Americans had been wronged by the Spanish violations of the Pinckney Treaty. “It is
a glorious thing,” he wrote sarcastically, “for a nation to suffer injuries and then buy redress—to
be kicked and then pay damages.” How the United States responded to such a threat would have
long standing diplomatic ramifications. 106
New Orleans could have, and should have been obtained by military force, Fabricius
insisted. Like the new kid on the school playground, the United States had to stand up to the
bully (France) that would take its lunch money. The Kentucky militia—80,000 of them—had
been ready to move, Fabricius sighed wistfully. They could have made short work of the New
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Orleans garrison and vindicated American rights to the world. Fabricius could only think of one
reason why New Orleans had not been seized immediately, and that was the Jefferson
administration’s servile fear of the despot Bonaparte. He was thoroughly disgusted by the idea
of a free republic engaged in diplomatic negotiation with the likes of Napoleon and drew a vivid
picture of Ambassador James Monroe “crawling like a reptile at the First Consul’s feet.” Any
American who was not ashamed by this image, he suggested, ought to “send to Algiers or
Botany Bay, and ask the honor of an act of citizenship.” Paying a great deal of money for a
territory that the United States could have had for nothing, argued Fabricius was nothing more
than “tribute” and brought the United States into “common cause” with the French empire just as
they were going to war with Great Britain. Likening of the United States to a tributary state of
Napoleonic France proved a rhetorical device that gained increasing power as the decade
continued.107
Others against the treaty were a bit easier on the Jeffersonian administration. Instead of
seeing Jefferson kowtowing in servile fear of Bonaparte, they saw a naïve philosopher president
hopelessly outwitted by the hardnosed political and military scheming of the First Consul.
Ideological opponents had long cast Jefferson as an idealist whose policies sounded good, but
could not work in the real world. Until he was president, however, these attributes had been
more amusing than dangerous. In a series of essays that ran in a wide variety of papers from
June to October 1803, an author writing under the appropriate pseudonym “Calculator,” laid out
the case against the purchase in economic terms that painted the administration as being
hopelessly outclassed by Napoleon at the negotiating table.
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Calculator’s first objection to the Purchase was the type of land that Napoleon had sold
the United States, sight unseen. Quoting heavily from a document that American ambassador
Robert Livingston had presented to Bonaparte on the folly of maintaining a colony in Louisiana,
Calculator described Louisiana as a vast “western wilderness.” It contained no “mines of gold or
silver” and would take years and untold amounts of money to make profitable. Why, Calculator
asked, should the United States pay an exorbitant sum for a piece of property that our own
ambassadors had just told Bonaparte was worthless? This was a common critique of the treaty.
Fabricius, who had an acerbic comment for nearly every aspect of Louisiana, memorably called
the territory an “untrodden waste for owls to hoot and wolves to howl in.” It was, he continued,
the “realm of alligators and catamounts.” Another anti-treaty writer guffawed at wondrous tales
of a mountain of salt somewhere in the interior of Louisiana. He sarcastically wondered if
Bonaparte would have consented to part with the territory if only he had known how rich it was
in salt and rocks.108
For Calculator, the timing of the Purchase also demonstrated the naiveté of Jefferson and
his followers when confronted by Napoleon. They were so blinded by an irrational ideological
need for expansion, he argued, that they forgot basic laws of economics and diplomacy.
According to Calculator, “it cannot escape notice that the purchase of Louisiana was negotiated
at a juncture the most favorable which could possibly happen for obtaining that wilderness on
cheap terms.” Everyone knew that Bonaparte was planning to renew his war with England,
Calculator pointed out, and without an effective navy he could not have long maintained his hold
on Louisiana. “The territory he put on sale,” wrote Calculator, “he was effectually barred from
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possessing; and was also in the utmost danger of losing.” Thus, Calculator concluded, “This
circumstance tends to increase the public astonishment at the enormous price which has been
pledged.” In other words, Bonaparte had sold on a buyer’s market and the ambassadors should
have taken advantage of that fact in their negotiations. Instead, they had allowed Bonaparte to
hoodwink the administration by playing to their naïve Jeffersonian ideology of expansion at any
cost.109
The discussion of natural borders which had played such an important role during the
Mississippi crisis the year before did not disappear entirely from the American conversation
during this period, but it did take a back seat to other arguments. For example, Calculator saved
his commentary on natural borders for his last article. Even then it only occupied a small part of
his larger argument. Louisiana, he suggested, was a foreign territory because it lay beyond the,
“the vast body of water which till very lately has been considered as the ultimate limits of the
United States.” Why then, he asked, should Americans transgress this clear “ordination of
nature.” Indeed, for Calculator, the Mississippi River appeared to be the very voice of the
Divine, “which has seemingly said, ‘Hitherto ye shall come, and no further.’” This supernatural
argument probably still had some power in Congregationalist New England, but by 1804 most
Americans had moved to a position that sought a more worldly understanding of borders. 110
The more secular concern was that breaking the boundary of the Mississippi would
shatter the wall which held Americans to their natural boundaries. Only nations keeping to their
natural limits could restore order in the chaotic world created by Bonaparte. In many ways, this
was a fall back to the American formulation of natural borders discussed in the first chapter
which argued that national expansion to natural frontiers (and no farther) was good because it
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preserved peace. In the fall of 1804, numerous Federalist papers reprinted an article originally
from London. The author suggested that before the Purchase, the Mississippi had provided an
“unequivocal boundary” to both Spain and the United States, but with that natural border
transgressed, only an “imaginary” boundary remained. Lured by the riches of Mexico and Peru
with no natural border to arrest their movement, what would stop aggressive American
expansion into those places? The article suspected that the selling of Louisiana would ultimately
lead to the “total loss of Spain of its South American dominion.” Even worse, the article
continued, the nations of Europe could not sit idly by and watch this happen. Unchecked
expansion by the United States, the article concluded, would thus also probably lead United
States into war eventually with Great Britain, France, or both. 111
The pro-treaty faction, on the other hand, celebrated America’s freedom from the natural
borders which had constrained her in the past. In an “Address to All Monarchists,” an author
writing under the pseudonym “The Old Soldier” roundly condemned the Federalists for their
opposition to the Purchase Treaty. In his closing he brought up the idea of boundaries by
extolling the virtues of the new, sprawling American empire:
when I consider the almost boundless extent of the United States, including the all important
acquisition of Louisiana, a territory stretching from sea to sea, or from the great river, Mississippi, to
the ends of the earth, and from near the tropic of cancer...to the polar circle; when I consider the
sublime grandeur, magnificence and potency of a monarch commanding such an unbridled kingdom,
and sole sovereign of such an immense territory, in comparison of who the emperor of China and the
Great Lama of Tibet dwindle into subalterns, Bonaparte and the Kings of Europe are very little
things…
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The contrast between these two positions is instructive. For many Federalists, crossing the
natural boundary of the Mississippi would lead to the United States becoming enmeshed in an
endless series of border disputes with European powers—an odd line of argument for a party
who claimed that they wanted to see the United States within a European context. For the Old
Soldier, however, the extent of America’s boundless empire proved its greatness in comparison
to the rest of the world. In the end, arguments about borders became less important once the
treaty was actually received by the Congress. Shifting the argument away from natural
boundaries seems to indicate that Americans largely agreed that their nation should expand. The
question became how this expansion ought to take place. 112
Even if most Americans had made peace with the idea of expansion, the pro-treaty
faction had difficulty responding to the other criticisms leveled by their opponents. The fact that
they felt the need to respond at all is illustrative of how effective the rhetorical assaults from the
Federalists actually were. In this case, what the pro-treaty faction did not say about the
document is just as instructive as what they did say. When they responded, most conspicuously
avoided using the words “Bonaparte” or “Napoleon” and opted for less polarizing words like
“France.” Clearly they understood the uncomfortable optics of dealing in real estate with the
likes of Bonaparte and realized how powerful of a symbol he had become to the American
populace. Even so, some did attempt to weave the rhetoric, if not the name, of Bonaparte into
their defense because he was such an effective symbol.
When treaty advocates did use the rhetoric, if not the name, of Bonaparte to support the
purchase, it usually took the form of a commentary on what they saw as hypocritical warmongering on the part of the Federalists. For example, “Curtius” pointed out the hypocrisy of
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Federalists who had demanded war to seize New Orleans over the winter of 1802-03 but now
criticized a treaty in which territory was gained through peaceful negotiation. Federalists, he
wrote, had been prepared for the “sacrifice of our national character upon the shrine of
ambition,” during the Mississippi crisis. He sincerely hoped that the Federalists would not fool
themselves into thinking that their “warlike and bloody resolutions” had frightened Bonaparte
into selling Louisiana. The fact that Curtius felt the need to highlight those words indicates that
he chose them—and the word “ambition”—for their rhetorical power. In this case, he knew full
well that Americans would associate those words with everything they found distasteful about
Napoleon.113
The force of Curtius’s argument came from his appeal to a deep seeded American
paranoia about the ambitious accumulation of power. There was nothing particularly new in an
appeal of this sort—Americans had been using “ambition” in their rhetoric since before the War
for Independence. What was innovative was that by 1803, when Americans like Curtius used
words like “warlike” and “ambition” were no longer simply describing the abstractions of Locke
or Plutarch’s long dead Julius Caesar. 114
Starting after his coup in 1800, an overwhelming majority of Americans began to
associate these words with Napoleon. In December 1802, for example, a typical article in the
New York Morning Chronicle warned that “Universal domination appears to be the object of
[Bonaparte’s] all grasping ambition.” The author continued by explaining that the First Consul
had at his command one of the, “most warlike nations of the earth.” Bonaparte thus became the
113
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living, breathing embodiment of bellicose ambition. In April 1803, the New York Morning
Herald reported, “we perceive no bounds to the ambition of Bonaparte.” Using a simple
keyword search in the Readex America’s Historical Newspapers database, a startling trend
emerges. Between 1800 and the end of 1803, the word “ambition” appeared in the major
newspapers of the United States 9,154 times. Of these times, the word was linked to Napoleon
in almost twenty-five percent of the articles. As Bonaparte consolidated his power, his name
became synonymous with “ambition.” This was even more so once he established himself as
hereditary “Emperor of the Gauls” in December 1804. By using words like “ambition,” Curtius
could link Federalist policy to Napoleon without even using his name. 115
In September and October, the Spanish minister in Washington attempted to protest the
treaty on the grounds that French troops still occupied the Italian province promised to Spain as
part of the original retrocession. In other words, Napoleon had sold the territory under false
pretenses. The Jefferson administration ignored the petition, but this almost became a serious
hiccup in the process of taking possession. Federalists in the House of Representatives briefly
attempted to hold up further votes until copies of the Treaty of San Ildefonso could be obtained
to verify that Napoleon did, indeed, have a legitimate title to Louisiana. Apparently even
administration supporters in Congress had qualms, for the resolution requiring the copies of the
treaty was voted down by only two votes even though Jeffersonians enjoyed a 3-1 majority in the
House. Based on the newspaper accounts, the public did not get wind of these events until
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November when Federalist congressmen started write home to their constituents, but when they
did, it resulted in another rhetorical salvo from the anti-treaty faction.116
Some interpreted the episode as further evidence of the Jefferson administration’s naiveté
in dealing with Bonaparte. For example, an anti-treaty writer identifying himself only as “N”
wrote a satirical piece in a New Hampshire paper that criticized the Jefferson administration’s
lack of forethought when it came to imperial matters. The national debt might well be a “mortal
canker” on the young country “N” opined, but, a great deal was a great deal when it came to
western real estate. It was a shame that the United States had such “shortsighted rulers,” he
wrote sardonically. For “a few trifling millions more, Bonaparte would have added…the
exhaustless mines of Peru and Potosi, and with them a tract of the country, in value above all
price.” Now was the time to buy, “N” pointed out, since once all of Europe was at the foot of
Bonaparte, he might not be willing to make such excellent bargains. The point of the piece, of
course, was that Bonaparte would be happy to sell anything (no matter who actually owned the
legal title) to the starry-eyed Jeffersonians. 117
For “N” the American response to the Spanish objection showed more about Jefferson’s
naïve willingness to blindly follow his expansionist ideology, but for other writers it showed just
how corrupt the United States had become in dealing with Bonaparte. One furious letter posted
in a New England paper called Napoleon the “arch-swindler” who had stolen Louisiana from his
Spanish allies. “I view,” he went on, “the U. States as no better than confederates with a gang of
thieves—and as receivers of stolen goods.” Another widely circulated letter made a similar
point. “The Spanish minister's remonstrance,” the anonymous author wrote, “is treated with as
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much contempt as Bonaparte would treat a remonstrance from the Landamman of Switzerland.”
The anti-treaty faction had struck a chord—though not quite hard enough to derail American
expansion. By directly linking American expansionist policy to the morally ambiguous imperial
policies Bonaparte, suddenly the Louisiana Purchase did not look like such a triumphant affair.
The event shows just how flexible the rhetoric of Napoleon had already become by 1804—even
amongst similarly minded factions. 118
Pro-treaty partisans felt like they needed to respond to this accusation. They bypassed
the moral ambiguousness of the deal, and focused directly on the legal aspects. The editor of the
Charleston Courier put it in simple terms for his readers, “What then has the government of the
United States, a bona fide purchaser, to do with conditions on which the province was sold to
France?” He continued by making an analogy that his readers would be familiar with. “If I buy
a horse from Titus, which Caius had sold and delivered to him, taking his bond or note as a
security for the payment of the stipulated price, what should we say, if Caius, finding his security
to be worthless, should come to me and beg of me not to buy the horse?” The legal answer was
simple, if perhaps hard on poor Caius. “We should be apt to tell him that he had now nothing to
do with the horse and that if he was displeased with his bargain, he had only to upbraid his own
folly in giving credit to whom he ought to have known better than to trust.” Translated to
Louisiana, the author was saying that it was Spain’s own fault for doing business with an
unsavory character like Bonaparte. Understandably, the author neglected to explain the wisdom
or the ethics of the United States doing business with the same questionable character. 119
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There were also rumblings from anti-treaty types about the legal ramifications of making
real estate deals with Bonaparte’s government. Most of these revolved around the question of
the Consulship’s legitimacy. Since Bonaparte had come to power in a coup some anti-treaty
authors asked, was his government really the legitimate government of France? If it was not, did
the treaty hold any legal standing? The easiest answer to these questions was provided by
Senator James Jackson. Jackson was a long serving English-born senator and one-time governor
of Georgia. In a speech that was reprinted in Jeffersonian papers from his home in Georgia to
Vermont Jackson explained the consulate was, indeed, the legal government of France. Jackson
argued that no matter what misgivings he had personally of the French government, “Bonaparte
by the consent of the nation is placed at its head.” Jackson here referred to the mostly legitimate
plebiscite that had named Bonaparte “First Consul for life” in August of 1802. “No nation,”
Jackson continued, “had the right to interfere with rule or police of another.” The acts of
Bonaparte, then, were the genuine acts of the nation of France. Jackson, like other pro-treaty
advocates, thus simply ignored the question of whether Americans should deal with Bonaparte
by simply saying that they could deal with him. 120
Other Americans, however, disagreed with Jackson’s assessment of Bonaparte’s
legitimacy. This, then, led to the uncomfortable question of whether the government of the
United States could, or should, make legitimate treaties with his government. As before,
expansionists tended to quietly side-step the second half of the question and focus simply on the
legal reality of the situation. One congressional speech that made its way into the Aurora—
probably the mostly widely read American newspaper of the time—was that of Representative
James Elliot. Elliot was a first term congressman from the politically divided state of Vermont
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and he attempted to thread the needle of legality when it came to Bonaparte. “I believe,” he
began, “there is not within these walls an admirer of the present government of France.” But, he
continued, “we all know the distinction between a king or government de jure and de facto. If
Bonaparte be not the rightful ruler of the French republic, he is the present possessor of the
powers of government, and can bind the nation by treaties.” This meant, he argued, that even if
Bonaparte died before the ratified treaty made it back to France, it would still be binding upon
the French people. Americans would continue to use the difference between de facto and de jure
governments to their advantage as they expanded later in the century. 121
Despite the heated rhetorical battle in the press, the final outcome was hardly in doubt.
Congress reflected the growing Jeffersonian influence in the nation and the Louisiana vote
showed it. With remarkably little debate on the floor, the Senate voted to accept the treaty a
mere two days after receiving it by a margin of twenty-four to seven. One New Hampshire
Federalist griped, “the Senate have taken less time to deliberate on this great treaty than they
allowed themselves on the most trivial Indian contract.” Only one Federalist—Jonathon Dayton
of New Jersey—crossed the aisle. 122
Despite the lopsided result, the heated debate reveals some important insights into the
ideological thought behind American expansion and anti-expansion during the first decade of the
nineteenth century. Arguments over expansion was a genuine ideological battle even when it did
not directly involve military force. Over the years, historians have suggested a wide variety of
explanations for Federalist opposition to the treaty. The traditional explanation is that the
opposition was motivated by political sour grapes. For example, according to Thomas Farnham,
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Federalists represented a minority northern sectional faction by 1803 and their opposition was an
attempt to block southern expansion because it would presumably expand the Jeffersonian voting
bloc. Linda Kerber argued that Federalists saw the acquisition of Louisiana as a national security
issue as the new territory would undoubtedly contain a large percentage of slaves. Many other
historians have simply dismissed the opposition all together as insignificant when compared to
the larger sweep of American expansion. 123
Those who opposed the treaty and their arguments ought to be taken seriously. While
they lost the debate, their arguments established a rhetoric of anti-imperialism that, in the words
of Alexander DeConde, “would be echoed later in the century by a new breed of antiimperialists.” The underlying focus of the opposition’s most lasting arguments were not based
on political partisanship or on national security. More often than not, the opposition presented
genuine and principled ideological concerns about a free republic dealing with the likes of
Napoleon. The fact that the pro-treaty faction felt that they had to respond at all demonstrates
that linking Bonaparte to American expansion retained much of its rhetorical and ideological
power.124
Accepting the Louisiana Treaty, however, was only the first step on the American road to
empire. On October 26, the Senate passed the legislation which allowed for the formal
occupation and administration of Louisiana. Two days later the House of Representatives
followed suit and forwarded a bill to the Senate allocating the funds needed to purchase the
territory. With that, the question of whether or not the United States would be an empire was
settled for good, but this only opened up new questions about the administration of that empire.
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The language of the bill allowing for the formal occupation of Louisiana resulted in a vigorous
debate amongst Americans about what their new empire should look like. How Louisiana was
administered would be key to the future of American expansion. As one Senator put it
succinctly, “the U.S. in time will have many colonies—therefore precedents are important.” In
the debate that followed, the opposition used Napoleon’s empire to engage the Jeffersonian plans
for occupation.125
Both Federalists and Jeffersonians had some doubts about how the Purchase Treaty
would shape the occupation of Louisiana. The clause in question was in the third article of the
treaty—allegedly written by Bonaparte himself—which proclaimed that, “The inhabitants of the
ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as
possible…to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities, of citizens of the
United States.” Some Americans smelled a rat. The always cantankerous Senator William
Plumer wondered, “What could induce Bonaparte to insist on this people’s [sic] being
incorporated into the Union? He has never discovered a strong attachment to the rights of any
nation, or to that of any individual.” Historians of the Purchase are only recently starting to
realize how fundamental qualms over the people of Louisiana were to native born Americans. It
was not until 2004, that Peter Kastor observed laconically that, “it was the demographic
expansion, rather than the geographic expansion [of the United States] that was the subject of so
much concern.” Even these demographic worries, however, had their roots in perceptions of
Bonaparte.126
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Read literally, the treaty appeared to require that all inhabitants of Louisiana become
citizens of the United States. This caused many Americans, both Jeffersonian and Federalists,
grave concern. Part of the problem was that less than half of the inhabitants were of European
decent. The rest were, as one newspaper put it, an amalgamation of, “red-white, black, [and]
black and white.” Would they also become citizens? The terms of the treaty seemed to suggest
that they would. Though simple racism was a partial factor here, the critique was more
sophisticated (and conspiratorial) than that. “Can it be conceived then,” asked one writer, “that
these people, bred in [French] despotism, will suddenly be fitted for self government and
republicanism?” This author was just as worried about the ability of “white” Louisianans to
become American citizens as he was concerned about the other members of Louisiana society. 127
Many wondered if Napoleon had once again fooled the naïve Jefferson administration.
One writer complained that, allowing “people of different nations, distinguished by dissimilar
manners, various habits, strong prejudices, and fixed sentiments of attachments to several
countries,” to enjoy the benefits of citizenship, “must soon produce a dissolution of the union.”
This, as some writers pointed out, would only help Bonaparte in the long run by providing a
ready ally for him in the western hemisphere. Others wondered if Napoleon had deliberately
inserted the third article knowing that the United States could not fulfill this part of the document
and thus giving France a reason to “justly abrogate the whole treaty,” and reclaim Louisiana
without paying back the $15 million. Nothing seemed impossible to the wily Napoleon in
1804.128
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Other writers were not quite so conspiratorial. After all, as one historian has pointed out,
“nationhood as a concept was in its infancy,” in 1803. Over thirty years ago, James Kettner
showed that Americans came from an English tradition of citizenship which did not allow for a
subject to truly change their allegiance. In other words, once one was a citizen of the “Great
Republic” of France, one was always French. Louisiana, then, which changed hands on a regular
basis, presented a particularly troubling case for Americans. The inhabitants had been French
subjects; therefore they would always be—at their core—French. This line of reasoning was a
stretch in a post-revolutionary world where so many British colonists had voluntarily thrown off
their own allegiance to the British monarch, but, as Peter Kastor has recently demonstrated, the
argument still had real power when it came to the bewildering variety of seemingly strange
peoples in Louisiana. After all, some of the older ones had been French, British, and Spanish
subjects at various times in their lives—and this was only counting those who would have
identified themselves as of European decent. Few spoke English as a first language—and many
balked when their first governor, William Claiborne spoke no French. Members of the
opposition had legitimate reason to question where the allegiance of Louisianans truly lay. 129
Even Bonaparte himself—or at least his minions—made this charge more believable. In
the widely published farewell to the people of Louisiana, the French commissioner in New
Orleans, Pierre Laussat, proudly announced that the First Consul congratulated the people of the
territory on their “peaceful emancipation.” Bonaparte, he said, would always think on the
inhabitants of Louisiana as his brothers. “Your children will become our children,” he
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explained, “and our children will become yours.” Bonaparte, Laussat continued, wished to
“perpetuate the ties which unite the French of Louisiana with the Frenchmen of Europe,” and he
hoped that that sight of the French flag would, “never cease to gladden [their] hearts.” More
than that, however, Laussat repeatedly reminded the inhabitants of Louisiana of Bonaparte’s
insistence that they be incorporated into the union as soon as possible in order that their liberty,
property and religion be protected. 130
Words like these greatly worried an author in The Repertory. “In the face of the World,”
he wrote, Bonaparte had officially encouraged the Louisianans to remember their “common
origin” as Frenchmen. According to the First Consul, the author continued, “The people of
Louisiana…will always be attached to the interests of France.” Thus, “A band of Frenchmen is
to be incorporated into our Union, and to remain, after incorporation, still Frenchmen, still
attached to the interest of France.” Yet, the author marveled, “this threatened danger stirs no
fear, the insult stirs no anger.” Another disgusted author wrote that Napoleon was obviously
counting on the “cameleon [sic] inhabitants of Louisiana” to gain a “preponderance” of influence
at “the national councils.” The fear was that Bonaparte knew that they would always maintain
their “eternal love and gratitude” for France. Thus, as new states were carved out of Louisiana
and gained congressional representation, eventually the emperor would have a nation of allies
ready to do his bidding. Interestingly enough, Julien Vernet’s recent work on the transfer of
Louisiana to the United States shows that, prior to the official handover, Laussat did indeed
deliberately set up a pro-French municipal council in New Orleans in an attempt to maintain
French influence in the region. Sometimes, rhetoric is reality. 131
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What then was to be done with the “cameleon” inhabitants of Louisiana? More than a
few Americans proposed solutions that sounded more like what Napoleon would impose on one
of his “sister republics” than an “empire of liberty.” “I have always thought,” mused Federalist
Gouverneur Morris (who had been of the loudest advocates for a preemptive military strike on
New Orleans) “that when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana, it would be proper to govern
them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils.” Senator George Campbell of
Tennessee explained to his congressional colleagues that he considered the Louisianans as
standing in, “nearly the relation to us as if they were a conquered country.” In the legal terms of
the nineteenth-century, this meant that the United States would have had virtually unlimited
power over their fate. Then, of course, there was the novelist and militant expansionist, Charles
Brockden Brown, who fully expected that the United States would have to treat Louisiana’s
“present inhabitants as vassals.” Presumably this would be the case until settlers from the United
States moved into the area and supplanted the degenerate French and mixed-race population. Of
course, these men carefully did not use any kind of reference to that ambitious despot, Napoleon.
Clearly, there was clearly some cognitive dissonance at work here which the opposition was
quick to point out.132
Ultimately, the overwhelmingly pro-administration Congress agreed—at least to a certain
extent—with those who agitated for a less than republican solution for Louisiana. Both the act
authorizing the occupation of Louisiana and the act creating the territorial government gave the
executive branch sweeping authority to administer the new region and severely limited any
popular participation in government. According to the occupation document, the President was
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authorized to “employ any part of the army and navy of the United States,” as well as the militia
to enforce the transfer. Presidential supporters saw this threat of force as particularly important
given that Spain had threatened to contest the occupation and they still occupied the territory
even though it had been (in theory at least) ceded to France. Then, of course, there was no
guarantee that “cameleon” inhabitants of Louisiana had any interest in becoming part of the
United States. The act also gave the President the unilateral authority to exercise all “military,
civil and judicial powers,” in Louisiana until such time as Congress could make other
arrangements.133
Five months later the Congress passed the statute creating the territorial government of
Louisiana. They created a governor, who would be appointed by the President and serve at his
pleasure. The governor would be assisted by a council of the thirteen “most fit and discreet
persons of the territory.” These too would be appointed by the President, as would the judges
who would see to the judicial needs of the territory, and the officers of the territorial militia. In
fact, every virtually civil, military, and judicial officer of the new territory would be appointed
by the President of the United States. Significantly, there would be no legislature. Why the
Congress set up a government with so much power invested in the president is a matter of
conjecture. It does however, seem quite surprising given the Americans’ familiarity with British
colonial rule. Not everyone was happy with the outcome, of course. One Federalist Senator
glowered, “this is a Colonial system of government.” He was not being complementary. 134
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The opposition launched a counterattack that tied the American occupation of Louisiana
directly to Bonaparte. In March of 1804, the editor of Boston’s Repertory vented at what he saw
as the potential for tyranny contained in act creating the territorial government. “IT IS A
DESPOTISM” he wrote using all capitals and italics to emphasize his point. “Never, before,
have we seen a system of government, constructed by any association of men, among whom
there was not of the people to be governed!” The editor then tied the imperial occupation
directly to the best imperialist he knew. “Without the least levity of allusion, we may truly say,
this is a transaction worth the school of Bonaparte.” For emphasis he explained exactly what he
meant by this.
A country is partly bought, and partly conquered; for thousands of troops were in
readiness to overpower any symptom of resistance which might appear, and which the
order for the organization of those troops proves was expected. The American flag was
hoisted under the protection of American arms. The purchasers of the country without
the slightest reference to the opinions of its inhabitants, form a constitution for them, to
which they must submit.
To the nineteenth-century reader, this all sounded suspiciously like how Bonaparte had treated
his conquests during the Italian campaigns. 135
In 1796, for example, The Minerva had brought up several issues that Americans found
themselves facing less than a decade later in the occupation of Louisiana. Confronted by
Bonaparte’s successful campaigns in Italy, The Minerva lamented that this conquest was done in
the name of republicanism. Calling attention to an order of Bonaparte’s which threatened to
burn the homes of any Italians who did not submit to his “republican” rule, the editor groaned,
“this is the gentle language of republicanism.” In another article the editor bewailed Bonaparte’s
monetary exploitation of the Italian republics. He could understand the abuse of the native
population as an unfortunate side effect of war, but, “to give these operations an air of honor and
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generosity,” Bonaparte had played the hypocrite and pretended “to conquer the people into
freedom.” This maligning of republicanism was the worst tragedy of the conflict, according to
the Minerva. Eight years later, Americans faced the some of these same issues as they debated
how to treat the potentially hostile population of Louisiana. 136
Returning to The Repertory, the editor had saved his most biting remarks for Thomas
Jefferson himself. The act creating the new government in Louisiana gave the President virtually
unlimited power, the editor fumed. “Have we got an angel in the shape of Thomas Jefferson,” he
asked sarcastically, “that a territory of this boasted extent, bordering on a country not the most
friendly to us, and peopled by inhabitants who will be very difficult to govern, should be solely
entrusted to him?” Or, he added ominously, is Jefferson, “as Bonaparte announced himself, the
delegate of heaven, commissioned to regulate the destines of men?” The editor of The Repertory
was not alone in his assessment, though he perhaps was the most vocal. 137
Writing in the Washington Federalist, “A.B.” made similar accusations. “When
Bonaparte took possession by violence of the government of France,” he wrote in February 1804,
“the democrats, who till that event had been in the habit of extolling him as the purest and best of
republicans, immediately denounced him, as a usurper, and a traitor because, forsooth, he had
undertaken to rule a people without previously obtaining their consent.” Was this any different
then what Jefferson had just done in the Louisiana territory he asked rhetorically. “He is surely
as much of a usurper, as Bonaparte—for he has become their master, and is in the exercise of the
most despotic and absolute authority without having consulted them on the subject.” A.B.
thought the presidential supporters hypocritical for, “instead of applying to Jefferson, the angry
and harsh epithets with which, but a short time since, they loaded Buonaparte [sic], they hail him
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as the best of men and patriots.” They would probably continue to do so, A.B. sneered, even if,
Jefferson, like Bonaparte, “were to enslave, and by fraud or violence, reduce one half of Europe
under his dominion.” While Jefferson was certainly the first American president whose
accumulation of political power would to be likened to Bonaparte, he would not be the last. 138
The inhabitants of Louisiana were also concerned about the rather un-republican system
with which their new imperial rulers had saddled them. In a remarkable document presented to
Congress in the winter of 1804-05, Louisianans questioned the legitimacy of the American
occupation. The document, titled, “A Remonstrance of the People of Louisiana against the
Political System Adopted by Congress for Them,” appealed to the history of the United States to
support their inclusion into the American system of liberal government. They briefly referenced
Article III of the Purchase treaty, but, realizing its controversial nature, carefully framed most of
their argument on the inalienable rights of mankind implied in the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution. The Louisianans concluded by hoping that the nation which had been
formed on the principle that “governors were intended for the governed and not the governed for
the governors,” would not be “deaf to their just complaints.” 139
Many native-born Americans scoffed at the Remonstrance. The Republican Watchtower
printed a particularly vicious response to the document which linked the Louisianan identity to
Bonaparte rather than to the United States. In the article, the author posed as a Louisiana Creole
and composed a satirical mockery of the Remonstrance. In the original document the authors
had conspicuously avoided unnecessary references to Article III and made no reference at all to
Bonaparte, but in the mock one, the Consul entered the argument in the first paragraph. “You
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promise de citizen Bonaparte dat you shall take us into one state” the “Creole” wrote. This was a
subtle jab at the Jefferson administration which had, after all, promised to incorporate these
people into the United States as soon as possible in the Purchase Treaty. It also demonstrated a
childish misunderstanding of the American political system. Of course, the “Creole” continued,
it was not the Louisianans who had actually wanted to leave the French Empire; it was the
Americans who “give fifteen million dollar for his [Bonaparte’s] permission for dat.” These
comments demonstrated the “Creole’s” filial attachment to his French master. By starting the
piece in this way, the author cleverly tapped into already established doubts that many
Americans had about the administration of their new empire. 140
The debate over the occupation of Louisiana shows how elastic the rhetoric of Bonaparte
could be in the hands of Americans by 1805. Where one group expressed concern that the
Purchase Treaty required the inhabitants of Louisiana to become members of the American body
politic, the other voiced concern about the lack of popular participation in the Louisiana
government. Both groups ultimately tied their arguments to Napoleon Bonaparte. The popular
debates over the occupation of Louisiana also lend credence to the arguments of recent historians
like Jay Sexton and Ian Tyrell who argue in Empire’s Twin that anti-imperialism was an
“important shaper of imperialism.” This became even more evident in the pro-imperial
arguments that developed over the next several months as Jeffersonians found themselves forced
to appropriate the very language of their opponents to justify national expansion to the American
public.141
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As they celebrated the addition of Louisiana to the United States, pro-expansionists found
that they could not help but compare the new empire of the United States to that of Bonaparte’s
France. As they did, they turned the potent anti-expansionist Bonaparte rhetoric of their
opponents into a positive, pro-imperial argument. Even before the ink was dry on the treaty, the
Jeffersonian senator from Kentucky, John Breckinridge, cheered the acquisition of, “an empire
of perhaps have the extent of the one we possessed.” Just as important to this old revolutionary
was that this American empire had been won “from the most powerful and warlike nation on
earth, without bloodshed, without the oppression of a single individual…through the peaceful
forms of negotiation.” To Breckinridge, the Louisiana Purchase showed just how different the
peaceful conquests of United States were in comparison to the bloody wars of Bonaparte.
Indeed, it even showed that peaceful conquest could overpower even the mighty Napoleon.
Ironically, within weeks of making this speech Breckinridge would be introducing the legislation
for the military occupation of the Louisiana territory. 142
When David Ramsay spoke, people listened, which, perhaps says something about the
nature of the United States at the turn of the nineteenth-century. Though he had served as a
doctor during the War for Independence and completed multiple terms as a member of the South
Carolina legislature and in the Continental Congress, he was probably best known to Americans
as a historian. His two-volume History of the Revolution in South Carolina was the first book to
receive an American copyright. Amongst a host of other historical writings, he published several
volumes on George Washington, as well as the first comprehensive history of the American
Revolution. So, on May 12, 1804, when David Ramsay gave a stirring speech to “a very large
audience” at St. Michael’s Church in Charleston, South Carolina celebrating the Louisiana
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“cession,” it was reprinted all over the nation. Within the month, anxious readers all over the
nation could buy a printed copy for twenty-five cents at their local shop. 143
Ramsay’s message was similar to that of Breckinridge. He began with a geographer’s
introduction to the new territory which painted a territory of “prairies or natural meadows of
inexhaustible fertility” and forests that abounded “with excellent timber.” It did not take long,
however, for the historian in Ramsay to think about the Louisiana “cession” within a geopolitical
context. “In other countries, and under the direction of other governments,” he pointed out, “the
energies of nations have been called forth—thousands of lives have been sacrificed—seas have
been crimsoned with human blood in the attack or defense of a few acres or of barren rocks.” In
1804, no one would have had any doubt which “other government Ramsay had in mind. In case
his audience was not already thinking about any number of Bonaparte’s bloody victories,
Ramsay provided Malta as an example. For his audience, this would have immediately called to
mind Napoleon’s attack on the island in 1798. 144
Not so for American expansion, Ramsay claimed. “We have gained this invaluable
territory,” he continued, “without the imposition of any new taxes; and at the same time with the
consent of the inhabitants, and without giving offense to any of the powers in Europe.” With
these words Ramsay simply brushed aside Federalist concerns about the lack of popular
participation in the new territorial government or the lingering doubts about Spanish title to the
territory. He also countered Federalist apprehension about paying $15 million to support
Bonaparte’s wars in Europe by insisting on calling the Purchase a “cession.” This choice of
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words linguistically turned the tables on Federalists who had railed against Jefferson’s naivety in
dealing with Bonaparte by suggesting that it was actually Jefferson’s hardnosed negotiations
which had gotten the best of the First Consul. 145
With the minds of his audience already on Napoleon, Ramsay doggedly stayed on the
theme. He asked the audience to consider what would have happened if Louisiana had stayed
“in the hands of that wonderful man, who presides over France.” He imagined that Bonaparte
would have used New Orleans as the “fulcrum of an immense lever by which he would have
elevated or depressed our western country in subserviency to his gigantic projects.” He would
have turned Kentucky and Tennessee into virtual colonies and eventually this would have
inevitably led to between east and west. Thus, for Ramsay, Bonaparte’s expansion generated
war and bloodshed, but the exact same action taken by Americans produced peace. 146
In many ways, this reflected a question over whether the United States was something
new—a nation freed from the history of Europe. For the Federalists, the answer had been “no.”
They saw the United States as a nation that would have to play by Europe’s rules, which is why
they so strongly argued for seizing Louisiana by force before the transfer to Napoleon took place
during the Mississippi Crisis. On the other hand, for Ramsay and his fellow Jeffersonians, the
bloodless acquisition of Louisiana through negotiation seemed to prove that the United States
was truly different than Bonaparte, Europe, and the rest of the world. In a newspaper
retrospective of 1804, one proud expansionist explained the difference between the United States
and France. “Looking on America,” he began, “we see an extensive empire, enlarging her
territory…at peace with the world and rising with happy celerity to that rank in the scale of
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nations, to which her character, her institutions, her privileges, her pursuits give a title.” On the
other hand, across the Atlantic, one saw Bonaparte, “actively employed in equipping numerous
armaments to make a decent on England, and at the same time squabbling with all the rest of
Europe.” Like Ramsay, this author highlighted American exceptionalism by seeing expansion
by the United States as establishing peace in North America while simultaneously viewing
French expansion as conquest. 147
The overwhelming passage of the Louisiana Purchase Treaty showed that Americans had
largely accepted that their nation would expand—at least into Louisiana. The raucous debate
surrounding the treaty and the terms of occupation demonstrates that Americans still virulently
disagreed over how the nation ought to expand, how the empire ought to be administered, and
what American expansion meant for the rest of the rest of the world. As they contested these
important questions, Napoleon increasingly became the standard by which Americans measured
their decisions over expansion and the administration of their new empire. Yet, as many had
foreseen, Louisiana would not be the last place Americans coveted for their own. In fact, even
where the boundaries of Louisiana were was a perplexing question that the Purchase Treaty had
not settled. Over the next four decades Americans sought to work out exactly what their “empire
of liberty” actually was and how they ought to approach it. As they did, the ideas and rhetoric of
Napoleon continued to occupy an important place in their debates.

147

The Daily Advertiser (New York, NY), January 1, 1805.

96

CHAPTER 4 ALLIES AND ANNEXATIONISTS: FLORIDA AND THE WAR OF 1812
Readers of the Federal Republican were in for a treat as they opened their papers on the
morning of April 7, 1813. Inside, they found an article titled, “Short Answers to Short
Questions.” The article was a response to another article that had appeared in the Richmond
Enquirer—a Jeffersonian paper—earlier that year and took the form of a series of questions and
answers on the War of 1812 that read very much like a catechism. In one question, for example,
the Federalist faithful read, “Q. Was it ambition which declared [the war]?” To which the
answer was, “Yes. Low, sordid, despicable ambition. The ambition to be dignified by the title
of Ally to Imperial France.” Shortly thereafter, the readers came to this question regarding the
motives for war. “Q. Is it the thirst for dominion? A. Not content with Louisiana and West
Florida, the declared object of the war was the conquest of Canada…and the occupation of her
territories.” Near the end of the article, the reader came across a similar question with a similar
answer. “Q. Is [the war] for the unjust plunder of a poorer neighbor? A. Let the Indians,
Canadians, and Floridians answer.” As this article demonstrates, by the War of 1812, the links
between aggressive American expansion and the imperialism Napoleon’s France were solidified
to the point where they were literally part of the Federalist catechism. 148
Historians have known that the borderlands were central to the War of 1812 since Julius
Pratt published Expansionists of 1812 in 1925. However, the “borderlands” idea remains rather
nebulous. Many recent historians of the war have taken “the borderlands” to mean that our
geographic and demographic understanding of the war is too limited. These historians have
incorporated a much broader view of the war along these lines. In 1981, Frank Owsley Jr.
argued that the Creek War of 1813-14 should be seen as part of a bigger campaign for the South.
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More recently, James Cusick suggested that the Patriot War in Spanish East Florida, which lasted
in fits and starts from 1811 to 1814 should also be seen as part of a broader war narrative that
emphasizes the regional nature of the conflict. Jeremy Black also expanded our view of the war
in the other direction by tying its military and strategic aspects back into the Atlantic context of
the Napoleonic Wars. Implicitly, all these historians suggested that we rethink the War of 1812
as a war of American conquest, rather than as a tiny republic fighting desperately for survival
against the British empire. 149
This chapter builds on all of this new research into the military history of the War of
1812 by suggesting that to understand how Americans—in particular Federalists—came to terms
with the war’s expansionist aims we must first understand the rhetoric behind their debate over
aggression in Florida. There is, of necessity, a military component to any work that deals with
armed expansion and aggressive diplomacy, but, this is not a military history in the strictest
sense. Instead, this chapter explores how Americans—especially the American public—
vigorously debated how to come to terms with their own expansion through the midpoint of the
War of 1812. Americans struggled with the language to explain their republican expansion,
though elites drew extensively on the theory of Emmerich Vattel. To make their case to the
American public, however, both Jeffersonians and Federalists returned to the person and
concepts with whom their constituents best identified as imperialism personified: Napoleon
Bonaparte. Americans found that they could best explain and understand their own expansion
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into Florida by looking across the Atlantic to France, and applying what they saw to their own
unique context.
The decade between the Louisiana Purchase and the beginning of the War of 1812 were
characterized by increasingly acrimonious and hyper-partisan debates over the future of
American foreign policy. Though clearly the minority, Federalists and disgruntled Jeffersonians
managed to hold the upper hand for the remainder of Jefferson’s time in office. They derailed
administration plans to force a sale of Spanish Florida in 1806, and then managed to turn the
Burr Conspiracy into a referendum on Jeffersonian expansion policy in 1807. Elected in 1808,
the new Jeffersonian president, James Madison, turned the tables on the opposition. In 1811, he
took advantage of a popular revolt in West Florida to seize that province from under the nose of
the Spanish despite fierce opposition from Federalists. Finally, in 1812, Madison was able to
secure the necessary votes for America’s first declared war despite vigorous opposition from his
Federalist opponents.
After losing the debates over the Louisiana Purchase, anti-expansionists—now becoming
more and more identifiable as the Federalist party—spent most of 1805 regrouping and waiting
for an opening through which to launch a rhetorical counterattack. In 1806, they got their chance
when expansionists made a colossal tactical blunder in their pursuit of Florida. Americans had
long seen Florida as a natural part of their economic and physical security. As discussed in the
first chapter, not a few militant expansionists had suggested seizing Florida along with New
Orleans to protect American interests during the Mississippi crisis. In particular, West Florida,
which referred to that part of Florida which lay west of the Perdido River, captivated the
imagination of many Americans. In the hand of the United States, the numerous rivers of area
would provide a rich commercial outlet for the burgeoning American settlements in what would
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become Mississippi and Alabama. The Spanish, however, saw this same strip of land as their
last piece of leverage against the monstrous territorial ambitions of the United States. 150
Unfortunately, in their haste to snap up Louisiana from Bonaparte in 1803, American
negotiators had failed to pin the French down on the exact limits of the territory. This was
almost certainly a deliberate ploy of the First Consul. With the borders between the United
States and Spain left open to interpretation, only he could act as ultimate arbiter of the Purchase
treaty—an extremely useful bargaining chip with war looming. As Bonaparte intended, the
nebulous boundaries immediately led to friction between the United States and Spain with both
nations appealing to Napoleon for support. In the dreams of American expansionists (including
the Jefferson administration) Louisiana included both east and west Florida, most of Texas and
even Oregon. Meanwhile, the Spanish insisted, correctly as a matter of fact, that neither Florida
nor Texas had been part of the original retrocession to France and thus could not have been part
of the French sale to the United States. In typical Bonaparte fashion, the emperor played both
sides of the issue for as long as he could. Eventually, however, war forced him to publicly
support the Spanish claims. Spain, after all, had proven itself as one of Bonaparte’s more
reliable, if reluctant, wartime allies. Even more importantly, it possessed a large fleet with which
Napoleon could challenge British naval supremacy. 151
Along the contested border of West Florida, matters quickly spiraled out of Bonaparte’s
control. In June 1804, two American brothers named Kemper and a gang of toughs marched on
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the West Florida capital of Baton Rouge in an attempt to convince the local population to declare
their independence from Spain. Theirs were mostly local grievances, however, and the majority
of Floridians were generally happy with Spanish rule. When support for their rebellion failed to
materialize, the filibusters fled into Mississippi. Understandably, the Spanish believed that the
American government had something to do with the plot, but the territorial governor of
Louisiana, William Claiborne, refused to extradite the two conspirators, and the wary Spanish
began shifting troops into the disputed area. In response, the President dispatched a sizeable
portion of the tiny American army to the region. Another series of coups by disaffected
Americans in West Florida fizzled in mid-1805 and caused both sides to edge even closer to a
war-footing. In December, Jefferson sent a State of the Union message to the new congress that
sounded a remarkably bellicose tone. “Our citizens have been seized, and their property
plundered…by the regular officers and soldiers” of the government of Spain he warned
ominously. These depredations, he added, had taken place on territory claimed by the United
States as Louisiana. A few days later, Congress went into a secret closed-door session. War
seemed but a matter of time. 152
When Congress emerged in early February, most Americans were stunned at the result.
Instead of the expected vote for war, Congress had instead passed “An Act Making Provision for
Defraying any Extraordinary Expenses Attending the Intercourse between the United States and
Foreign Nations.” This vaguely worded act, popularly referred to as the “Two Million Dollar
Act,” authorized the President to spend up to $2 million to negotiate for Florida. To Americans
who viewed West Florida as having been part of the original Louisiana Purchase, this seemed
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like paying for the same real estate twice. Others were uncomfortable with what looked
suspiciously like bribe money. 153 Horrified at what one prominent Jeffersonian—the Virginian
John Randolph—saw as a “base prostration of national character,” the congressional opposition
began launching devastating rhetorical salvos at the Jeffersonian plan almost as soon as the
prohibition on releasing details of the secret proceedings was lifted at the end of March. As
before with the Louisiana Purchase, the vast majority of the opposition was in favor of
expansion, but argued that the manner of expansion was just as important as the physical
expansion itself. As they went on the offensive, the French Emperor and his empire figured
prominently in the argument against expansion at all moral and economic costs.154
Without knowing the full details of Jefferson’s gambit for West Florida, virtually all of
the opposition saw the President prostrating American interests at the feet of Bonaparte instead
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of Machiavellian intrigue on the part of the President. One typically bellicose Federalist, for
example, was extremely disappointed to hear that Congress’s secret session had not been called
for the raising of, “ships, troops and taxes” for a war with Spain, but instead for voting
“TRIBUTE to Bonaparte!” He found it unconscionable that the United States should pay for
Louisiana a second time. This was, he fumed, nothing more than “servile condescension to the
French tyrant” who demanded “Tribute, Tribute, Tribute.” Federalists had long seen Jefferson
and his party as kowtowing to the French empire, but the emphasis on the United States
becoming a full-fledged tributary to the French Republic was a new device which owed its sting
to what Americans saw as the ill-treatment of Napoleon’s “sister republics” in Europe. 155
The idea of tribute was a powerful one in early America because it implied dependence.
Dependence on anyone or anything was dangerous because it robbed an actor of their freedom to
act in the best interest of the community. Americans understood this freedom to act
independently as the characteristic that made classical republicanism possible. Without it, an
actor was little better than a slave. The actor might be an individual, but it could also be a
community or even a nation. Napoleonic Europe furnished perfect models of this dependence in
the semi-autonomous “sister republics” of France. As the Napoleonic wars dragged on,
Americans saw these dependent satellites being milked for money and men to supply the
ravenous needs of the French war machine. 156
Americans were not shy about using these examples in their everyday discourse. For
example, when one New England author complained that while New England states provided the
Federal government with the overwhelming majority of its tax revenue, it was the southern slave
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states that received the majority of federal post-office funds, he used a classic Napoleonic
illustration. “Does not the enlightened government of the French Republic,” he asked, “in a like
manner receive tribute from Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Hanover, and
the numerous dependent principalities of Germany?” He concluded sarcastically, “Are not our
proceedings equal and correct according to the model of our sister republic, and will they not
very speedily have the same desirable and happy issue, with respect to our equality, liberty and
independence?”157
Because it was so effective, other opposition writers quickly took up the refrain of
“tribute” to Bonaparte in the wake of the Two Million Dollar Act. Many publicly questioned
whether the United States was truly the master of its own foreign policy—the hallmark of
national independence. One author, for example, cringed at “giving Two Millions of dollars to
France, to have Bonaparte’s permission to treat with Spain.” The author had no faith in the
Jeffersonian members of Congress to protect American interests or independence. “If Jefferson
& Co. should pass a law to transfer the independence and liberties of this country to the Emperor
Napoleon,” he snarled, “a majority of these exclusive patriots would be found to justify the
measure.”158
Others used the same message, but presented a more dejected rather than angry tone. For
example, “Col. Cent” who wrote under a headline that cleverly reversed the famous rallying cry
of the XYZ Affair from “Millions for Defense, not a Cent for Tribute” to “Millions for Tribute,
not a Cent for Defense.” Col. Cent sadly suggested that, “the word Independence be stricken
from our records and the declaration thereof sent off with the tribute money.” Another
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(misinformed) opposition author sadly concluded that that since sixty tons of silver had set sail
for France as a “peace offering to Bonaparte” even before the Congress had lifted the veil of
secrecy from its disgraceful proceedings, “these states, once free, sovereign and independent,
[have] become a humble tributary to France.” 159
Not every member of the opposition was quite so maudlin, however. The West Florida
fiasco provided a marvelous opportunity for Federalists to sharpen their satiric wit. Several
newspapers offered a reworked version of Yankee Doodle that they saw as more appropriate for
the times. It featured the rousing chorus,
Yankee Doodle keep it up!
Yankee Doodle dandy!
A word or two from Bonaparte
goes down like sugar candy.
The ditty closed with the biting verse,
Our State Machine is mov’d about,
Some say on slippery rollers;
We’ve sent a Hornet’s Nest to France
To sting the French with dollars
To make them feel our desp’rate power,
So secret was the doing,
That few e’er thought, at Bona’s nod,
A tribute was a brewing.
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The core message of the song was essentially the same as in the other pieces. However, by
appropriating a popular song of the revolution, the opposition portrayed the Jefferson’s actions
not only as fundamentally weak and laughable, but also as betraying the nation itself. The song
also shows that the opposition made efforts to reach an audience beyond than the Federalist elite
of New England.160
Another, similarly irreverent format that the opposition began to use was the satirical
cartoon. In response to Jefferson’s West Florida woes, cartoonist James Akin produced a
popular cartoon titled “The Prairie Dog Sickened at the Sting of the Hornet” (figure 1). The
cartoon was only produced as a stand-alone print, but it was reproduced widely enough to justify
satirical commentary in two of the most important Federalist newspapers of the period. In the
cartoon, Jefferson is portrayed with the body of a prairie dog—undoubtedly a reference to the
“wilderness” of Louisiana. He is in the act of vomiting up $2 million while a French diplomat
teases him with maps of East and West Florida. Napoleon appears as a hornet that has just stung
the prairie dog, thus, in the words of the New York Gazette, “acting as a violent emetic on the
terror-struck spaniel.” Though Bonaparte is the smallest figure in the drawing, the cartoon is
clearly a commentary on his inordinate power over Jefferson. The title of the cartoon itself
indicates the diplomatic connection between the prairie dog and the hornet and offers a clear
indication of which man Akin thought was in control of the relationship. 161
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Figure 1. James Akin, “The Prairie Dog Sickened at the Sting of the Hornet,” 1806

In case anyone missed the point of the cartoon, the Federalist newspapers quickly
published a satirical explanation that highlighted the new role of Bonaparte in directing
American foreign policy. The cartoon was, the article insisted, was a “historical” piece of art
and not a caricature—as suggested by some “ill-natured folks.” Indeed, said the article, it was
such a masterpiece that it now hung in the halls of the Bonaparte’s Palace, where it was greatly
enjoyed by the emperor himself. With great attention to historical detail, the article continued,
the painting depicted Bonaparte administering a new purgative to a unique species of North
American dog which caused him to “disgorge Two Millions of Dollars at the feet of a certain
little Marquis.” The “dreadful operation” of this medicine was already well known in “Holland,
Spain, Italy, and most parts of the Continent of Europe, by the name of the Napoleon physic.”
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Like the parody of Yankee Doodle, Akins’s cartoon and the satirical commentary that went with
it demonstrate a turn toward the satirical in the use of Napoleon in rhetoric over expansion, and
show that Bonaparte had become a cultural symbol with whom Americans regardless of class
could identify.162
For one of the rare times in American history, the opposition rhetoric was so effective
that it completely derailed plans for expansion. Stunned at the furor he had created and at the
defection of many in his own party, Jefferson dropped all ideas of using the French Emperor as a
mediator for West Florida. After a fresh round of negotiations with Madrid failed miserably in
1806, he quietly let the matter drop. The damage had been done, however, and despite their
fervent insistence otherwise, Jefferson’s allies could never quite shake the accusation that they
were the toadies of Bonaparte.
After the decisive French victory at Austerlitz in 1806, the third coalition broke apart
leaving Britain to carry on the struggle against Bonaparte alone. A fourth coalition went to war
again later in the year, but was crushed by the end of 1807. Buoyed by his unbroken string of
success, Bonaparte looked to reshape the map of Europe once again. In 1806, he reorganized the
ancient Holy Roman Empire and formed the Confederation of Rhine in its place. Next, he
established the Kingdom of Holland in the place of the Batavian Republic. In 1807, he
organized the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (Poland) as a counterbalance to Russia, and, through the
Decrees of Berlin and Milan, established the Continental System to put economic pressure on
Great Britain. The Continental System proclaimed a blockade and closed all European ports to
British ships—or neutral ships that had traded with Great Britain. By the start of 1808, Napoleon
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was quickly reaching the height of his power and even his opponents marveled at his ability to
use Machiavellian tactics to remake political systems at will.
Americans too watched Bonaparte with a mixture of wonder and concern. To understand
why Bonaparte’s moves in Europe played perfectly into the fears of Americans who were
already concerned about events on their southern border, we must leave Florida for the moment
and take a digression into the murky world of the Burr conspiracy. Even after 200 years,
historians have a difficult time explaining exactly what took place during the Burr conspiracy
and separating the fact from the newspaper frenzy that resulted. Many modern historians have
accepted the traditional account of Burr the national traitor. Put very briefly, this version
account runs as follows. After killing the Federalist darling, Alexander Hamilton, in the famous
duel at Weehawken, NJ, the Vice President emerged a marked man. Ostracized by his political
friends and shunned by the President, he concocted a plot to recruit an army of secessionist
westerners and, with help from Britain and Spain, establish a new empire in the states and
territories west of the Alleghenies. Once this task was complete, he expected to lead his
victorious army into Mexico, Spanish Florida and, possibly, march to Washington itself to unseat
Jefferson.163
More recent research, however, suggests that Burr probably only planned to take
advantage of the war scare on the Texas/Louisiana border and lead a filibustering expedition into
Spanish Mexico with the assistance of the British navy. Filibustering was a privately backed
military invasion intended to topple a government by encouraging residents to “liberate”
themselves from alleged tyranny. It had also been an integral part of the Jeffersonian strategy of
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peaceful expansion for many years. Interestingly enough, Burr was so ambiguous as to his plans
that even those he attempted to recruit were somewhat mystified as to his ultimate intentions.
One he attempted to sway was Andrew Jackson, who was at that time a Major General in the
Tennessee militia. When Jackson reported on his odd meeting with Burr to his superior, he
cautiously wondered if Burr’s actions were occasioned by a desire to prevent Louisiana from
being snatched up by “the rapacious hands of Bonapart,” who, according to Jackson, “might be a
troublesome neighbour to the united States.” 164
Burr’s filibustering plans fell into disarray during the fall of 1806. His chief coconspirator, the slippery General James Wilkinson (who had been on the Spanish pay-roll for
decades as a double agent) turned on his erstwhile confederate. Alleging that 20,000 Burrite
freebooters were traveling south to attack New Orleans, Wilkinson fired off letters to
Washington warning of the grave danger. Meanwhile, he set about preparing a defense of the
Crescent City and purging the town of Burr’s associates. In actuality, no such invasion force
existed and Wilkinson was merely covering for his own long list of misdeeds. Once Burr
realized Wilkinson’s betrayal, he briefly attempted to flee. After only two weeks on the run,
however, the former Vice President, along with about 100 cold and hungry supporters
surrendered to authorities in Mississippi on January 12, 1807. 165
Such were the facts. What the nation’s newspapers reported, however, was quite
different. Burr had accumulated many political enemies in his life and now all of them sensed
blood in the water. Accusations of treachery were made even more sensational when the subject
was portrayed as the American Napoleon. Burr’s ambitious character had been associated with
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that of Bonaparte since at least his presidential run in 1800, but his treason trial breathed new life
to this old accusation. Early reports of Burr’s activities noted the similarity between the
ambitions of Burr and those of the French emperor. For example, the Richmond Enquirer
suggested that the object of Burr’s mission appeared to be establishing a western empire and that
such a territory could only be run by an emperor “bearing a resemblance to Bonaparte.” Many
papers linked the two men through use of the word “emperor.” Almost immediately, Burr was
styled the “Emperor of the Quids” by the highly influential Jeffersonian paper, The Aurora in an
attempt to distance Burr (himself a Jeffersonian) from the presidential wing of the party. Other
papers called him “the little emperor.” Thanks to the such actions, Americans of the Early
Republic easily made a link between the characters of former vice president and the Napoleon. 166
For the Federalists, the Burr affair symbolized everything that was wrong with
uncontrolled Jeffersonian expansion beyond the Mississippi. For as long as they could
remember, the dark, foreboding western regions of country had seemed to breed discontent and
threats of disunion. To them, Burr’s alleged conspiracy demonstrated the weakness of the
Federal government in the West and they focused on the threat to union highlighted by the
imagined plot. The timing of the conspiracy also seemed suspicious to Federalists. For several
years, Bonaparte’s armies had been occupied in Europe, but with Napoleon’s dramatic
destruction of the Third and Fourth Coalitions, many thought they saw the ambitious and
treacherous hand of Bonaparte behind the insidious machinations of Burr.
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On January 1, 1807, the Federalist New York Gazette reported with certainty that muskets
of “new and of French manufacture” had been seized from the conspirators. Also, it was
reported, among Burr’s associates, there were two “foreign gentlemen…who spoke the French
language.” This could only indicate one thing according to the editors of the Gazette: Burr’s
actions had been “conducted under the auspices of Napoleon.” A week later The Western World
warned its readers that if the rumored destruction of the Prussian army at Jena-Auerstedt were
true, it would clear the way for Bonaparte’s restless ambition to turn its gaze westward once
again. The author warily concluded that, “since the late operations of col. Burr,” he suspected
anyone who suggested that Bonaparte was not still interested in the conquest of North America
of trying to “lull us into security, the more easily to conquer us.” Even after his acquittal, the
perceived treachery of Burr remained linked to Bonaparte for many years to come. In mid-1810,
with West Florida descending into chaos, Baltimore’s Federal Republican warned that Louisiana
“contained a mass of excitable matter, every way fitted for the conjoint projects of Burr and
Bonaparte.” This of course, was a throwback to Federalist demographic concerns of 1803 in
which they had warned that that the citizens of Louisiana maintained their original allegiance to
Bonaparte.167
Even well after Burr’s acquittal, most of his countrymen continued to see him as the
American Napoleon—and thus a powerful symbol of treacherous ambition. In 1808, the
Universal Gazette printed a letter originally from the National Intelligencer. "We have enemies
within our walls, inexorable, vigilant and powerful,” warned the anonymous author. “The same
inordinate love of power which has raised Napoleon to his lofty eminence, impels them; and if
they do not pursue the same means to attain their ends, it is because we are vigilant and
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powerful.” It was worth remembering, concluded the author, that such treacherous enemies
would have made Aaron Burr president, “and who doubts but that either he would have been
another Napoleon or that our fields would have been crimsoned with blood." Ultimately it was
this linking of Burr to Bonaparte in the American mind which turned a filibustering expedition
into treason.168
The threats of internal dissention and international intrigue to the young republic that
undergirded both the Federalist response to the Burr conspiracy were not new but they took on a
new fervor due to popular renderings of Bonaparte in the American press. The first best-selling
Bonaparte book in the United States was A Secret History of the Court and Cabinet of St. Cloud,
which was already on its fourth printing in the United States by 1807. This lengthy work
purported to be a series of letters written in 1805 from a “gentleman” in Paris to his confident in
London. Many of the anecdotes contained in the book found their way into the daily papers and
later Napoleon biographies. The book portrayed the “wily Corsican” and his cronies as petty,
cruel, conniving, self-serving, amateur aristocrats who did not play by the accepted rules of
international diplomacy. Instead the Bonapartist regime relied on subterfuge and illegitimate
force to achieve their foreign policy ends. Interestingly, the American-printed 1807 version of
the book included a series of miscellaneous sketches at the end, one of which—the sketch of
Swiss folk heroine Martha Glar—undoubtedly interested American readers a great deal as it
included a direct warning to the people of the United States. 169
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In the first sentence, the sketch emphasized to Americans that the conquest of the,
“virtuous, peaceful, and happy little Republic of Switzerland,” had been accomplished by the,
“intrigues…more than by the arms of France.” What followed was a dismal tale of “horrid
outrages” perpetrated by the French and their treacherous collaborators on the poor people of
Switzerland and the tragic death of Martha Glar. In 1797, the patriotic speech of this sixty-fouryear-old grandmother, had roused the peasants of her village to resist the French invasion of
republican Switzerland. Stirred by her call to arms, men, women, and children marched out to
defend their homes, but after fighting valiantly most were butchered by the French army at the
battle of Frauenbrun. Among the dead numbered Glar herself, her husband, her father, two of
her sons, both of her daughters, her brother and three of her grand-daughters. Such stories of
desperate female martial valor in defense of freedom easily recalled to the American mind the
Revolutionary War images of Molly Corbin and Jane McCrea and Glar’s story tapped into an
already established trope of American popular culture.170
The author saved his most important point for last. The sketch ended with words of
warning to his American audience. “May the sad fate of the simple, virtuous, and unoffending
Swiss republics,” the author wrote, “be a solemn warning to all other states and kingdoms.”
They must be ever on guard against the “perfidious machinations of the French.” In case the
point was not clear enough, however, the author continued. It was inevitable that “the free,
happy, and prosperous republic of the United States of America, shall…in the course of a very
short time, be exposed to the threats of Gallic tyranny.” The author feared it might already be
too late for Americans to open their eyes to the dangers of French duplicity. “God grant,” he
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prayed, “this sad prediction not be verified; God grant that we be guarded in time against French
intrigues and arms, and that at least the present generation may not be witness to the ruin of their
country.”171
Americans heard similar words of warning against treacherous Bonapartian foreign
policy from other sources. In 1807, Thomas Branagan published Political and Theological
Disquisitions on the Signs of the Times Relative to the Present Conquests of France. Branagan’s
was a remarkable career. Irish by birth, he worked on slave ships and as a foreman on a
plantation in the British slave colony of Antigua before having a Methodist conversation
experience and embracing abolitionism. With his newfound faith he moved to first to London
and eventually to New York and began writing against slavery. In Disquisitions he found a way
to yoke his favorite subject to the looming threat of Bonaparte. 172
Branagan started by warning Americans that the dangers to the republic came in two
interconnected forms: first, internal threats which he defined as, “domestic factions, foreign
spies, and at least 900,000 mortal enemies who are continually gnawing the vitals of the body
politic.” By the last, he meant the enslaved portion of the United States who might very well rise
in revolt if given the opportunity by a treacherous foreign power like Bonaparte. After the chaos
and violence of the successful slave revolt against the French in St. Domingue, American slave
owners were already on edge about what might happen if their own slaves rose up against them.
The idea that Napoleon might actually encourage such racial violence was carefully calculated to
clearly illustrate how treacherous and opportunistic the emperor could be. The second threat was
the large number of French emigrants who, according to Branagan, secretly maintained their
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allegiance to Bonaparte. He expected that unless Americans realized these dangers quickly, it
would only be a matter of time before Bonaparte’s agents raised a fifth column element in the
United States made up of French immigrants, domestic “partizans” of Napoleon, and slaves.
Once that was done, Bonaparte’s crack troops could easily complete what “secret artifice and
intrigue” of his agents had started. 173
Lest Americans think this an unrealistic scenario Branagan reminded his countrymen of
the fates of Europe. “What was it that ruined Switzerland?” he asked, “I answer French
diplomatic artifice.” “What annihilated the Batavian Republic?” he continued, “I answer French
fraternizing violence.” Furthermore, he warned, there was no reason to think that Napoleon
would be content with his European empire. “The quibbling policy of the court and cabinet of
St. Cloud respecting the boundary of Louisiana,” he pointed out, “should be sufficient evidence
of the hostile intentions of France.” “Be assured,” said Branagan, it was ultimately Bonaparte
who was “at the bottom” the Spanish “insolence” on the West Florida issue as well as the Burr
conspiracy. For Branagan, these events showed clearly that Bonaparte was preparing the North
American continent for subjection into his universal empire. 174
Branagan’s basic theme of Napoleonic intrigue in foreign policy was echoed in the
newspapers, Federalist as well as Jeffersonian, especially after Bonaparte ousted the Bourbon
monarchy of his ally Spain in mid-1808. Napoleon had been justifiably suspicious of his
Spanish ally after they considered joining Prussia against the French in the Fourth Coalition of
1806. The catastrophic Prussian defeat at Jena-Auerstaedt, however, convinced the Spanish to
reconsider their moves, but they continued to greatly resent their domination by France,
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especially after they were forced to acquiesce to the French Continental System. The
Continental System was Bonaparte’s answer to the British blockade of Europe and closed all
European ports to British goods in 1807. 175
With the Spanish unable to prevent British influence in British-allied Portugal, Napoleon
sent almost 100,000 French troops into Spain to assist. This move proved extremely unpopular
with the Spanish people and led to a military coup that forced the abdication of the ailing Charles
IV in favor of his son. The older Bourbon monarch appealed to Bonaparte to act as an arbiter in
the dynastic dispute. Always the opportunist, Napoleon forced both father and son to cede their
throne to Bonaparte’s brother Joseph in March 1808. Within months, however, a nationalistic
Spanish resistance movement developed in the rural areas and set up an opposition government
known as the Cádiz Regency. The country rapidly devolved into a brutal guerilla war in which
both sides seemed willing to outdo each other in terms of ghastly cruelty. 176
Americans watched events in Spain very closely, and it seemed to play directly into their
notions of Bonaparte that the popular press had been fomenting since at least 1805. Many,
especially Federalists, applied the events of Spain to their own nation. When they connected the
usurpation of the Spanish throne to the popular perceptions of Bonaparte in the media, the result
was something like what appeared in the North American and Mercantile Advertiser in
September 1808. In this letter to the editor, “A Ploughman” wrote that he had fallen asleep
while reading reports of the brutal French occupation of Spain and had a dream. In this dream,
“a little Frenchman” stood before him and handed him a copy of the Jeffersonian newspaper, The
Aurora which contained a series of eleven edicts that mirrored French policies in Spain. Among
other draconian policies, the edicts named his imperial majesty Joseph Bonaparte “King of the
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Continent of North America,” forbade prints of Washington and Hamilton, and threatened to
shoot any who kept weapons in their homes or gathered in groups of more than eight (children
could gather in groups of up to twelve). 177
The aspect of this dream that would have stood out the most to the nineteenth century
reader century was the complicity of other Americans in these usurpations of their own liberties.
After all, it was not by accident that these edicts were being issued through the Jeffersonian
papers and that one of the edicts authorized William Duane, the firebrand editor of The Aurora,
to “arrest all printers who have published aught disrespectful to the Emperor and see that their
bodies are pierced and stung on a pole.” Conspiratorial stories of Napoleon’s imperial treachery
in Switzerland, Holland, and Spain created a volatile environment of suspicion in American
politics perhaps only rivaled by the Red Scares of the twentieth century and forced Americans to
reconsider their own place and role in the world. 178
The portrayal of Bonaparte’s perfidious and violent means of expansion in Europe,
especially in Spain, and the seemingly very real threat of his subterfuge undermining the
American republic during the Burr conspiracy led at least some Americans to conclude that the
means of their nation’s own expansion in North America really did matter. For other Americans
it reinvigorated a belief that foreign empires—especially that of Bonaparte—on the North
American continent were dangerous to American national security. How to react to these threats
though, provoked debate, even amongst political allies. These themes played an increasingly
important role as Americans considered the ramifications of the overthrow of the Bourbon
monarchy in Spain and their contemplation of war with Great Britain in 1812 to the persistent
problem of Florida.
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Even before it was clear that Bonaparte would overthrow the Bourbons in Spain rumors
were already flying about how the decaying situation in the Iberian Peninsula would alter
American territorial ambitions. In late 1807 and early 1808, an extract of a letter from a wellplaced source in Washington D.C. appeared in many papers. The author reported that rumors in
the “most respectable circles” claimed Bonaparte would soon issue a proclamation in which he
would no longer acknowledge American shipping neutrality—a reasonably accurate explanation
of Bonaparte’s Milan Decree. Furthermore, and less accurately, it hinted that Napoleon would
guarantee the United States Canada and Nova Scotia for American entry into a war against Great
Britain.179
This article touched off a brief firestorm. Federalists assumed that the Jefferson
administration would take the bait and draw the United States into a military conflict with Great
Britain for the misguided purposes of territorial aggrandizement. On January 5, 1808, the Boston
Repertory published a “Dream.” In the dream, the author traveled to New York in May, but
instead of finding a prosperous port, he found ships laid up, soldiers patrolling the streets, and
fortifications being built along the East River. “The Genius of Bonaparte prevailed,” wailed the
dreamer. “His imperial fiat: his imperious command, have been heard…and his voice was
obeyed in terror on our shores.” The author cursed his “deluded leaders” for their ambition and
warned his fellow countrymen. “Think not…that the wily Corsican will better keep his word
with you than with the exhausted Republic of Holland,” he began. “Think not that you will be
left peaceably to occupy the provinces of Canada or Nova Scotia when conquered by your allied
forces…think not the mighty Bonaparte will generously yield up the boon of the Floridas.” Such
were the miseries, he concluded, that flowed from “an ambition of territorial aggrandizement.”
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The Federalist suggestion of a military alliance between France and the United States was a
relatively new rhetorical tool that gained power as time went on. At this early date, however, it
was not particularly effective since the Jefferson administration confined itself to economic
warfare and harsh language against the British.180
Other Federalists also decried any military action in support of France. An author
identifying himself only as AB wrote an article that ran in several newspapers, including page
one of the New York Spectator. He asked the administration if they really believed that
Bonaparte would allow any nation to rival his own empire. Did they truly think that Bonaparte
would actually allow the United States to “remain as it is now, ONE VAST OR RATHER
BOUNDLESS STATE?” This was an interesting line of attack. In effect, AB imagined a
bipolar world dominated in the west by the United States, and in the east by Napoleon. Such a
world might seem reasonable to the starry-eyed Jeffersonians, but not to Bonaparte. Would the
emperor, asked AB rhetorically, allow the United States “to cross in any direction, his gigantic
march toward universal dominion?” The answer, was, of course, a negative one. 181
Another gloomy take was offered by an author writing under the pseudonym “Peace.” In
a widely reprinted article titled, “War Unnecessary and Ruinous,” he decried any war against
Great Britain because it would do nothing but eventually draw the United States into a
unwinnable war with Napoleon. Like AB, “Peace” could not imagine a world in which
Bonaparte could allow the United States to remain the dominate power in the Americas. There
were no limits to French ambition he wrote, and it was useless to trust in patriotic American
unity in case of war against the French. Almost quoting verbatim from A Secret History of the
Court and Cabinet of St. Cloud, he wrote, “France has done more by her intrigues than her
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arms,” and, he reminded his readers, “are there not Burrs and Wilkinsons in our country?” “My
fears for the independence of my country,” he stated flatly, “are founded on the character of
Bonaparte.” It was the height of foolishness, he wrote, to trust any territorial promises made by
the Emperor. In what was becoming standard Federalist rhetoric by 1808, he asked, “where are
the nations who have negotiated with Bonaparte…and what has become of his guarantees?” 182
“Peace” then questioned the entire idea of expansion from a national security standpoint.
“As to possessing Canada and the Floridas—of what use would they be to us—of what use is
Louisiana to us, unless to hatch treasons.” Canada was a country of Frenchmen, he continued,
echoing arguments made about the population of Louisiana five years earlier, “and Frenchmen
are always Frenchmen.” With the British defeated using American help, what then? With both
Canada and Louisiana full of French sympathizers, the United States would be hemmed in
territorially and fall easy prey to Bonaparte’s treachery. “I tremble for the independence of my
country,” he concluded, “when it must rest on the faith or humanity of a conqueror.” It is
important to note that the real power in all of these arguments came not in questioning the means
of American expansion per se, but rather in the dangers of expansion to national security,
especially when expansion required trusting in the good will of the treacherous Napoleon. 183
Federalists who breathed a sigh of relief when the Jefferson administration did not
actually plunge the United States into an ill-conceived war for Napoleon in 1808, still could not
escape two uncomfortable and interrelated facts. The first was that the decaying Spanish
empire—nominally under the control of Joseph Bonaparte—still laid claim to large swaths of the
Americans including both of the Floridas as well as Mexico and Cuba. Under the Bourbons,
Spain had continued to dispute the validity of the entire Louisiana Purchase. No one in the
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United States was quite sure whether a Bonaparte on the throne would change that policy.
Second, despite spending $15 million and nearly going to war to prevent Napoleon from
becoming their western neighbor in 1803, there was once again a Bonaparte on their borders. As
one Federalist newspaper editor groaned forlornly, “thus ends the miserable policy of attempting
to attain security by purchasing the ground that a suspecting and meddlesome tenant might
occupy.” Another lamented, “Has not Bonaparte one foot in Spain, and another in South
America? Are not East and West Florida his own? Let him but raise a standard there and we
shall soon see, furnished from our own bowels, thirty thousand men glittering in arms.” 184
Not all Americans were such pessimists, however. Some saw a golden opportunity to
start history anew in North America. Stories of burgeoning independence movements in some
parts of the Spanish American empire encouraged some in the United States to consider the
nature of their own expansion. Often they did this in terms they derived from Bonaparte’s
expansion in Europe. The most eloquent and thoughtful example of this type of thinking
occurred in a series of five articles first published in the Virginia Patriot, but later printed
throughout the east coast under the pseudonym Rusticus during the fall of 1810. 185
Rusticus began his articles by stating that the world was changing before his eyes. “We
see mighty empires reduced to dependence,” he wrote, “and states long deemed unimportant
become formidable to their neighbors.” He acknowledged that, at least in this age, much of this
was due to Napoleon, but he reminded his readers that the rise and fall of empires had been
going on since the dawn of time. With the rise of independence movements in Spanish colonies
he continued, it appeared that the tide of empire was shifting inexorably west to the Americas
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where new nations would rise from the ruins of the Spanish colonial empire. This was, of
course, of paramount interest to the United States as it would give the nation “formidable
neighbors who will be able to manage their own affairs.” “The Atlantic,” he wrote, “will no
longer roll between the U. States and the mighty potentates of the earth. They will border upon
us to a great extent and touch us at points particularly vulnerable.” 186
Rusticus then tried to explain how he believed the United States ought to react to this new
geopolitical reality. Put simply, Americans would need to tread with great caution. According
to Rusticus, there were two outstanding issues that needed to be resolved to preserve the
economic and political security of the United States in this new world order. First was the
acquisition of the Floridas, which would provide settlers in Alabama and Mississippi the water
routes they needed for the transportation of goods to Mobile and the Gulf of Mexico. Possessing
Florida would also prevent these same settlers from being influenced by powers—obviously he
had only one in mind—hostile to the United States. The second issue was the frustratingly vague
boundary between the United States and Mexico, which would, he wrote, cause no end to enmity
between the two powers when Mexico became a “distinct power.” Resolving these disputes
without “employing the sword” would undoubtedly be a difficult proposition that would “take a
great deal of moderation and of mutual good will,” according to Rusticus. Making things even
more difficult was the dubious circumstances by which the United States had acquired Louisiana.
As Rusticus pointed out, these had been deliberately calculated by Bonaparte to “make
impressions unfavorable to that friendship which it is in the interest of neighbors to cultivate
with each other.”187
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With the groundwork laid, Rusticus moved into the heart of his argument. In doing so,
he tied American conduct directly to Bonaparte. French claims in the Spanish colonial
possessions, he wrote, were those of an “ambitious despot.” According to Rusticus, Bonaparte’s
expansion came through “sinning against heaven and earth…violating the most sacred laws
divine and human, betraying friends who trusted implicitly in him.” Thus Bonaparte had
“robbed an ancient and high minded people of their sovereignty, and on atrocious deeds founds
his whole claim to dominions over their American brethren.” Yet, Rusticus continued, “the right
given by force and fraud can only be coextensive with the means which gave it.” In other words,
expansion done through deceit and unlawful force could only be maintained though the same
means. Rusticus thus maintained that it would be near impossible for Bonaparte to maintain his
grasp on the distant American colonies because his rule could only be enforced directly through
coercion and deceit. 188
So much for the cruel and treacherous expansion along the Napoleonic model. But,
insisted Rusticus, there was another way when it came to extending an empire. If the United
States considered the “abstract right” and the “great, unalterable principles of justice” it would
set the conditions for a permanent friendship with the newly formed governments of the
Americas. “The Floridas may be seized,” Rusticus wrote, “under various pretexts.” But
obtaining this critical piece of territory through “force or intrigue would make a deep and lasting
impact on Spanish America.” “A generous mind,” he went on, “cannot view without extreme
disgust a nation boasting its justice and moderation and liberty lying in wait for the distress of its
neighbors and seizing the moment when they are struggling for existence…to wrest or seduce
from them an extremely valuable portion of their territory.” Put simply, if the United States were
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to expand through Napoleonic means, it would set the stage for perpetual animosity and war in
the Americas, but if she expanded through just and magnanimous principles, it would create an
environment of peace and prosperity for generations. 189
In his final article, Rusticus explained explicitly how to apply these principles of just
expansion to the situation facing the United States. First, the nation had to support these nascent
American independence movements to prevent French control of Florida and Mexico. This was
critical to American national security and economic prosperity. Second, to ensure perpetual
friendship among the new empires emerging in the Americas, the United States should give up
the half of Louisiana west of the Mississippi to an independent Mexico in return for the Floridas.
Mexico resented the loss of its northern territories, he explained, and these territories were full of
strange peoples who could never be assimilated into the United States and the vague boundaries
would invariably cause problems between the two nations. Florida, on the other hand was a
knife poised at the heart of the United States, but was disconnected from and therefore useless to
Mexico. Ultimately, claimed Rusticus, this trade would have the happy benefit of divesting each
nation of, “a territory of no value to the owner, but of immediate importance to the opposite
party.” Just as important, it would set a tone of cooperation and peace in the Americas. 190
Rusticus represents the way that at least some idealistic Americans sought to understand
the new world that Bonaparte’s own cruelty and deceit had made possible within ideas that they
appropriated from the expansion of the Napoleonic empire. He imagined a peaceful and rational
expansion to America’s natural limits in contrast to the cruel and treacherous expansion of
Bonaparte. He also represents an almost purely Vattelan worldview. For Rusticus and others
familiar with the Swiss political theorist, Napoleon’s European empire had overturned the
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delicate balance of power that was the best safeguard against a “universal monarchy.” States had
an obligation to protect each other to maintain the balance of power and the nations of Europe
had failed in their basic Vattelian obligation to protect the sovereignty of their brother nations.
In the New World, it fell to the United States to help establish a new, peaceful balance of power
of mutually supportive, sovereign nations. Rusticus never, of course, mentioned this directly.
His popular audience hardly cared about the intricacies of dead Swiss theorists. Still, the
fingerprints of Vattel were clearly evident in the work of Rusticus. Despite Rusticus’s eloquent
appeals for a peaceful balance of the power in the Americas, however, most Americans were far
less magnanimous. They also used the rhetoric of Bonaparte to frame their arguments.191
One group that Rusticus was writing against were Federalists who called for an
immediate military solution to the Florida problem. “If Napoleon obtains a footing on this
continent we are undone,” stated one in an article in the American Citizen. Like Rusticus, this
author was preoccupied by the Spanish colonies in the Americas. “Spain, I fear is conquered,”
the author continued, “the colonies of Spain, if they do not become Independent, will follow the
fate of Spain.” Unlike Rusticus, however, he saw little that cheered him in these independence
movements. South America was unprepared to be a republic, he complained, and would likely
become an independent monarchy. Cuba, with its valuable plantations and strategic position in
the Caribbean, would probably be seized by the British. The Floridas, however, did not have the
population to become an independent republic and had no strategic value to the British. Thus
they would probably fall “under the dominion of the grand despot.” Yet, the author wrote,
almost petulantly, “they should belong to us.” In fact, he continued, “all Europe should be
excluded from them.” “They must be purchased or conquered,” he declared, and it seemed
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inconceivable that Bonaparte would part with a colony with which he could exert influence on
the United States. There was but one alternative he concluded: “we must take them.”
Fortunately, the author reasoned, “very little fighting will be necessary.” Without a navy, he
argued, Napoleon was, for the present at least, unable to oppose the designs United States in the
Americas. Thus, when the moment for action came, Americans had an excellent chance to defy
Bonaparte if Americans remained, “faithful to ourselves, faithful to our interest [and] faithful to
our safety.”192
This rhetoric for war to prevent Bonaparte’s gaining a foothold on the North American
continent sounded very similar to the debates over the use of military force during the
Mississippi Crisis of 1803. Yet, there was at least one major difference. During the Mississippi
Crisis, those in favor of an attack on New Orleans had justified their calls for war through
Spanish abrogation of Pickney’s Treaty. It was a flimsy excuse, to be sure, but one that held up
legally in a Vattelian world. In this case, however, there was no such legal justification.
Bonaparte’s influence was so dangerous to the sovereignty of the United States, that an openly
offensive, preemptive war was preferable to it. The article did not even present the façade of
rendering assistance to a struggling neighbor. More than a few Federalists perceived Napoleon
to be so dangerous to the very existence of the United States that they were prepared to turn
Vattel on his head.
Still other Americans looked with cynical satisfaction on the Napoleonic usurpation of
the Bourbon monarchy as finally marking an end to the political fiction that Spain was actually
in control of her own foreign policy. For example, in July 1808, an editorial in The Monitor
wrote that the United States had little to fear from a Bonaparte on the throne of the Spain.
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Indeed, the editorial argued that it had the potential to be an excellent real estate opportunity for
the nation. Like Louisiana in 1803, reasoned the author, Florida was little more than a target for
the Royal Navy and thus Napoleon would likely be interested in divesting himself of the
vulnerable property as soon as possible. The article ended with cynical optimism. At last there
would now be no more “baffling responses from Madrid to Paris and Paris to Madrid, but the
avowed and responsible authority will be found in the person of Bonaparte.” This fact, the
author concluded, “will certainly be an advantage to all nations.” Enough Americans agreed (or
at least seemed to) with this sentiment for a Federalist author in the Newburyport Herald to
explode in rage over Jeffersonians who would rather see “every man woman and child in Spain,
spitted on the bayonets of Bonaparte’s war dogs, than lose their fifteen millions.” 193
In the flurry of ideas flying through the press about national security and expansion, few
Americans apparently considered that the West Floridians might have something to say about
their own future. In the aftermath of the failed rebellions of 1804 and 1805, three factions
gradually developed in West Florida. The most numerous composed of those settlers who were
content with laissez faire Spanish rule—or at least those who owed their land grants and
positions of authority to the Imperial government. Another, smaller group supported an
American annexation of the territory, and a third faction sought to set up an independent republic
of West Florida. The overthrow of the monarchy in Spain and crumbling authority of the
Spanish governor, however, led to the fatal weakening of the loyalist faction.194
Taking advantage of the situation, pro-independence residents of the four parishes west
of the Perdido River called for a convention in late July, 1810. The convention delegates
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carefully avoided any overt talk of rebellion but drafted a document pledging nominal support
for the Cádiz Regency and to offering to “assist” the governor by taking over most of his
executive duties. This was a thinly veiled attempt at direct rule, but with only twenty-eight
Spanish soldiers at his disposal the governor had little choice but to cooperate with the
convention. Quietly, though, the governor attempted to send secret messages to Spanish officials
in Pensacola requesting aid to reestablish his authority. Learning that messages had been sent to
Pensacola and fearing harsh reprisals, the convention deposed the governor as “unworthy of their
confidence,” and quickly mustered a force of pro-independence militia. This force easily
overran the tiny Spanish garrison at Baton Rouge on September 23, 1810, and the convention
declared the Republic of West Florida an independent nation shortly thereafter. On October 10,
the newly independent Republic of West Florida warned that their independence was threatened
by the “partizans” of Bonaparte and formally requested admittance to the United States. 195
The request of West Florida to join the union created something of a foreign policy crisis
in the Madison administration. Based on the Vattel’s law of nations, Madison could not
recognize the independent West Florida government, even to accept it into the Union, without
effectively renouncing the American claim that West Florida had been bought and paid for with
the original Louisiana Purchase. This would allow both the Cádiz Regency and Napoleonic
Spain to legitimately claim West Florida as a rebellious province and view any American
interference there as an act of war—and also a violation of Vattel’s principle of non-interference
with other nation’s sovereignty. The British might also view any American meddling with West
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Florida as an attack on their new ally, Bourbon Spain. Time was working against Madison as
well. He knew that the British had already quashed an independence movement in Venezuela in
support of Spain earlier in the year and there were reports that runaway slaves and Indians were
being stirred up by Spanish agents along the border with East Florida. It would be all too easy
for the British navy to step in on behalf of their ally in the name of restoring order to the chaotic
situation.196
With this bewildering variety of factors in mind, Madison moved quickly and attempted
to thread the needle of foreign diplomacy. Without waiting for Congress to reconvene in
December, Madison decided to ignore the West Florida government altogether so as not to
jeopardize American claims to the area. Instead, in a carefully worded proclamation on October
27, he announced that the United States would occupy the region pursuant to the title conferred
by the Louisiana Purchase in order to preserve the “tranquility and security of our adjoining
territories.” In separate instructions, Madison ordered the governor of the Orleans Territory,
William Claiborne, to immediately incorporate West Florida into his own jurisdiction and
authorized him to use the Army, navy gunboats, as well as militia from Louisiana and
Mississippi to quell any resistance from the government of West Florida. Even though most
inhabitants of the area did hope to become part of the United States, they wanted to do it on their
own terms and many resented the heavy-handed methods of the American government. Despite
some initial protests and threats to resist an American invasion, however, it was abundantly clear
that Claiborne had overwhelming military force at his disposal. After seventy-four days as an
independent republic, the nation of West Florida quietly fell under the jurisdiction of the United
States at the point of a bayonet. Even this occupation did not entirely solve the Florida issue,
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however. The key cities of Mobile and Pensacola remained under Spanish control as did the rest
of the Florida Peninsula. 197
Despite Madison’s legalistic, if harsh, approach, Federalist newspapers were apoplectic at
his handling of the West Florida affair. They vented their rage through the Napoleonic rhetoric
that was already second nature to them. After a decade as an opposition, cracks were beginning
to show in the Federalist camp and the party had a difficult time coordinating their responses to
the Florida affair without seeming hypocritical. By the end of the crisis, the most effective
attacks were those that argued the United States had become a willing tool of Napoleonic France.
No matter which approach they used, however, the Federalist appeals to the American people
used the rhetoric of Bonaparte.
Even before the crisis reached forced Madison to act the Federalist newspapers began
their attacks. In August, the editor of the Boston Gazette wrote a scathing editorial in which he
warned his readers that the Madison administration would likely not take advantage of the
golden opportunities that the chaos in Florida provided to the nation. Like many others before
him, the editor pointed out the important advantages of American possession of the Floridas.
West Florida, he noted, contained Mobile, “an outlet essential to the convenience of a large
district of the western country.” East Florida, in the hands of Americans, would prove “an
invaluable security and a powerful means to annoy our enemies.” In the hands of others,
however, it would be a “scourge to chastise and vex us.” The United States, he insisted, would
justified in “gaining them at considerable expense.” Yet, as the region was populated mostly by
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Americans, the editor continued, that it was likely that they would soon make an “offer of
associating with our union.” Yet, in this offer, “they will likely be disappointed.” 198
Madison would not dare to receive this western “Gibraltar” into the union even at little
cost to the United States because such a step would “involve him with Bonaparte.” Even if the
British and the Spanish renounced their claims on the territory the editor argued, Madison would
never move against the French Emperor’s wishes. “Mr. Jefferson used to say,” the editor
concluded, “that the Floridas would fall into our hands without effort, as a ripe cherry would fall
into the hands of him, who waited with patience for the proper season.” The current
administration, however, would rather allow the cherry to fall to the ground and rot. “To them it
is forbidden fruit—forbidden by Napoleon.” For this editor and those who thought like him, the
whole basis of Jeffersonian expansion was dictated by fear of Bonaparte. This was not unlike
how Federalists had portrayed Jefferson as a starry-eyed idealist during the Louisiana Purchase
debates. By 1810, however, the global circumstances had changed. Bonaparte was the
undisputed master of Europe and Federalists adjusted their rhetoric accordingly. Many
suggested that the Madison administration cowered in fear before Napoleon rather than simply
being naively hoodwinked by his empty promises. 199
Most Federalists were probably surprised when they read about Madison’s military
annexation plan for West Florida, but they quickly revised their lines of attack to correspond to
the new reality. Of course, Bonaparte was still central to their rhetoric. On December 18, the
Boston Repertory published a long discussion of the President’s proclamation. The Repertory
acknowledged that the United States had a “clear and unquestionable” title to West Florida. The
means of asserting this claim, however, were very important. “Is it consistent with sound policy
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and the pacific professions of the United States,” asked the Repertory, “to oust the Spaniards at
the point of the bayonet?” They found the timing of the territory’s “forcible seizure” extremely
questionable. “While Spain was the ally of France, we did not dare assert our rights in arms,”
the author noted.200
Yet, in 1810, the situation was reversed. Bourbon Spain was the ally of Britain,
struggling for its independence against the Bonaparte regime, and it was at this point that
Madison chose to forcefully assert American claims in West Florida at the risk of starting a war
with Great Britain. Small wonder the Repertory believed there was more to the policy than met
the eye. Why, asked the author, had Madison suddenly become a “military man” so interested in
“offending Great Britain and patriotic Spain?” For the editor of the Repertory, the bottom line
was simple: “he serves Bonaparte.” “We think it a just speculation,” concluded the Repertory
article, “that West Florida has been seized, not only with the consent of France, but with her
special insistence, and is probably to be held in secret trust for Napoleon until the fate of Spain is
decided.” In contrast to the earlier Boston Gazette article, the Repertory’s analysis of Madison’s
expansionist policies shows a shift to a much darker rhetoric. In the eyes of the Repertory, by
committing military forces to Florida, Madison was not simply reacting in fear to Bonaparte, but
was actively working as an agent of his foreign policy in the Americas. 201
Accusations of the administration’s complicity with Bonaparte in foreign affairs quickly
became commonplace. There had been occasional suggestions of this in earlier times, but,
before the West Florida revolt the debate had been in the abstract. The actual use of ground
forces to enforce the American claims in West Florida by military fiat was so distasteful to many
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Federalists that it led to an unmistakable ratcheting up of this rhetoric. For example, a typical
article making the rounds of the Federalist presses in early 1811 wondered that the United States
was, “actually and openly” taking part in Bonaparte’s “unnatural war against commerce and
civilization.” The author warned his readers that nation’s military was now arrayed against the
interests of the American people and ready “to carry the projects of the Emperor into execution.”
Another characteristic article in the Federal Republican accused the United States of being “an
instrument of Bonaparte’s aggrandizement.” 202
In the wake of the furor over the annexation of West Florida, Jeffersonians fought back
harder than they had done in years against Federalist attacks on their expansionists policies.
Recognizing the power of Napoleonic language in mobilizing public support, they too framed
their arguments using Bonaparte. On December 14, 1810, while the rest of Boston was reading
biting commentaries on the administration’s military occupation of Florida, the Jeffersonian
readers of the Old Colony Gazette were treated to a front page, seven-year retrospective on the
benefits of the Louisiana Purchase. “The cession of Louisiana to the United States was an
event,” the article began, “the importance of which does not appear to have been duly
appreciated.” The article singled out one group in particular who did not seem to understand the
value of Louisiana: “Those whose distempered imaginations discover in every passing cloud a
squadron of French balloons, with an invading army of exterminating jacobins.” This, of course,
was a jab at the Federalists, who always seemed too ready to believe the incredible stories they
read about the duplicity of the Emperor. 203
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It ought not be forgotten, the article continued, that there was at one time a very real
threat to the United States from Bonaparte. At the very moment the Purchase was worked out,
“the terrible Napoleon was on the point of sending out a formidable expedition of French troops,
for the very purpose of colonizing the country under consideration.” According to the article, it
was only through the shrewd diplomacy of Jefferson that the horrors of a Napoleonic colony as a
neighbor had not come to pass. In case the audience had forgotten, the article was happy to
remind them what the terrible consequences might have come to pass. For this, they reached
back to America’s favorite historian, David Ramsey and quoted at length from his Charleston
speech celebrating the Purchase. In particular, they highlighted the point where he argued that a
French military colony would have checked the expansion of the United States or led to its
dismemberment through to French economic pressure. To Ramsey’s analysis, they added one
more comment of their own. “No people,” the article wrote of the French, “are so well qualified
for acquiring an ascendency over the savage mind.” There was no telling what mischief the
“wily Napoleon” could have made on the western frontier with the help of thousands of native
Indian allies.204
“I think,” the article concluded, “we cannot too highly applaud the wisdom of that
policy…which so happily exempted the nation from the inconvenience and danger of a
formidable and restless neighbor.” Though it was cleverly disguised, the underlying message of
this article was not hard to discern when given the context. The Jefferson administration had
done whatever it took—including overlooking some his most cherished constitutional
principles—to prevent Bonaparte from gaining an American colony. In doing so, he had saved
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the nation from great danger. At the end of 1810, with the prospect of Bonaparte gaining control
of the Floridas, it was vital for the Madison administration to do the same. 205
Another way Jeffersonians defended Madison’s actions in Florida was by attacking
Federalist hypocrisy on the subject of Napoleon. On the first day of 1811, an article in the New
Hampshire Patriot went on the offensive against what it called the “uncandid and inconsistent
conduct of the Federalist faction in regard to taking possession of this territory.” The editor
asked his readers to recall that only five years ago, the same Federalists who now claimed
Madison’s actions as an act of war against a foreign power, had recoiled at the prospect of
paying $2 million for territory that we had already bought in the original Louisiana Purchase.
Quoting from prominent Federalist papers, the article went on. In 1805, the Federalists had
called Jefferson “cowardly” and “under fear of Napoleon,” for not daring to “take possession of
what was indisputably our own.” These same men now claimed that Madison was acting out of
“fear or love of Napoleon” for doing exactly what they had counseled before. No, the article
continued, Madison’s policy actually demonstrated that the course of the United States would be
charted in spite of Napoleon’s bluster and not because of it. In the end though, the author
doubted his logic would change any minds. “Each and every thing is condemned,” he
complained. “The President and Congress is stigmatized and abused—one is called a ‘French
President,’ and the other declared to be guided by the ‘secret hand of Napoleon.’”206
Without a doubt, the most damaging attack on the Madison’s expansionist policies in
West Florida had been the accusation that the United States had finally become an active
participant in Napoleonic expansion. This rhetorical weapon gained its potency because of the
assumptions Americans made about the purpose of military alliances. As Daniel Lang shows in
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Foreign Policy in the Early Republic, military alliances held an important role in the world of
Emmerich Vattel. In a perfect world, said Vattel, each nation state would have approximately
the same power and thus balance each other out. States became dangerous when they were not
balanced out by their neighbors. Alliances were an unfortunate necessity in an imperfect world.
They allowed smaller, less powerful states to preserve their sovereignty by collectively
counterbalancing their more powerful neighbors and allowed neighbors to band together to check
a state which attempted to upset the balance of power and create a “universal monarchy” by
subverting the sovereignty of other states.207
Bonaparte threatened to upend the whole Vattelian understanding of the proper role of
alliances because his alliances only reinforced his dreams of “universal monarchy.” This is why
the Richmond Enquirer was so struck by the remaking of Europe after the French victories of
1806. The Enquirer marveled at the ability of Bonaparte to create new kingdoms with a snap of
his fingers and then weave them into the fabric of his empire through a complex system of
alliances to suit his ambitious needs. “If his success should warrant an exorbitant extension of
his power,” the article explained, he could then “reduce Holland, Italy, and even Wittenburg and
Bavaria, into humble provinces of his empire.” On the other hand, “if the situation of Europe did
not favor his ambition,” he could simply “consider them like the Swiss Cantons, as simply
connected by alliance to his kingdom, but not subjected to his control.” In this way, he did not
have to actually govern another state directly; he could obtain just as satisfactory result by
entangling his neighbors in webs of deceitful alliances. 208
Thus, when Federalists accused their political opponents of making a military alliance
with Bonaparte, they were no longer simply suggesting that the Jeffersonians were naively
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making a bad deal for a worthless piece of real estate in the west. Instead, the Federalists
suggested that the Madison administration and its followers were actively scheming to pervert
the entire world order as envisioned by Vattel. Not only were they allying with a power that
sought to establish a universal monarchy through a system of complex alliances, but also they
were putting the nation’s very sovereignty at risk since an alliance with the emperor would only
be good as long as it suited the needs of Bonaparte. When it was within his power, the United
States would be reduced to a “humble province,” of the French empire, just like Holland and
Italy.
In January 1811, the Jeffersonian dominated Congress attempted to clarify the situation
in Florida by passing a resolution that provided for the “temporary occupation” of West Florida,
warned Spain that it would not tolerate the transfer of Florida to any “other foreign power.” It
also gave the President power to “take possession of, and occupy” any parts of Spanish Florida
east of the Perdido River that the “local authorities” in the area might be willing to “deliver up”
to the United States or that might be threatened by a third power. When Spain still refused to
give up Mobile and Pensacola, Madison attempted a more aggressive solution to the issue of
Florida. Seeking to duplicate the success of the West Florida revolution, American officials
quietly armed and organized a coup of American-born Floridians along the Georgia border with
the understanding that these “local authorities” would be more amenable to American annexation
than the Spanish officials. Backed by U.S. gunboats anchored menacingly offshore and promises
of U.S. military support, the rebels quickly took Amelia Island and forced the Spanish south to
St. Augustine.209
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At St. Augustine, however, the rebels ran into stiff resistance and the fighting devolved
first into a stalemate, and then into a nasty guerilla war. A bill that would have explicitly
allowed the handful of American military forces already in Spanish Florida to occupy the
territory failed to pass an increasingly disgruntled congress in June of 1812 and forced Madison
to reconsider his policies on the southern border. Realizing that such aggressive expansion in
Florida would further exacerbate a divided nation already at war with Great Britain, Madison
withdrew U.S. military support for the East Florida Republic. A second bill that authorizing the
use of force to prevent the British from using Florida as a base of operations failed in February
1814. However, a modified version did authorize the administration to seize the Mobile region
and this was done in short order. Devoid of American support, the rebellion collapsed and by
mid 1814, the last of the rebels had surrendered or fled the territory. 210
Preoccupied with an increasingly likely war with Great Britain on their northern borders,
Federalists—concentrated in the urban strongholds of the northeast—did not comment much on
the East Florida fiasco. Perhaps they missed an opportunity in doing so. In 1980, the historians
Ronald Hatzenbuehler and Robert Ivie argued through a complicated word analysis model that it
was the persuasive Jeffersonian rhetoric of “recolonization” by Great Britain which finally led
the congress to declare war on Great Britain. Still, the Federalists regrouped quite quickly and
solidified their anti-expansionist rhetoric around the connected themes of Bonaparte and
Florida.211
The best example was an article initially published in the Alexandria Gazette, but later
reprinted in numerous Federalist papers. It pointed out the uncomfortable connections between
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Madison’s actions in Florida and Bonaparte’s actions in Europe. “Madison did not pretend to
have any claim of right to this territory, but urged its conquest upon the plea of mere expediency,
to prevent it from falling into the hands of the British” the author pointed out. “This was,” he
continued, “precisely the reason given by Bonaparte for the conquest of Switzerland, of Holland,
of Italy and the neighboring republics and his present efforts to subdue Spain and Portugal; to
prevent the influence of the British in the affairs on the continent.” The author also found timing
of American involvement suspicious. “During the time that Bonaparte was a friend and ally of
Spain, and England her enemy, expedience never suggested to our administration that East
Florida might be conquered by Great Britain.” The author had one final complaint as he
concluded. “The farce of receiving a province from a handful of insurgents…is disgraceful in
the extreme. If Florida must be ours, let the arms of the United States take it, and not receive it
at second hand.”212
In the Alexandria Gazette article, the author artfully combined multiple pieces of antiexpansionist rhetoric around Bonaparte to create an effective public argument. First, he equated
the questionable moral justifications of American involvement with Florida to Bonaparte’s
previous expansion in Europe. Second, he directly tied American imperial expansion to
Bonaparte’s concurrent conflict with Great Britain, thus indirectly accusing the United States of
either forming a military alliance with France or demonstrating cowardly subservice to the
Emperor. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, the author indirectly accused the United States
of expansion through treachery with the comment in which he suggested that if Florida was truly
critical to the United States, the United States ought to seize it outright rather than foment
rebellion. Though he did not say it directly, any reader of the Gazette would have immediately
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equated such expansion through duplicity to the “wily Corsican.” Here again, expansion itself
was not the issue, it was the means of expansion that the Federalists found troubling. The doors
of the debate over the bill to allow American occupation of Florida were closed, so we do not
know how the representatives made their arguments. However, it does seem likely that many of
their arguments were made along lines similar to this article. If so, arguments against expansion
by tying American actions to Bonaparte proved highly successful once again.
As the United States drifted toward the War of 1812, Federalists throughout the United
States proved adept at retooling their Bonapartist rhetoric for the coming conflict with Great
Britain. Historians continue to paint Federalist reaction to the conflict as hysterically, even
treasonously, anti-war. This is a misconception. In “Party Unity and the War of 1812,” David
Hickey demonstrated that while Federalists were quite prepared to back defensive military
measures, like harbor defenses and the navy, they refused to endorse measures they deemed of
an “offensive” nature. Despite his excellent analysis, however, Hickey failed to provide a good
explanation for why the Federalists from South Carolina to Vermont were able to rally behind a
defensive war, but not an offensive one. Examining public Federalist reaction to the War of
1812 through the lens of the Bonapartist rhetoric they developed over the last seven years
fighting against aggressive expansion in Florida provides this missing link. 213
As in Florida, much early opposition to the impending war was based on the perceived
danger of entangling the United States with a treacherous military despot. A large number of
Federalists based their arguments on a widely reprinted article from the Bonapartist propaganda
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organ, Le Montieur. According to this article, the Emperor had allegedly proclaimed to a
delegation from Ionia that, “In India, in America, in the Mediterranean, everything that is and
has been French shall always be so. Conquered by the enemy, by the vicissitudes of war, they
shall return into the empire by the other events of the war, or by the stipulations of the peace.” 214
One representative article that based their argument off this piece began its life in the
Connecticut Current, but was printed as far south as Alexandria Daily Gazette. In the first part
of the article, the author made some of the same points about Florida that many had made before
him, but tied them to the new proclamation from the Emperor. He warned his countrymen that
Bonaparte’s claim to everything that had been French was no idle boast, and that this had
immense ramifications for the foreign policy of the United States. “West Florida as far as the
Perdido River, was owned and occupied by the French,” he noted, and the American government
had “employed some very extraordinary measures” to conquer it. Yet, he continued, “whether
they got it by purchase, or by the sword, Bonaparte declares that it will be his at last.” Therefore,
tying American foreign policy to the character of Napoleon was a highly dangerous prospect. 215
From there, the author artfully tied his concerns over American intervention in Florida
into his current opposition to a war with Great Britain. “Nova Scotia and Canada were owned by
the French,” he pointed out, and “now…there is a plan afoot for conquering Canada.” This was
too much for the author. “Is not, ‘the hand of Bonaparte’ in this thing?” Knowing the difficultly
of a cross-ocean invasion, the author surmised, Napoleon intended to make the United States an
unwitting tool of his own imperial aggrandizement. Yet, it went even deeper than that. “Over
and above all this,” he reminded his readers, “a very large part of the United States has been
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heretofore claimed by France.” Ultimately, the author concluded, Bonaparte’s imperial dream
included the entire western half of the North American continent as well as Florida and Canada,
and an ill-advised war with Great Britain would only help the treacherous Bonaparte realize his
immoral dream of “universal monarchy.” 216
The arguments above did not directly accuse the United States of creating a military
alliance with France, instead the author was content to simply point out the danger of trusting a
treacherous military despot. Many others commentators, however, did raise the damning
accusation of a military alliance with Bonaparte. Historian Lawrence Kaplan centered most of
an essay on this accusation, and concluded, unsurprisingly, that Madison did not, in fact, intend
to make any kind of military alliance with France. That is almost certainly true, however,
Kaplan misses the point. Perception is almost always more important than reality, and after at
least five years of seemingly pro-French foreign policy in Florida, the charges seemed
uncomfortably accurate to many Federalists.
A widely reprinted author writing under the pseudonym Nestor made this charge quite
forcefully. In one of several articles, he claimed that he had been accused of using imprecise
language by suggesting the relationship between the United States and France was one of
alliance. He shrugged off such concerns. “I presume that I was correct in using the term
alliance, for though we may, in pure finesse, abstain from signing a formal treaty offensive and
defense, our conduct will include all the necessary parts of the treaty.” “I presume,” he
continued sarcastically, “that no instance will be produced of two nations aiding one another by
making war on a third nation without being called allies.” Later in the war, another author linked
this point directly to American policy in Florida. As the magnitude of Bonaparte’s disaster in
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Russian became known, his fate became increasingly clear. The Boston’s Repertory printed its
own take on what they presumed would be a new world order led by Great Britain. They had
little good to say. “In the general restoration which will take place,” the Repertory asked
gloomily, “how will the voluntary allies of the humbled despot, the projectors of expeditions into
Canada and East Florida, as diversions in his favor, appear?” 217
Nestor was a prolific writer. In another article, he cleverly combined several of the older
Federalist arguments against expansion and turned them into a case against a war with Great
Britain. He began by playing on Federalist fears about Bonaparte’s deposition of the Spanish
monarchy by warning that the Iberian Peninsula was only the means to a sprawling overseas
empire. Nestor accused the United States of playing an “auxiliary” to Bonaparte’s imperial
dream since war with Great Britain would force her to divert troops from Spain to Canada and
Nova Scotia. Britain would soon be brought to the bargaining table. Yet, the Spanish empire
was only the start of Bonaparte’s overseas ambitions. He would claim “Maurilius, Bourbon, the
Cape of Good Hope, Martinique, Guadalupe, Demerara, and Suriname” as having once been part
of the French Empire—a reference back to Napoleon’s supposed response to the Ionian
delegation.218
Nestor elaborated: “[Bonaparte] will then tend to his American provinces that were given
him by Spain.” East and West Florida would soon have “French settlers and French garrisons.”
With the French in Pensacola, Nestor went on, he did not need to remind his readers “what a
submissive and tractable set of people our new French citizens in New Orleans are likely to
prove.” “Their revolt,” he growled, “is absolutely certain for they know that we should not
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venture to reduce them by force.” Nestor left his audience with a final jarring question. Having
helped Napoleon to “conquer peace,” how long did they think it would be before he “picked a
quarrel with the United States?” 219
In this remarkable article, Nestor built on multiple anti-expansionist arguments that had
been in place for nearly a decade. In the first place, he depicted American expansion as an
auxiliary to Bonaparte. This was a deliberate choice of words, since Nestor had used the world
“ally” in his last article. Nestor chose “auxiliary” as a classical term that denoted a military force
working with another nation’s military but that was clearly subordinate to the other nation in
terms of strategy and foreign policy. This was an obvious downgrade from an “ally” who at least
retained their free will in foreign policy. It is important to note that Nestor was not antiexpansionist. After all, he indirectly claimed that the United States did not have the courage to
impose martial law in New Orleans. His concern was that American expansion appeared to be
only for the dreams of Bonaparte.
Nestor then tied American subservience to Bonaparte to his own imperial designs in the
Americans. He did this by using American fears over his disposition of the Spanish monarchy
and turning them into a clear concern for American national security. He did this by blending
concerns over the duplicity of the Emperor with the demographic concerns that Federalists had
raised a decade earlier when discussing how to assimilate the peoples of Louisiana into the
American union. With Bonaparte kept out of North America, the peoples of Louisiana would—
hopefully—eventually assimilate to American political and social norms, but with the
treacherous Napoleon reintroduced to North America through his Spanish colonies or restored
French colonies, it would only be a matter of time before the west devolved into chaos and
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bloodshed. With his well crafted arguments that built on years of Napoleon fears, it is little
wonder that this was one of the most re-published articles in the United States during the first
half of 1812.
By June of 1812, the calls for action from the western-aligned “war hawk” wing of the
Jeffersonian party had become too loud to ignore any longer and Madison reluctantly asked
Congress for a declaration of war. After eighteen days of debate, Congress acceded to the
President’s request by the slimmest margin in American history. Though he had been able to
scrape up enough votes for war, Madison was not able to unite the nation behind his foreign
policy. Federalists vigorously opposed the War of 1812 using the anti-expansionist rhetoric
inherited from the Florida fiasco. The inconclusive nature of the conflict during its first two
years only emboldened the Federalists in their efforts to oppose what they saw as an immoral
war waged on behalf of Napoleon. 220
The war went badly from the start. Despite confident Jeffersonian assurances that with
the British occupied by Napoleon, conquering Canada would be a “mere matter of marching,”
American invasions in 1812-13 were stymied by a surprisingly tenacious Canadian defense,
American military incompetence, and the refusal of many American militiamen to cross an
international border and engage in an “offensive war.” Farther west at Fort Detroit, an illprepared American force surrendered to a smaller British army partly because the American
forces had not yet received news that war had been declared. At sea, the Royal Navy easily
outmatched their undersized American foe and established a crippling blockade. About the only
good news was that the British were unable to capitalize on their advantages since Napoleon still
occupied their attention in Europe. 221
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In 1814, the already dim American fortunes took a further turn for the worse. An AngloRussian coalition defeated Napoleon, forced the emperor to abdicate and sent him into exile.
This allowed the British to concentrate their forces and take the offensive in the American
theater. The British raided the Chesapeake, easily brushed aside American resistance, and
burned the national capital. Only a stubborn defense of Baltimore forced the British to withdraw
from the region. Farther south, the British assembled a large invasion force in the Caribbean for
the purpose of conquering New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. Opposing them was a handful of
troops under the command of Major General Andrew Jackson. A few months earlier, Jackson’s
troops had inflicted a crushing defeat on the pro-British faction of the Creek nation at the Battle
of Horseshoe Bend. While this victory forced the tribe to surrender virtually all of its remaining
territory to the United States, few Americans thought it likely that such a small force could repel
the impending British invasion. With the American war effort at a nadir, Federalist anti-war
rhetoric reached its height in the fall of 1814. 222
Almost as soon as the war began, a familiar trope took form when Federalists questioned
the very morality of American military conquest through comparisons with Napoleon. In 1803,
some Federalists had argued that the occupation of Louisiana was an unjust an immoral military
rule in the method of Bonaparte. Then in 1810, Federalists had strongly opposed American
military expansion into West Florida as immoral. Just before the commencement of hostilities,
an article in the Poulson Daily Advertiser reminded Jeffersonians that in 1802, their own papers
had warned that Bonaparte’s elevation to First Consul had demonstrated the importance of
avoiding wars that were not “purely defensive.” Yet in 1812, the article pointed out, all the
Jeffersonians talked of was “foreign conquests—invading Canada, [and] taking possession of
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Florida.” In reporting the declaration of war, the New York Commercial Advertiser wrote that
the bill for war included a provision that allowed the President to issue a proclamation, “in the
Bonapartian style, inviting the Canadians to revolt,” while also providing the executive the
power to “march troops into Canada and to conquer it.”223
Heated debates over the expansion of the regular army dripped in Bonapartist rhetoric.
One of the most powerful arguments was made by Elijah Bringham, a long-time congressman
from Massachusetts. Ultimately it made its way into numerous newspapers. He dismissed the
new army as one raised only for offensive purposes. What right, he asked pointedly, did the
United States have to Halifax, Nova Scotia, the Canadas or East Florida? What right did the
United States have to “invade and break into a foreign territory, and there establish a slaughter
house for the sons of America…destroy cities, demolish houses and plunder the inhabitants?”
He answered his own question, “There is no right but a Napoleon right, and that is power.” A
year later, Massachusetts governor Caleb Strong announced in a widely reprinted speech that the
American invasion of East Florida “annulled the distinction between power and right and
authorizes a government and its subjects, whenever they are able, to subdue and destroy the
neighboring state.” “It seems,” he continued, “impossible not to see the hand and realize the
morals of Bonaparte marking our destinies.” 224
Federalists outside New England echoed the rhetoric of their brethren. In March, 1813,
the Alexandria Daily Gazette carried a letter by an “Old Virginia Farmer.” The “Farmer”
commented extensively on Madison’s second inaugural address, but focused on the unjustness
nature of the war. In his inaugural address, Madison had announced that the war had been
carried on in a “just and honorable” manner. The “Farmer” ripped apart this claim by reminding
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his audience of the proclamation that General William Hull had issued upon his invasion of
Canada in July of 1812. Hull had warned the inhabitants of Canada not to resist his soldiers, lest
he turn their land into an “indiscriminate scene of desolation.” This proclamation, the “Farmer”
argued, showed the hollowness of Madison’s claim of just war. The “Farmer” illustrated his
point by examining what he thought was an analogous situation with which all his readers would
be familiar. As Napoleon’s army retreated out of Russia harassed by the Cossacks, villagers in
the Dutchy of Warsaw begged Napoleon to allow them to commence a guerrilla war against the
pursuing Russians. Yet, the “Farmer” wrote, “Bonaparte, great as were his extremities in Russia,
and intreated as he was by the villagers…turned pale with horror at their proposal.” In other
words, not even Napoleon could countenance such a proclamation “so repugnant to ‘justice and
honor.’”225
The Bonapartist rhetoric had an undeniable impact on at least the Federalist population of
the United States. In public, group denunciations of the war, Federalist men and women reverted
back to the same rhetoric they had heard from their leaders for over a decade. In the Providence
Resolves, published in the Newport Mercury in April 1811, Federalists of Rhode Island asked
their fellow countrymen if they were willing to see their sons drafted “like French conscripts”
engage in a war on behalf of “Bonaparte, who has destroyed the liberties and subjected every
Republic on the Continent of Europe; witness Holland, Switzerland, Venice, Lucca, Genoa,
whose citizens like Slaves, are exercised under the iron rod of Bonaparte.” The resolves warned
that by support for the war would end with the citizens of the United States “reduced to the same
state.” The public of Essex County in Massachusetts also publicly tied the war to Bonaparte.
They ascribed all the boundary disputes of the United States to the “intrigues of France,” and
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accusing the administration of conducting an ill-conceived war at the behest of a French regime
that would immediately demand the cession of Canada, Louisiana, and Florida at the conclusion
of hostiles.226
The primacy of Federalist Bonapartist rhetoric during the War of 1812 complicates our
view of the war in two aspects. First, it confirms the usefulness of the recent trend among
historians to expand our lens of the conflict geographically. The common language of the
rhetoric of Bonaparte shows that Federalists, at least, saw American policy into Florida and War
with Great Britain within the same Napoleonic lens. They easily shifted their rhetoric from one
conflict to the other because Napoleon allowed them to see both as immoral imperial
aggrandizement. Second, it demonstrates that while the Jeffersonians might have actually waged
the war in a regional way, as historians like J.C.A. Stagg and James Cusick have suggested, this
is not the whole picture. As Donald Hickey demonstrated in “Party Unity and the War of 1812,”
the Federalists displayed remarkable geographic unity throughout the war as they supported
“defensive” war measures while opposing “offensive” ones. 227
They were able to do this because of the common language of Bonaparte they developed
over past decade as they fought against aggressive Jeffersonian expansion in Florida. Federalists
did not oppose expansion per se, but they deeply cared about the means by which it was
accomplished. They viewed the conflict as a war of conquest that placed the United States into a
de facto, if not an actual military alliance with a violent and treacherous military despot bent on
creating a “universal monarchy.” As the War of 1812 grew increasingly likely, they transferred
the successful rhetoric of Bonaparte that they had honed in Florida to the war with Great Britain.
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So successful was this rhetoric with the public, that they were able to successfully partially derail
Jeffersonian dreams of expansion into both Florida and Canada.
Even before the ink was dry on the Louisiana Purchase treaty, Americans of all political
stripes looked covetously south toward Spanish Florida. Yet, for those seven years, the success
of American imperial success in the Floridas was greatly in doubt. Opponents of aggressive
expansion were remarkably successful in developing a language centered on Napoleon that
helped derail the Jefferson administration’s plans for duplicitous diplomacy in the $2 Million Act
of 1805. In the wake of Bonaparte’s redrawing of Europe, and especially his disposition of the
Bourbon monarchy in Spain, Federalists refined and honed their rhetorical attacks against
aggressive expansion. The successful American intervention in West Florida led to a further
refinement of rhetorical attacks against militant expansion that helped to stymie Madison’s
questionable policies in East Florida. They then easily transferred this rhetoric to opposing the
offensive nature of the War of 1812.
This rhetoric was not necessarily anti-expansionist in nature. By 1805, virtually all
Americans agreed that the United States would and should expand into Florida. Yet, for
Federalists, the means of expansion were incredibly important. Many of them argued that
American expansion should be done in a moral and logical manner—a manner that clearly
differentiated the United States from Bonaparte’s France. Another group argued that the
American expansion had to be based on a rational national security concerns. These Federalists
viewed Bonaparte as the most dangerous threat to the United States, both as an external threat—
such as when he threatened to take control of the Spanish possessions in the Americas, but also
as a treacherous ally who would likely turn on an unwitting United States that was foolish
enough to ally themselves with him. In both cases, the effectiveness of the rhetoric focused on
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the person and character of Napoleon Bonaparte. What the Federalists did not, and could not
know was that Bonaparte’s days on the throne of France were drawing to a close, and that the
effectiveness of their rhetoric would be challenged severely when Americans no longer saw him
as a threat.
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CHAPTER 5 SEIZING BONAPARTE’S DREAM: THE MEXICAN AMERICAN WAR
Americans in the early republic simply could not get enough of Napoleon. Their
voracious appetite for reading anything they could find about the Bonaparte resulted in countless
biographies, military histories, pamphlets, broadsides, religious tracts, and even song books
published about the French emperor. Yet, as familiar as they were with Bonaparte, Americans
could not agree on who he was or what his image represented. Between 1815 and 1850, several
very different images of Napoleon developed in the United States. A hand-colored lithograph
produced in Connecticut by the E.B. and E.C. Kellog firm near the end of this period neatly
illustrates the final result of what I call the American bifurcation of Bonaparte (figure 2). In the
image, three Bonapartes are presented to the viewer. The topmost depicts a young Bonaparte in
the uniform of a French lieutenant of artillery in 1794. To the subaltern’s lower right is a
handsome First Consul Bonaparte in a republican general’s uniform. To the left of both of these
the artist portrayed a garlanded Emperor Napoleon adorned in a splendid ermine-trimmed
imperial robe. To the American viewer was left the decision as to which Bonaparte was the most
representative one. 228
Even before he left power, and especially after he was overthrown in 1815, Americans
began to view Napoleon through the bifurcated lenses indicated by the Kellog lithograph. Many
Americans, especially those who identified themselves as Whigs continued to see Napoleon as
an aggressive and ambitious military despot. Yet, as new democratic currents swept through the
nation, Americans increasingly admired Bonaparte as both the ultimate democratic success story
and as a courageous republican military genius. Indeed, some Americans found it entirely
possible to hold both views concurrently.
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Figure 2, E.B. and E.C. Kellog, “Napoleon,” 1842-1848.

These twin images were reinforced by the flood of printed material on Napoleon that appeared in
the United States between his death in 1821 and the start of the American Civil War in 1861 and
greatly shaped how Americans faced their own expansion into the Spanish, and later Mexican,
borderlands. Using Bonaparte to contest American expansion was, of course, not new.
Napoleon had been integrated into the arguments of both pro and anti-expansionists since the
Louisiana Purchase, and had proved particularly useful to the Federalists in opposing the
aggressive elements of the War of 1812. Yet, by the start of the Mexican American War in
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1846, the more sympathetic, military image of Napoleon had become ingrained in the mind of
much of the American public and robbed the old anti-expansionist rhetoric of its power. The
loss of this rhetorical device helped lay the groundwork for the most aggressive expansion yet in
the young republic’s history.
For almost a century and a half after its conclusion, historians of the Mexican War spent
their time and ink assigning blame for the war—largely fighting the same battles that Americans
fought in the 1840s. It was not until the 1980s that any historians began looking seriously
beyond this debate. Social and cultural historians were some of the first to open new avenues of
investigation. These historians largely focused their attention on whether war did more to unify
or divide the young republic. Robert Johannsen’s To the Halls of the Montezumas fired the first
shot. By looking at mostly printed materials to gauge public reaction to the war, he argued that
whatever the causes of the conflict, the American public perceived the war a unifying national
event. Ten years later Johannsen’s ideas were bolstered by James McCaffrey’s Army of Manifest
Destiny. McCaffrey extended Johannsen’s thesis to the American army by suggesting that the
war was not long or bloody enough to force American soldiers to alter the starry-eyed
democratic ideals they brought with them to the battlefield. More recent scholarship, however,
has challenged these assertions. In A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair, Paul Foos looked at the
same soldiers McCaffrey did and found evidence of widespread disillusionment as well as class
and racial conflict. Most recently, Amy Greenberg’s A Wicked War found widespread and deep
division in American society as a whole over the conflict which she credited with spawning the
first national anti-war movement.229
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It seems almost incredible that such polar opposite views could be found in looking at the
same source material. In this chapter, using a similar methodological approach as Johannsen, I
offer at least a partial solution to this problem. By looking at a single symbol—Napoleon—in
which virtually every American could and did find meaning we find that it is far too simple to
only say that the Mexican American War was “unifying” or “divisive.” It was both. Before and
during the war, Americans of all types used common, presumably unifying, symbols like
Napoleon to debate their expansion, yet, they increasingly found to their frustration that this
symbol meant radically different things even to people who claimed a common history and
language. Ironically, it was by using what they thought was a unifying reference to make their
arguments for and against aggressive expansion into Mexico, Americans discovered exactly how
divided their nation was.
Federalist anti-expansionist rhetoric reached a highpoint during the War of 1812. Their
message, which centered on the national security threat posed by Napoleon, allowed the antiexpansionists to present a remarkably unified front in opposition to the aggressive aspects of the
war. Using such rhetoric, they managed to hold off the Jefferson and Madison administrations’
attempts to aggressively annex Florida. Their rhetoric was also probably at least partially
responsible for the collapse of American invasions of Canada when militia refused orders to
march across the American border, and for the New England unity displayed in the Hartford
Convention.
The success of this rhetoric was largely due to a generally common American
understanding of who Napoleon Bonaparte was, and what he represented. In The Old Dominion
and Napoleon, Joseph Shulim demonstrated that while initial reaction to Bonaparte was mixed,
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once Bonaparte had himself crowned Emperor in 1804, most of his overt support in the United
States evaporated. The image of the ambitious, treacherous, military despot replaced that of the
courageous, republican, military genius. Supporters of Bonaparte could still be found within the
United States, of course. In the August 14, 1806 edition of Boston’s Independent Chronicle, for
example, one brave writer cautiously suggested that the influence of Bonaparte had been good
for nationalistic groups in Hungry and Poland, and that he had always retained a “pacific
disposition” toward the United States. Such opinions, however, were quickly demolished by
vicious counter articles. One article directed at the Chronicle author quoted above decried those
American “jacobins” who excused Napoleon for the innocent “blood which he has poured in
torrents over the continent of Europe.” In such a climate, wise Americans kept any proBonaparte thoughts to themselves. By the War of 1812, pro-expansionists were reduced to
explaining how their policies would prevent Napoleon’s dangerous influence in North
America.230
This common American understanding of Bonaparte, however, collapsed with
astonishing speed. One reason for this was that Bonaparte could no longer be portrayed as a
legitimate national security threat to the United States. Capitalizing on the disastrous loss of the
French Grand Armée in Russia, a sixth anti-Bonaparte coalition formed in the spring of 1813,
and, after a year of hard fighting, eventually drove Bonaparte from the throne of France and into
exile on the island of Elba. The strongest arguments from both the pro and anti-expansionist
camps had always centered on the unacceptable national security risk posed by the French
emperor. Many Americans had been willing to go to war to prevent his controlling New Orleans
in 1803. The Madison administration had claimed that they occupied West Florida by fiat and
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engineered a coup in East Florida for the same reason. In large part, Federalists had opposed cobelligerency with France against Britain during the War of 1812 to prevent France from claiming
its old empire in North America at the end of the conflict. 231
To a certain extent, the British stepped into the role of America’s national security
bogeyman. For example, an editorial in the Republican Farmer worried that with the defeat of
Bonaparte, “America will now be nearly surrounded by the English or their red allies.” Yet,
most Americans never seemed to fear the British influence in North America as much as they
had Bonaparte’s. Indeed, one article from Georgia that found itself reprinted in multiple places
went so far as to claim, “If Bonaparte is hurled from the throne of France, and the war continues
with England, the occupancy of the Floridas by the United States would, at least secure our
Southern and Western territory against any exterior force that could be brought against it.” In
other words, the national security of the United States had actually been contingent on Napoleon
keeping British ambitions in North America at bay. With Bonaparte gone, the United States
would need to seize the strategic peninsula to prevent the British from laying claim to it. 232
Another reason for the rapid change was that Americans had begun to compartmentalize
their views of Bonaparte even before he was forced from power. In 1808, Hume Robinson—
who billed himself as a former American military officer living in Paris—published a self-styled
“American” account of Bonaparte’s rise to power. Within the first pages of the book, Hume’s
audience read that, “it must be remembered that Bonaparte assumes different characters as policy
dictates.” “When a General many of his actions were distinguished as being mild and humane,”
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he continued, but “when a Consul, he began to exercise that overbearing tyranny that power so
often engenders.” Finally, however, “when we behold him on the imperial throne and arrived at
the summit of his conquering ambition we see him degenerated into a bloody tyrant." Hume
meant that Bonaparte’s very character changed as time went on and could be understood on
different levels at different times in his career. In essence, this gave Hume’s readers permission
to indulge their fascination with the brave general, but still hate the treacherous despot. 233
Within weeks of learning of Napoleon’s exile to Elba, articles began to appear in
American newspapers that marveled at Napoleon’s military prowess while quietly skirting
around political aspects of his reign. Examples of good American generalship were rare enough
during the first few years of the War of 1812, and, of course, British military skill was a nonstarter, so the newspaper editors looked to France. Reporting on Andrew Jackson’s little army
gathering at New Orleans, the Baltimore Patriot opined that they expected to hear good news
from that locale soon, since, “General Jackson appears to possess that wonderful talent which
rendered Bonaparte so successful, that of making good soldiers of the most incongruous
material.” They did not have long to wait. Jackson, in fact, had already won a major victory
over the British at New Orleans earlier that month. 234
As might be expected for a war weary public, Americans made a great deal out of this
last-minute victory. Historians have often dismissed the importance of the battle, but Frank
Owsley makes a convincing case that the Battle of New Orleans finally cemented American
claims to Louisiana. The Spanish, he points out—a key British ally—still viewed Louisiana as
having been cheated from them by Bonaparte and considered West Florida as a province in
revolt. Without Jackson’s victory, Owsley contends, it was likely that the British would have
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backed Spanish claims to Louisiana and West Florida at the bargaining table in Ghent.
Ultimately, it had to be decisive military victory that established indisputable United States
claims in the Spanish borderlands. Americans knew this, but they added an additional
component to their celebrations of the battle: more often than not, they used it as an opportunity
to claim a military victory over Napoleon by proxy. 235
As much as the Federalists might have wished it, the United States did not embroil itself
in a war with Napoleon. The victory at New Orleans, however, gave Americans the next best
thing. As the commemorated their victory over the British, many transformed into a virtual
victory over Napoleon at the same time. One widely reprinted article informed its readers, “It
ought also to be remembered that Jackson's troops were 'backwoods militia,' who had never
before smelt gunpowder, and Packenham's were the 'choicest veterans of the Peninsula,' the
conquerors of the legions of Bonaparte.” A popular ditty held a similar theme,
Ten thousand men they landed
as Packenham demanded!
The hero who commanded New Orleans to destroy
all men of valiant heart who had beaten Bonaparte
But what was that to Jackson?
In both the article and the song the British were clearly identified as the soldiers who had beaten
Napoleon. The logic, then, ran as follows: if the British forces at New Orleans had bested
Napoleon, and Americans had bested the British forces, then the Americans must have been
more than a match for Napoleon himself. 236
Even in exile, Bonaparte remained ingrained in the minds of Americans when they
looked to their southern borders. Americans had almost gone to war with him in 1803 to prevent
him from controlling New Orleans and then had seized West Florida from Spain in 1811 to
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prevent his influence there. It was his questionable title to Louisiana and deliberately murky
boundaries which had caused over a decade of frustrating political conflict with the Spanish
empire. While it is impossible to prove with certainty, this proxy military victory over
Bonaparte probably helped some Americans finally make peace with their questionable claims to
both Louisiana and West Florida.
The year 1815 was a remarkable one. So remarkable, in fact, that the events occurring
during that fateful year allowed many Americans to make peace with at least some of the
political aspects of Napoleon’s rule. Following hard on the heels of the victory at New Orleans
and the Treaty of Ghent, which finally ended the War of 1812, Americans learned that Napoleon
had slipped off of Elba and returned to France. Americans waited breathlessly for news from
Europe—no doubt cursing the slowness of the mail ships. Soon they learned that the royal
French military units sent to prevent Napoleon’s approach had defected and returned him to the
throne in Paris. Yet another anti-Bonaparte coalition formed and finally faced down the French
at the Belgian village of Waterloo in June.
Napoleon lost the battle at Waterloo, but it was not clear what would happen next.
Rumors abounded. Some said that Bonaparte had been arrested by his own troops and beheaded.
Others reported that he had been taken prisoner by the British. Still others said that Bonaparte
was attempting to flee to the United States and seek asylum. In actuality, both of the last rumors
were true. Bonaparte had indeed seriously considered going into exile in the United States, as
had many of his officers and family members. Instead, Bonaparte surrendered himself to the
British. The British, unsure of what to do with their arch antagonist, sent him into exile again.
This time under guard and to the remote South Atlantic island rock of St. Helena. With
Napoleon gone, the Congress of Vienna, convened by the victors, reestablished the balance of
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power in Europe and restored the Bourbons to the throne of France in the uninspiring person of
Louis XVIII.237
Americans read about all these events with absolute fascination, and it triggered a
softening towards Napoleon’s politics because when compared to Louis XVIII, Napoleon
appeared to have democratic legitimacy. Most Americans learned of Bonaparte’s return by
reading the official French versions of the event that their local papers simply translated and
printed. These accounts, of course, painted Napoleon’s return in strikingly sympathetic and even
democratic tones. For example, in the account that most Americans read, when Napoleon first
encounters the French troops come to arrest him, Bonaparte dismounts, announces himself, and
tells them, “The first soldier who chooses to kill your emperor may do so.” According to the
article, the unanimous reaction from the humbled soldiers was to tear the white Bourbon cockade
from their caps and replace it with the Napoleonic tri-color as they cry, “Long Live the
Emperor!” A few paragraphs later, the Emperor returns to Paris to the wild shouts of, “down
with the Bourbons! Down with the enemies of the people! Long live the Emperor and a
government of our choice!” 238
Americans keyed into the contrasts in democratic legitimacy between Napoleon and
Louis XVIII illustrated in the Paris articles. In a letter to a friend, Andrew Jackson wrote that,
“The wonderfull revolution in France fills every body and nation with astonishment.” As a
popular military leader himself, Andrew Jackson noted one part of the article in particular. “the
tricoloured cockade being found in the bottom of each soldiers knapsack tells to all europe that
Naepoleon reigns in the affections of the soldiers that were to oppose him, and their dislike to the
Bourbons.” At first glance, it might seem odd that Jackson would see the army as a democratic
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element in French society. Two elements were probably at work here. First, Jackson himself
was well aware of Napoleon’s conscription system which had created a truly “peoples” army in
France. Second, Jackson, like many other Americans was likely adapting his own experience to
what he read about Napoleon. Most of the soldiers he had led in the past were militiamen, who
had to be led, rather than coerced—though Jackson did attempt to coerce obedience at times,
usually with disastrous results. In popular recitations of Napoleon’s return, Jackson noticed that
Bonaparte had given his soldiers the democratic choice to shoot him or to join him. This Jackson
must have understood and admired. 239
The second exile of Napoleon also allowed Americans to juxtapose the bloody restoration
of the Bourbons and Bonaparte’s peaceful, and somewhat democratic return from Elba. One
example of this was an article originally published in the Boston Gazette, titled “The ‘Usurper’
and the ‘Legitimate.’” In the article, the author reminded his readers that, “When the sanguinary
Napoleon returned to Paris from Elba, not a single drop of blood sullied the glory of his career.”
Yet, the article went on, dripping with sarcasm, when the “Legitimate Louis” returned,
supporters of the Napoleonic regime were “barbarously arraigned and most inhumanly
executed.” After describing one of the executions in heartrending detail the author left his
readers with little doubt which of the two—Napoleon and Louis—was the usurper, and which
was the legitimate sovereign. 240
Even Americans less inclined to read received the same message. A print distributed by
the Philadelphia firm of William Charles in 1815 provided a humorous commentary on the
chaotic nature of French politics after the Bourbon restoration (figure 3). In it, a portly Louis
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XVIII struggles up a greased pole towards a crown symbolizing imperial legitimacy. “Support
me or I shall fall” he cries. To help his endeavors, Louis stands on the backs of squabbling
figures representing the army, the Catholic church and various foreign powers. Noticeably
absent from his support are the people of France. In the background, but still prominent, is
Napoleon on the rock of St. Helena carefully guarded by British cannon. Watching with a hint
of amusement, the Napoleon figure comments, “I climbed up twice without any help.” Whether
they read the original reports of Napoleon’s return from Elba or saw the commentary that
followed, many Americans drew the similar conclusions: even though Napoleon was an emperor,
he was at least a popular and democratic one. 241
While the events of 1814-1815 did soften the image of Bonaparte considerably in the
eyes of many Americans, this image was not unopposed. Federalists continued to use the antiNapoleon imagery that they had used for so long with such success. A great many Americans
were genuinely glad when Bonaparte was forced out of power in 1814, and public gatherings
were full of orations praising his downfall. At least some of commentators used the occasion to
remind Americans of the unfortunate consequences of territorial ambition through association
with Bonaparte.
On July 4, 1814, the respected physician Charles Caldwell addressed the Washington
Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania. Caldwell began with a brief account of the rise and fall of
Napoleon using the trope of the bloody, treacherous tyrant. Then he discussed what he saw as
the unfortunate American dealings with Napoleon. During our own revolutionary struggles, he
pointed out, Spain and Holland were “sincerely attached to our interests.”
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Figure 3, William Charles, “Louis XVIII climbing the Mât de Cocagne” (Detail), 1815.

Yet, in the last few years, the United States had shamefully yoked itself to “him who carried
carnage and mourning into both Holland and Spain.” This was, of course, disgraceful said
Caldwell, but the actions that had followed were even worse. In reference to West Florida, he
thundered Americans had acted “in an equal violation of magnanimity and right” to Bonaparte
when they “invaded a defenseless province.” 242
As Caldwell’s speech shows, with Napoleon no longer a national security threat, most
Federalists reverted to their other effective argument against unscrupulous expansion: critique by
example. A scathingly sarcastic commentary on the British-American peace talks in Ghent, for
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example, contained this passage that compared American territorial ambitions to Napoleon’s
own,
The commissioners in the name of the United States, indeed, disavow all projects of
aggrandizement whatsoever; and acts of theirs having a contrary appearance, are all
accounted for by particular circumstances; and so were all aggrandizements of
Bonaparte; it was his enemies that forced him to extend the power of France from the
Rhine to the Elbe, from the Elbe to the Vistula. It was mere friendship for the royal
family of Spain, that made him place his brother on the throne of that kingdom; so it was
Spain that made it necessary for the United States to acquire Louisiana; it was Spain that
compelled them to seize the Floridas, and Great Britain that prompted them, at an
unlucky hour, to seize the Canadas.
Messages that condemned opportunistic, territorial aggrandizement by comparing it to that of
Napoleon still held power in a sizable, but shrinking section of the American people. 243
Even after Bonaparte lost at Waterloo, Federalists continued to remind Americans of
their unfortunate co-belligerency with Bonaparte during the War of 1812. For example, when
one Federalist editor was told that Napoleon intended to seek asylum in the United States
following the loss at Waterloo he hoped it was true. If it was, he snidely opined, the emperor
ought to be held by the government and exhibited for money until all the debts incurred by the
War of 1812 had been paid off. After all, the editor reasoned, reverting to the rhetoric that had
served his party so well, the Madison administration had waged the war on Napoleon’s behalf.
The sheer number of these arguments show that they still held some power, but reactions to the
American invasion of East Florida in 1818 demonstrated that numbers of people who could be
reached by such arguments were shrinking. 244
The harsh Treaty of Fort Jackson, which ended the Creek War in 1814, left the Creek
people divided and dispossessed of their Georgian and Alabamian homelands. Despite clauses in
the Treaty of Ghent which promised to restore their territory, the defeat at New Orleans forced
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the British to renege on their promises to support their erstwhile Indian allies. Desperate and
abandoned, many Creeks moved south into Florida where they joined bands of Seminole Indians
and runaway slaves. Over the next few years, land pressures there led to increasingly violent titfor-tat raids between American settlers and Seminole war bands, who used the ill-defined
international border between East and West Florida as a sanctuary. In March of 1818 tensions
boiled over. With vague orders to protect American interests and citizens in Florida, the senior
army commander in the region, Major General Andrew Jackson, launched a full-scale invasion
of Spanish East Florida with nearly 4,000 soldiers, militia, and friendly Creek allies claiming that
he was pursuing enemy Seminole war parties.245
Through a combination of bluster, ruthlessness, good fortune, skill, and Spanish
unpreparedness, Jackson’s army quickly overran not only most of the Seminole villages in the
territory, but also all of the major Spanish garrisons. During the campaign, his army captured
two British nationals: Alexander George Arbuthnot, a Scottish trader, and Robert Ambrister, a
former Royal Marine. Jackson accused the men of providing firearms to the Seminoles (which
they probably did) and of inciting them to make war on American settlers (which they probably
did not). Never one to bother much with the international implications of his actions, Jackson
convened a courts martial, which, unsurprisingly, found both men guilty, and then had them
executed.246
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Foreign reaction to the Seminole War was quite negative. Britain protested the summary
execution of its citizens. The men were unfortunate noncombatants in the wrong place at the
wrong time, they said. Spain, of course, vehemently objected to the invasion and occupation of
her territory. Neither country, however, was in a place to make good on its complaints. Britain
did not wish to endanger relations with her best trading partner and eventually let the matter drop
after a suitable period of righteous indignation. Spain was more difficult. Jackson’s invasion
endangered ongoing negotiations between Spain and the United States for the cession Florida. In
the end, however, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams took advantage of the situation and
issued a letter blaming the whole war on the British, the Seminoles, and the Spanish. In fact, the
whole episode actually strengthened Adams’s diplomatic hand in the long run. Once
negotiations resumed, he demanded that Spain either control her Indian subjects in Florida, or
cede the territory to someone who could. 247
However, just because he had avoided the international consequences of his actions did
not mean that he had completely escaped punishment. He still had some powerful enemies in
Congress, and they refused to let an opportunity like this go to waste. In early 1819, the House
Military Affairs Committee issued a report condemning Jackson’s actions in Florida. Based on
their recommendations, the House of Representatives readied itself to debate a series of bills that
would have disavowed the aggressive expansionism of Jackson. There was no guarantee that
such bills would fail. After all, on at least three separate occasions before, Congress had derailed
aggressive expansion in Florida. The ensuing debate took almost a month, which, at that time,
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was the longest ever spent debating one issue, and was carefully followed in the papers by the
American public. 248
Despite the obvious similarities, surprisingly few of those in the anti-expansion camp
took the opportunity to draw parallels between Jackson’s actions and those of Bonaparte. Even
the most eloquent orator in the House of Representatives, Kentucky’s Henry Clay, shied away
from bringing too many references to Bonaparte into his anti-Jackson speech. Born in 1777 and
a lawyer and hemp plantation owner by trade, Clay spent virtually his entire adult life
representing Kentucky in Congress. He rose to prominence in Congress as a leader of the socalled “War-Hawks” during the War of 1812 who pushed for American entry into the conflict.
He had built a reputation, however, for moderation in expansion and fostering good relations
with the Latin American republics. When, as Speaker of the House of Representatives, stood to
address the House and a packed gallery, on January 12, 1819, he knew that he was speaking to
the American people and not just his congressional colleagues. If they expected a long harangue
tying Jackson’s treatment of the Creeks and Seminoles to Bonaparte’s treatment of Italy, or
Holland, or Prussia, or half a dozen other places in Europe, however, they would have been
greatly disappointed. 249
While Clay did denounce the Treaty of Fort Jackson as unreasonable and found nothing
in international law which could sanction Jackson’s invasion of a foreign country, he tied neither
of these episodes to Bonaparte. Instead of linking Jackson to illegal national expansion through
Napoleon, Clay saved his Bonaparte references for what he saw as Jackson’s overly aggressive
and ambitious character. Clay’s strongest attack came in his condemnation of Jackson’s
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execution of Arbuthnot. Jackson’s best biographer, Robert Remini, characterized Clay’s allusion
to Bonaparte here as “subtle.” It was not. Considering the execution, Clay claimed could think
of only one analogous incident, that of the arrest and execution of the Duc D’Enghein. Here,
Clay referred to, and described in detail, an infamous incident in which Bonaparte had a French
royalist seized by his military from the neutral state of Baden, arrayed on trumped up charges
and quickly executed. It was this incident, and, thus by implication, not Bonaparte’s
expansionism, which according to Clay, “had brought more odium than almost any other
incident on the unhappy Emperor of France.” This was truly a momentous shift in rhetorical
strategy, and though Clay’s speech was widely reprinted, no one seemed to have noticed. 250
Napoleon appeared one other time in the Clay’s remarks, and he was used once again not
to contest expansion, but as a warning against the character of military heroes. Near his
conclusion, the Speaker warned that aggressive, expansionist warfare had the tendency to erode
the liberties of free societies. Wars resulted in glory-covered heroes, and such men had a habit
of swaying the democratic crowds to do their will, no matter how injurious to liberty. Of course,
Bonaparte was the obvious example of this. Clay was quick to point out that he did not think
Jackson to be another Napoleon, but lest anyone doubt that such things could happen in the
United States, Clay warned that Bonaparte had proven the dangers of “military chieftains” to
unwitting societies. Quoting from a well-known biography of Napoleon by Madam De Staël,
Clay pointed out that well regarded Frenchmen had insisted that they would never again see
monarchy in the very month that “Bonaparte with his grenadiers had entered the palace at St.
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Cloud…and laid the foundations for that vast fabric of despotism which overshadowed all
Europe.”251
Most of the anti-expansionist camp followed the lead of the Speaker, appealing to
Bonaparte only as a reflection of his treacherous political character, not to his expansionist
tendencies. They were not foolishly missing a golden rhetorical opportunity. Instead, they were
recognizing how Bonaparte’s reputation had changed in the years since his deposition, and
changing their rhetoric to reflect what they imagined was the new reality which was an American
public that that increasingly found aggressive expansion in the manner of Bonaparte acceptable.
As the bifurcated image of Napoleon became more prominent, Americans became more
comfortable with military expansion. Clay understood this, and hoped that they still might be
swayed by appeals to the political despot image of Napoleon. However, as he would do so many
times in his political career, Clay miscalculated. Parts of the American public were probably
moved by his oration, but many more had accepted the softer image of the democratic emperor
produced by the momentous events of 1815. Despite this, Clay did lay a rhetorical groundwork
on which anti-expansionists would build over the next two decades.
Surprisingly, at least in a few cases, Napoleon was also used by the pro-expansionists.
Representative Ballard Smith of Virginia spoke after Clay, and used much of his speech to refute
the Speaker. In the middle of his lengthy speech, he spent what must have been several minutes
discussing the ultimate justification of American expansion. “The gentleman,” he began, “asks
what would be said to our unreasonable demands were the Treaty of Fort Jackson to be seen by
the powers of Europe. And I ask who would presume to find fault with them.” It certainly could
not be France, he sneered, “who so recently demanded Spain, Portugal, Italy, Holland and
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Germany.” In essence, Ballard was suggesting that Napoleon’s imperialism had overturned the
old Vattelian world and replaced it with a realpolitik system in which nations could expand as far
as their means and ambition could take them. This was an extraordinarily bold move by Ballard
in a country where so much of the rhetoric of expansion had been built on not being like
Napoleon, but it seems at least not to have hurt the final result. Indeed, the final result probably
had more to do with the pro-expansionists carefully not using Napoleon rather than through their
use of him. Not only was Jackson completely exonerated, but by a vote of 42 to 112, the House
refused to pass a more general bill to prohibit the invasion of a foreign country without the
express authorization of Congress. 252
With the Jackson’s army firmly ensconced in Florida with the approval of both the
executive and legislative branches of government, the Spanish came to the bargaining table. In
the resulting Adams-Onis Treaty, the Spanish ceded East Florida to the United States in return
for the United States renouncing its claims on Texas—another offshoot of the murky borders of
Louisiana that would have profound consequences a few decades later. The immediate effects of
the use of Napoleon by the pro-expansionists is difficult to assess. The use of Bonaparte as a
positive was certainly hesitant and not at all commonplace. Indeed, they may have score more
political points by not mentioning him at all. Either way, they seem to have been more more
successful than their opponents in reading the effect of the events of 1815 on the American
public. Whether it was from a careful use of Napoleon, or from not using Napoleon, the results
were undeniable. Jackson’s aggressive expansionism was completely condoned and after sixteen
years of political and military posturing the United States finally acquired Florida through
aggressive military diplomacy.
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Jackson’s pro-expansionists should also be credited with laying the groundwork for a
new use of Napoleon that began in earnest shortly after the Florida treaty was signed. This line
of argument posited Napoleon as an example—not of moral goodness, but of greatness. As
William Weeks demonstrated in his analysis of John Quincy Adams’s rhetorical defense of
Jackson’s invasion, this type of argument tapped into a deep desire of the post-revolutionary
generation for their actions to be rooted in the myths of virtue, mission, and destiny. In these
“neo-greatness” arguments, the system and practice of empire building of the United States was
compared favorably to that of the Napoleonic Empire. This was not entirely new of course.
David Ramsey had used this line of argument in his valedictory on the Louisiana Purchase, but
awkward questions about aggressive expansion posed by the Federalists during the long War of
1812 drove these arguments out of fashion. Once the war was successfully terminated, however,
and the image of Bonaparte softened sufficiently thanks to the events of 1815, these arguments
once again gained favor.253
One of the first of this “neo-greatness” argument came almost as soon as news of the
Florida Treaty became known. Perusing the reaction to the cession from Europe, a triumphant
editor of the Providence Patriot was hard pressed to contain his glee. “The gigantic schemes and
comet-like progress of Bonaparte dazzled and confounded the vision [of Europe],” he wrote,
“but the steady inevitable march of Columbia to unparalleled greatness arrests the attention and
commands the admiration of every intelligent observer.” Europe, he continued, had contrived to
halt the progress of Bonaparte, but, “it is in vain that the governments of the old world would

William Weeks, “John Quincy Adams’s ‘Great Gun’ and the Rhetoric of American Empire,” Diplomatic History
14, no. 1 (Winter, 1990): 25-42, see especially 41-42.
253

173

strive to check the rising glory of the new.” In other words, Napoleon’s empire might have been
great, but the rising American empire would be even greater. 254
Bonaparte’s premature death on St. Helena in 1821 occurred conveniently as the last of
the revolutionary generation in the United States was passing away. In many ways, this added
fuel to the neo-greatness arguments, since death humanized and rendered Bonaparte even more
harmless in the minds of most Americans. In one telling example, the editor of the Easton
Gazette discussed the elaborate funeral observances for Bonaparte taking place in New Orleans.
For over two decades, many Americans had suspected that the Louisianans maintained their
Napoleonic allegiance and had justified their aggressive actions in the area based on this
assumption that Bonaparte’s influence in the territory would lead to insurrection. Yet, after the
death of Napoleon, such overt support for Bonaparte by Louisianans seemed harmless.
According to the Easton Gazette, it ought not surprise Americans that the “old French feelings
still exist” in the hearts of Louisianans. Yet, he continued with a rhetorical shrug, “there is now
as little danger to us now in paying honors to Napoleon as there is to Nero or Caligula.” 255
The best example of the neo-greatness argument occurred in 1826. In a charming article
titled “Napoleon and Franklin” one author imagined a dialogue between the dead French
Emperor and that quintessential dead American, Benjamin Franklin. Bonaparte starts the
conversation by pointing out the weakness of the American grasp on North America. “Why do
you not take Mexico and Cuba?” Bonaparte asks, “And why do you let the Russians keep a foot
on your continent?” Franklin patiently explains that Americans have no need to conquer such
places and points out that “the peaceful possession of all the really valuable part of [Europe],”
would have been more effective in fulfilling Napoleon’s European ambitions. To this, Napoleon
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scoffs and explains that Franklin underestimates how global his ambitions truly were. Analyzing
this new information, the ever-wise Franklin doubts that such a far-flung empire built on one
man’s talents could possibly have survived the death of great Napoleon. The system of
expansion practiced in the United States, Franklin continues, is of a more lasting kind. The
Americans, “have founded an empire destined to be wider than the Roman,” according to
Franklin, and that through “peaceful colonization and expansion” the language of liberty has
already been spread, “through vast regions.” Americans thus have no need to impose their
empire on conquered people as Bonaparte did with his “iron legions on Europe.” Even the
brilliant Napoleon struggles for words to contradict the wisdom of the American sage, and
finally grumbles, “Enough, Doctor, this philosophizing is worse than Moscow.”256
The bifurcated images of Bonaparte that appeared in wake of his abdication were both
intensified and solidified by the tidal wave of printed material about the emperor that appeared in
the United States following his death. The vast majority of this material painted Napoleon as the
great, democratic, military genius and left those who focused on Napoleon the bloody tyrant
increasingly on the defensive. It is important to remember that this printed material did not
occur in an American vacuum. The single most important change of the decades between 1815
and 1850 was the expansion of American democracy. The societal changes wrought by market
revolution emphasized the ability (true or not) of the individual to work his way up in a system
of individualistic capitalism. This led to demands by the middling and working classes for the
rapid expansion of the voting franchise, which, by 1850, had been extended to virtually all white
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men. It was within this expansion of the democratic system that Americans read and internalized
their printed materials about Bonaparte. 257
According the leading historian of American biography, biographies written in the
nineteenth-century United States were written for two basic reasons: to promote nationalism and
encourage character formation. In many ways, these twin goals were intertwined, for the national
character was only as great as the collective character of men and women who formed it.
Biographies and histories of great men were particularly useful to these purposes because they
held the mantels of truth and attainability, whereas characters in a novel were invented and thus
seen as unattainable ideals. Problems, arose, of course, when Americans could not agree on
exactly what character meant. Yet, American readers of biography and history also read them
for a different reason: for entertainment. In a world without reality television or streaming
movies, Americans found escape in exciting biographies. Publicly, at least, most biographers
and historians would have sniffed at such a suggestion. The low-brow genre of the novel was for
entertainment. But, especially when it came to military subjects, it is difficult to believe that
young men did not find biographies as a means of escaping the stresses of daily life. Napoleon’s
life neatly fit the bill for all of these purposes. 258
American consumers of Napoleonic printed material could not have helped but notice the
democratic character of the French Emperor. The overwhelming majority of Bonaparte
biographies portrayed his rise as an incredible “rags-to-riches” elevation and highlighted his
industrious character. Almost every biography had some comment like the following one from
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the introduction to a popular biography: “In his rise and in his career of prosperity and glory,
[Bonaparte] greatly surpassed…the heroes of antiquity.” The author explained that while
Alexander and Caesar came from noble families and had powerful friends to assist them, “the
early advancement of Bonaparte was without any such powerful aids, and at the same time more
rapid.” Even young American children imbibed this characterization of Bonaparte. One
grammar school reader noted that, “Napoleon Bonaparte was one of the greatest warriors who
ever lived. He won many battles and rose, by his skill and courage from a poor Corsican boy to
be an emperor, and the most powerful sovereign in Europe.” The message was clear enough for
readers of all ages—if you would rise in the world, model your character and habits after that of
Bonaparte.259
If Napoleon’s rise was incredible, however, it was not simply a matter of chance.
Biographies regularly described his calm, calculating demeanor, seemingly inexhaustible energy
and attention to the tiniest of details. A passage from the very popular, five-volume set titled,
The Napoleon Anecdotes reported a popular story from Bonaparte’s early military career
illustrates the general idea. Not long before daybreak, one of Bonaparte’s friends cautiously
opened his apartment door and was surprised to find the young officer fully dressed, and
surrounded by reports and maps. “What!” the friend exclaimed, “Not yet in bed?” Napoleon
scoffs and replies, “In bed? I have already risen. Two or three hours are enough for any man to
sleep.” Another anecdote described Bonaparte as the consummate planner. “No human
precaution, which it was possible to adopt, was ever…neglected or forgotten by Napoleon.”
Napoleonic biographies were full of this type of character analysis. In the uncertain world of the
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market revolution, this was the type of character advice that would serve a young, ambitious
American man just as well as the future emperor of France. 260
Perhaps even more important than his own democratic rise was the perception that
Napoleon had presided over the creation of a true meritocracy in France and supported the
democratic rise of others. The two ideas were certainly linked in the eyes of many Americans.
In the most popular of all the Napoleon biographies, Sir Walter Scott’s mammoth, nine-volume
Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, the author of Ivanhoe wrote that, the emperor, “lay the foundation
of his throne on the democratic principle which had opened his own career.” Thus, because of
his own democratic rise, Napoleon threw “open to merit…the road to success in every
department of the state.” Scott’s egalitarian Napoleon clearly affected the thinking of young
Americans like feminist leader Margret Fuller. In 1847, she mimicked Scott’s words almost
verbatim when she wrote to The New York Daily Tribune. “Through Napoleon,” she declared,
“career had really been open to talent.” 261
It is important to note just how men got ahead in the world of the democratic emperor.
There were a few stories that highlighted elevation of intelligent youths, such as the tale of the
thirteen-year-old Milanese boy who impressed Bonaparte so much with his discernment that the
general ordered his father to see after his son’s education, for “he will be no common man some
day or other.” These, however, were the exception. The vast majority of stories that featured
advancement under Napoleon were tales of meritorious military promotion. In one story,
Napoleon is refused passage on a certain road by a watchful French sentinel who has orders to
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not let anyone pass by. The soldier is later called to headquarters and made an officer for his
discipline. In another case, a young Lieutenant bravely steps out of ranks at a review to calm the
Emperor’s horse and is promoted on the spot to a Captain in the elite guards battalion. In
perhaps the most well-known tale, the young general Napoleon promotes a brave sergeant at the
siege of Toulon for coolness under fire. At the end of the anecdote, the reader discovers that this
valiant soldier was none other than the future General Junot. These tales of rapid military
advancement based on merit convinced many American youths that gallant military service
during wartime was an excellent avenue for their own rapid social advancement. 262
The military advancement of so many young men was contingent on nearly constant
warfare in the Napoleonic empire. Traditionally, war—especially aggressive, offensive
warfare—was seen by Americans as a dangerous proposition and the bane of republics. In fact,
anti-expansionists had held up Bonaparte for almost two decades as the example, par excellence,
of the dangers of military aggression to republics and humanity. Yet, this view rapidly lost
ground in the two decades after Napoleon’s death. The challenge came most strongly from the
memoirs of Barry O’Meara, the Irish physician who attended Bonaparte on St. Helena. His
sympathetic Napoleon in Exile captivated millions of Americans. Even in the midst of his first
presidential campaign, Andrew Jackson found time to converse with a friend about the book. “I
am happy you have read O’Meara’s works,” he wrote. “The world generally has taken up false
ideas of Napoleon—much prejudice had been raised against him [but] I never had a doubt but he
was a great & good man.” Since O’Meara purported to record the conversations he had
Bonaparte during the last years of his life, the statements within the book were regarded as the
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closest thing available to Napoleon’s memoirs and treated as a truthful account of the great
man’s opinions.263
In O’Meara’s hands, Bonaparte’s wars became honorable, brilliant campaigns that
defended the natural boundaries of France against aggressive European monarchs and spread
democratic values throughout Europe. This became the dominant understanding of Bonaparte
through the 1850s. O’Meara even managed to work in the democratic trope into the idea of
Napoleonic warfare. According to him, even as emperor, Napoleon saw his empire as a “kind of
republic,” whose maxim was “the career open to talents without distinction to birth or fortune.”
American histories of Bonaparte continued to use this trope of positive expansion for decades.
For example, John Abbott’s widely successful History of Napoleon Bonaparte actually compared
Napoleon’s expansion favorably to that of the United States in an astonishing passage that
deserves to be quoted in its entirety:
It was the plea of Napoleon that he was not going to make an unjust war on the
unoffending nations of the East, but that he was the ally of the oppressed people, drawing
the sword against their common enemy, and that he was striving to emancipate them
from their powerful usurpers and to confer upon them the most precious privileges of
freedom. He marched to Egypt not to desolate but to ennoble; not to enslave but to
enfranchise; not to enrich himself with the treasures of the east, but to transfer to those
shores the opulence and the high civilization of the West. Never was an ambitious
conqueror furnished with a more plausible plea. England, as she looks at India and China
must be silent. America, as she listens to the listens to the dying wail of the Red Man,
driven from the forests of his childhood and the the graves of his fathers, can throw no
stone. Napoleon was surely not exempt from the infirmities of humanity. But it is not
becoming an English or an American historian to breath the prayer, "We thank Thee, oh
God, that we are not like this Bonaparte."
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O’Meara’s book and the ones that followed gave Americans permission to begin seeing warfare
as a positive method of spreading democracy and freedom. 264
Printed material on Napoleon not only helped reshape American thinking on the
legitimate ends of warfare, but also shaped how many thought about the physical nature of
combat and military service in general. For this, Sir Walter Scott was the chief culprit. His Life
of Napoleon Bonaparte was a runaway American best seller. A check of library holdings from
the 1830s-1850s shows that every library for which the American Antiquarian Society has
records had at least one edition of Scott’s work. Scott’s take on Napoleon was actually mildly
negative. While he admired Napoleon’s military and administrative skill, he found fault with
Napoleon’s habit of hubristically confusing his will with that of the French people. Even this
was too much for many Americans. In fact, his work spawned a cottage industry of American
biographies defending Napoleon from the British author. One American newspaper reviewer
commented accurately, “The people of this country have ever looked upon Sir Walter Scott with
suspicion since the production of this biography.” Despite being castigated by Americans as an
unfair, negative, portrayal of the great man, Scott actually painted a Napoleon who was
ambitious, yet egalitarian. As discussed earlier, this fit nicely into the democratic American
imagination.265
In her 1990 essay, “Romancing the Empire,” historian Amy Kaplan showed that the
romantic novels of the 1890s offered an explanation for American overseas empire building at
the turn of the twentieth century. This was not a new phenomenon. Scott’s views on Napoleon’s
political life were almost certainly not what most young, male Americans took from his work.
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He, was, above all, a romantic novelist, and he wrote his history using the literary devices which
had served him so well in Ivanhoe and Waverly. Of the battle of Austerlitz, Scott reported,
“Such were the preparations for this decisive battle, where three Emperors, each at the head of
his own army strove to decide the destiny of Europe.” The idea that a single titanic battle could
decide the fate of three great empires was heady stuff by itself, but Scott went even further. On
that fateful morning, “The sun rose with unclouded brilliancy,” he wrote. “As its first beams
rose across the horizon, Bonaparte appeared in front of his army surrounded by his marshals, to
whom he issued his last directions, and they departed at full gallop to their different posts.”
Imagining such a magnificent sight could hardly have failed to stir the hearts of young
Americans.266
American commenters marveled at Scott’s ability to evoke martial emotion in his work
on Napoleon. The Barre Gazette, for example, printed the part of the biography in which Scott
described Napoleon’s crossing the Alps during the Italian Wars, and gushed that it was “one of
the most graphic accounts of the feat which has ever been written.” The Salem Gazette
concurred with this assessment. In an editorial on Scott, the author admirably wrote of his work
on Napoleon: “the depictions of the battles are clear and graphic. All other men’s descriptions
are confused compared to his. They have fine words—he has fine images. They have plenty of
smoke—he is all fire.” Ultimately, that was the rub. Whatever their concerns were with Scott’s
analysis of Napoleon as a person, a large majority of Americans—especially young men—were
enthralled by his brilliant martial prose that made military service seem like a grand, memorable
adventure. This worried many anti-expansionists.267
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It is notoriously difficult to measure the influence of printed material. One crude way to
measure its influence is by seeing how well the materials sold, but a more effective way is to
gauge the reaction of the opposition. By the latter measure, the pro-Napoleon mania that swept
the United States was astonishingly effective. The shrinking circle of who continued to see as
Bonaparte as a bloody, treacherous tyrant saw the tidal wave of pro-Bonaparte literature as a
grave threat to the moral and political character of the nation and reacted to it as such. Between
1820 and 1850, these Americans—mostly concentrated in the old Federalist (now Whig)
strongholds of the northeast—were increasingly put on the defensive, but they managed to mount
a respectable rear guard action that culminated during the Mexican War.
By far, the most popular anti-Bonaparte tract in the United States was William Ellery
Channing’s Remarks on the Character of Napoleon Bonaparte Occasioned by the Publication of
Scott’s Life of Napoleon. Channing (1780-1842), was one of Unitarianism’s leading lights by the
time he published his work in The Boston-based Christian Examiner in 1827. The work was so
popular, however, that it was printed as a separate pamphlet almost immediately after its initial
publication. It proved most influential among the New-England elite. For example, the son of
President John Quincy Adams, Charles Francis Adams, wrote highly of the essay in his diary and
noted discussing it over dinner with friends and arguing its merits in debating society. The
young lawyer and future Supreme Court Chief Justice, Salmon P. Chase also wrote favorably of
Channing’s essay in his diary, “Undazzled by the blaze of military and civil glory which has
surrounded the Hero, he has deeply penetrated and faithfully exposed his real character.”268
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After reading Scott’s work, Channing had grave concerns, but they were not those of
Americans who thought the author had been too hard on the emperor. Instead, Channing worried
that Scott’s sympathetic view of his subject would affect the moral character of the Americans.
Channing admitted that, like Scott, he could not deny Napoleon’s military greatness. He was old
enough to remember with what “rapturous admiration” he first read of Bonaparte’s Italian
campaigns in the newspapers, and wrote that he could not read Scott’s brilliant rendition of his
military exploits “without a quickened movement in the veins.” Yet, with the wisdom of age,
Channing had come to understand that while military genius was a form of greatness, it was its
lowest form. There was no question, Channing wrote, that Napoleon had been a military genius,
but he lacked the intellectual and moral greatness which were far superior. 269
Indeed, according to Channing, it was the presence of Napoleon’s military genius without
the restraint of moral and intellectual greatness which was responsible for the “unprincipled and
open aggressions” that characterized Bonaparte’s wars. Military success had bred the dangerous
notion in Napoleon’s mind that an “empire of the world” was the “fulfillment of his destiny.”
Channing’s choice of the word “destiny” was a deliberate swipe at Scott’s writing. In Scott’s
saga, Destiny (always capitalized) was a nearly physical character. “She” was literally at
Bonaparte’s side “leading him by the hand, and at the same time protecting him with her shield.”
Napoleon was, according to Scott, “the man of Destiny.” For Channing, this was dangerous,
self-aggrandizing nonsense that would corrupt the minds of impressionable young Americans.
Ultimately, Channing argued, it was Bonaparte’s misguided sense of “destiny” had led to the
corruption of the entire French nation, who “in her madness and folly had placed her happiness
in conquest [and] felt that the glory of her arms was only safe in the hands of the First Consul.”
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For Channing, it was a sad commentary on the state of the French people that they had allowed
their national character to be usurped and corrupted by one man. 270
All this led Channing to his final paragraphs in which he commented on the nature of war
itself. As a rule, Channing was far more interested in the conduct of individuals than of nations.
His chief concern with Scott’s sympathetic portrayal of Napoleon’s character was in its ability to
convince the minds of impressionable young men that military genius and a sense of destiny
were the chief ends in life. Yet, he felt obligated to lodge a brief commentary on warfare in
general. War was, in his opinion, a very great evil—especially when it was conducted for the
fulfillment of some misguided sense of personal destiny. “Wearied with violence and blood,”
Americans should pray that God “subvert oppressive governments by the gentle, yet awful power
of truth and virtue.” Yet, if this was impossible, war could be necessary. Its most harmful
effects, he continued, could be muted if those who engaged in it “took to the sword with awe,”
and remember that they served one whose “dearest attribute was mercy.” In practice this meant
that individual soldiers should “not stain their sacred cause by one cruel deed, by the infliction of
one needless pang, [or] by shedding without cause one drop of human blood.” For Channing, the
lesson of Bonaparte was ultimately that war and national expansion was a reflection of individual
human character. 271
A decade after the publication of Channing’s Remarks, another book was published that
addressed similar concerns in a slightly different way while still keeping Napoleon central to the
message. Its author was one of the most remarkable, and yet unknown, men in the history of the
early republic. William Ladd was born into a wealthy New Hampshire merchant family only
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two years after the United States declared their independence from Great Britain. After
graduating from Harvard and serving for a time as a sailor on one of his father’s merchant
vessels, Ladd decided to change the world. Luckily for him, he was able to ride a growing tide
of Christian humanitarian reform that swept through in the United States during the first half of
the nineteenth century. After a brief attempt to undermine African slavery by setting up a cotton
plantation in Florida using paid immigrant laborers failed miserably, Ladd listlessly moved from
humanitarian cause to humanitarian cause before finally discovering on the international peace
movement in the early 1820s.272
Ladd began his crusade for peace in 1823 by starting local peace society in his home of
Minot, ME. Over the remaining seventeen years of his life, Ladd worked diligently for his new
cause. He successfully unified the disparate peace organizations across the United States into the
American Peace Society, and had some success in enlisting support for his cause from other
humanitarian organizations. He had considerably less success, however, in realizing his dream
of creating an international Congress of Nations to hear and arbitrate transnational disputes—a
plan that presaged the modern United Nations. Ladd also devoted a considerable amount of time
and energy to combating the growing tide of militarism that he saw emerging in the youth of
America. He vocally opposed the creation of the Bunker Hill memorial, calling it a “monument
to barbarism and anti-Christian spirit” and wrote numerous books aimed at American youths
which advocated Christian pacifism. One of the last books that Ladd wrote was published
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pseudonymously in 1838 and explicitly tied Napoleonic literature to the militarism that he
believed was corrupting the youth of America. 273
Written under the pseudonym Philanthropos, Howard and Napoleon Contrasted was
aimed at older children and featured eight chapters, or dialogs, between two school boys named
William and Henry. The former was an idealized model of Christian virtue, while the latter was
a representation of the young American everyman. Henry is a truly remarkable character. He
has read all the latest Napoleon biographies and gripes about the British bias of Scott’s Life and
the Secret History of St. Cloud. He grew up surrounded by pictures of Napoleon and his
marshals. Additionally, a cadre of adults—including his father, his school master, and his
minister—who taught him that the chief end of life is making a great name for oneself in this
world. Unsurprisingly, Henry virtually worships at the altar of military glory and the its chief
saint—Napoleon. He loves the martial spectacle of the local militia musters and longs to finish
his education at a military academy, and become a military officer of great renown. 274
Surrounded as he is by the new American martial culture perpetuated by Napoleonmania, Henry is quite shocked—even outraged—when his best friend, William, questions his
life’s goals. William, however, is undeterred and attempts to reason with his friend along two
parallel lines of attack. The first line of attack was reminiscent of Channing, though certainly
more accessible to children. William asks Henry to compare the actions and objectives of his
idol with those of a nondescript Christian merchant. Though Henry finds the biographies of such
lowbrow men “flat and uninteresting,” William patiently coaches him to a new understanding of
humanity. When pressed by William’s keen logic, Henry finds to his surprise that there is a vast
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difference between greatness and goodness, and that Napoleon had the former without the latter
which made him cruel and unjust. Even the French nationalism which Scott held up as
Bonaparte’s chief virtue William reduces to simple selfishness for it demands that he love only a
small portion of humanity at the expense of all others.
William’s other line of attack was one to which Channing briefly alluded but never fully
engaged. This was the dangerous “War Spirit” fostered by the celebration of Napoleon. Henry
loves the spectacle of the local militia musters. “Oh how I love a sham fight!” he sighs while
perusing Scott’s Life of Napoleon, “and to hear the cannons roar, and the muskets rattle, and the
drums beat, and the horses neigh, and feel the ground tremble.” In words directly reminiscent of
Scott, Henry comments on how he loves to see the bright glint of the sunlight off the bayonets
and swords of the militia. “Oh! It is the most glorious sight in the world,” he says to William.
“If a sham fight is so glorious, what must a real fight be like?” With such magnificent
spectacles, it is no wonder that Henry finds the biographies of Christian merchants so boring.
Ladd here made a damning comment on how Napoleonic literature had finally developed into a
new social culture that celebrated martial glory at the expense of Christian charity. Luckily for
Henry, his friend has no illusions about the real nature of war. 275
William makes his case in an innovative style. Instead of relying on the Bible as he did
in his initial arguments, he goes to one of the most famous of Bonaparte military histories, the
General Philipe-Paul Comte de Ségur’s History of the Expedition to Russia. First published in
English in 1825, this French history of the disastrous 1812 campaign remains in print. An 1841
introduction to an American edition noted that, “nothing can more effectively dissipate every
illusion of military glory than the perusal of this dreadful narrative.” So hoped William. Ségur’s
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history in hand, he quotes lengthy, graphic descriptions of hungry and half-frozen French
soldiers hacked to death by marauding Cossacks, blown to bits by Russian shells, or even
committing suicide. When Henry points out that this was a campaign lost, William describes the
spread of disease that killed so many American soldiers following their victory at New Orleans.
Ultimately, William concludes, “the life of the modern solider is ill-reported by heroic fiction,”
and that if Henry persists in his dream of becoming an officer, it is likely that he will perish in
“hopeless misery” languishing in a disease riddled camp or a prison ship far from loved ones. 276
Williams stark description of the soldier life finally has the desired effect, and Henry
resolves to give up his dreams of earthly glory and focus his life on Christ rather than on
Napoleon. Paradoxically, Ladd had to fight Bonaparte with Bonaparte, and though he probably
did not intend it, it was actually the Comte de Ségur and not the Bible that managed to sway
Henry away from the dangerous influence of Scott’s Napoleon. This literary device was not far
from the reality, and it informed the rhetoric of anti-expansionists for the next decade and a half.
If they wanted to make an effective argument, they would need to work within the image of
Bonaparte as the American military authority and standard of national greatness.
In many ways, Americans saw their debate over national expansion between 1836 and
1848 as a contest waged over the image of Bonaparte. Many saw the outcome of these debates
as providing the United States a legitimate national claim to the greatness of the Napoleonic
Empire. For other Americans, the problem was that the greatness of the Napoleonic empire
could only come at the expense of American goodness. It was almost as if the argument between
Henry and William in the last section had become a national argument waged by millions of
Americans. Over the course of these years, Americans picked up many of the threads of the
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Napoleonic rhetoric they had learned over the pervious thirty years and used them to weave new
defenses and critiques of national expansionist policy.
The outbreak of the Texas revolution in 1835 set the United States and Mexico on a long,
slow, side towards war. Shortly after gaining its independence, Mexico had attempted to
populate its northern state of Coahuila y Tejas in an effort to create a buffer that would keep land
hungry Americans and restless Comanche raiders from the core of Mexico. Enticed by promises
of cheap land and low taxes, thousands of American families spilled into the area and largely
ignored government demands that they become Mexican citizens and abandon slavery. Thus, it
was hardly surprising that a rebellion broke out in the marginally loyal Mexican province with
abrogation of the 1824 Constitution and the creation of a more centralized state. 277
After successfully dealing with similar revolts in the south of Mexico, general and
President Antonio López de Santa Anna turned north and led an army into Texas where he
quickly defeated Texans at Goliad and San Antonio. A few months later, however, a Texan
force under Sam Houston surprised and virtually annihilated the overstretched Mexican army at
the Battle of San Jacinto. Santa Anna himself was captured in the aftermath and forced to
acknowledge the independent Republic of Texas as a condition of his release. Following their
victory over the Mexican army at San Jacinto in 1836, the infant, cash-strapped, Republic of
Texas quickly applied for admission into the United States and Mexico warned that any
American interference with what they saw as a rebellious province would be viewed as an act of
war.278
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Not only did American expansionists find war to be an acceptable risk, many were
positively anxious for a military conflict in which they could take up the military mantel of
Napoleon. Texans assured their northern cousins that they could “plant the American Eagle”
over the Halls of the Montezumas as easily as “Napoleon replaced his conquering banner on the
turrets of Vendome.” Meanwhile, the editor of the New York Herald did not fear any war with
Mexico. After all, he assured his readers, the United States had a population of twenty million
souls who were “as fearless, as brave, and as passionately fond of glory…as the French under
Napoleon.” Such an argument could not have been made with any kind of legitimacy before the
bifurcation of Bonaparte and the proliferation of Napoleonic literature. 279
The other expansionist argument that utilized Bonaparte was more understated but
deserves careful examination. It played on the old trope of expansion in the name national
security. Without a real Bonaparte, however, expansionists had to invent one. This they did,
partly without even trying to. Santa Anna himself laid most of the groundwork for them when he
began to accept the moniker, “Napoleon of the West.” 280 This was a helpful image, at least at
first, for Santa Anna present to Mexican citizens looking for a strong, nationalist leader. Many
Americans were even willing to grant him some Napoleonic legitimacy. “He is,” wrote one
editor, “unquestionably a man of consummate abilities. He has always heretofore been
successful in his enterprises—he subdued a nation to his sway and became the Napoleon of
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Mexico.” Once Santa Anna became a threat to Texas in 1835, however, Americans turned this
into a weapon.281
Expansionist Americans used Santa Anna’s use of Napoleon to justify their expansion in
several ways. First, they drew on the political image of Bonaparte to paint Santa Anna as an
ambitious, treacherous, blood thirsty despot, while at the same time chipping away at his military
claims to the mantle of Bonaparte. A letter written from Vera Cruz on June 22, and published in
several American papers, for example, described in graphic detail Santa Anna’s attack on
Zacatecas. According to the letter, men, women, and children were butchered in the streets. The
sovereignty of the state was destroyed, he continued, and the “torch of rational liberty”
extinguished. All this was blamed on that “singular hero of the Americas, the Napoleon of this
continent.” The picture painted by this letter showed no glorious military conquest to defeat an
enemy army, only the slaughter of civilians, which delegitimized Santa Anna’s claim to the
military aspects of Bonaparte. It also highlighted the wanton destruction of civil liberty which
emphasized Santa Anna’s similarities to the Emperor Napoleon rather than the General
Napoleon.282
Santa Anna’s failures in the Texas revolt also badly compromised his claims to the
military mantel of Napoleon. Not only was his execution of prisoners at Goliad and the Alamo
widely publicized and condemned, but the embarrassing rout of his army at San Jacinto was
quite un-Napoleonic. Virtually every paper in America printed some variation of Santa Anna’s
surrender in which he tells Sam Houston, “The man who conquered the Napoleon of the South
was born to no common destiny.” Next to the story, the editor of the New Bedford Gazette
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snidely put into words what many Americans were thinking: “a pretty fellow to call himself a
Napoleon who was caught napping...and whose highest pretentions to military fame consisted in
having slaughtered unarmed prisoners.”283
After his embarrassing defeat at the hands of the Texans, the moniker “Napoleon” when
applied to Santa Anna by American papers was always preceded by “the so-called” or “the selfstyled,” which delegitimized his claims to greatness and made him vulnerable in a military sense.
When Santa Anna returned to power in Mexico in 1842, most Americans were probably
unsurprised and sympathetic when they read in their papers that the Republic of Texas was
strongly considering a preemptive attack to conquer Mexico to the Isthmus of Panama. To
justify this course, the Texans called for an “appeal to the God of Battles for a redress of the
grievances” given them by the “self-styled Napoleon of the West.” By appropriating Santa
Anna’s appropriation of Napoleon, Americans and their Texas cousins not only turned him into a
dangerous political threat, but also made him into a counterfeit who had all of Bonaparte’s
ambition, but none of his greatness.284
Anti-expansionists—almost all Whigs—drew on years of anti-Bonaparte rhetoric to make
their case. Some made arguments that differed little from those made by their fathers against the
Louisiana Purchase. For example, one letter to the editor of the Philadelphia Enquirer read, “If
we embrace Texas for fear she will conquer Mexico and become a powerful rival we shall only
act upon a policy which knows no limits and is always fatal to those who undertake it as proved
by Alexander and Napoleon.” This was virtually the same argument made by the editor of the
American Citizen writing against Coriolanus in 1803. Others Whigs adopted well-worn
arguments about legitimacy and constitutionality. In a paragraph that could have been lifted
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from a paper in 1803, the editor of the Richmond Whig argued against annexation by pointing out
that there was no provision in the constitution for the incorporation of foreign territory into the
union. In fact, he continued, even Jefferson had admitted as much during the purchase of
Louisiana, and only made the deal at the “order of Bonaparte, at whose name the whole world
grew pale, but none grew so pale as Thomas Jefferson.” 285
Yet, at least a few Whigs did try to incorporate aspects the bifurcation of Bonaparte into
their rhetoric though sometimes the result probably left even contemporary Americans scratching
their heads in wonder. For example, on May 23, 1844, the freshman Senator from New Jersey,
Jacob Miller, warned that, “this Texan treaty belongs to the code of Napoleon. Its object is
dominion and its only sanction the sword.” He did see one difference, however, between the
expansion of the United States and Napoleon which he proceeded to explain. “Napoleon first
won the country by open, manly war; whilst we, pursuing a less hazardous course, steal into the
country under the cover of a treaty and then having the nine points possession in our favor, make
war upon Mexico for our title.” Miller, in attempting to use the acceptable military image of
Bonaparte, made “open, manly warfare” preferable to expansion through treaty. This was not
entirely new since Federalists had complained about negotiating for New Orleans rather than
simply seizing it in 1802. The key difference was that in 1803, Federalists demanded action to
protect the United States from Bonaparte, whereas Miller was suggesting that the United States
act in imitation of Bonaparte. 286
The most cringe-worthy of all the Whig attempts to use the bifurcation of Napoleon,
however, occurred in the June 27, 1844 edition of the Boston Courier. An author writing under
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the name Franklin argued that while Napoleon conquered kingdoms and empires, he had always
“employed the spoils of victory for nobler purposes than piling up dollars and counting them.”
He had stimulated the spread of science, established commercial programs that encouraged
economic growth for all Europe, and “laid the foundation for the greatest moral reform since that
began at Bethlehem.” High praise indeed. “Conquest, in such hands and so used,” Franklin
mused, “has something to palliate, if not ennoble it.” On the other hand, he snorted, American
conquest “by land jobbers and stock brokers can have no redeeming qualities.” Remarkably,
both “Franklin” and Miller argued against the annexation of Texas by arguing that the expansion
of the United States was not enough like that of Napoleonic France. 287
Polk’s election led to the annexation of Texas in late 1845. War did not come
immediately, but the simmering border dispute between the two republics did not dissipate.
Mexico considered the Nueces River the southern border of Texas, and the United States
maintained that the boundary was 150 miles farther south along the Rio Grande. After failing to
secure purchase of the disputed territory—probably on purpose—Polk ordered an army under
Zachary Taylor into the area. In April 1846, a border skirmish occurred in which several
American soldiers were killed. Polk used this incident to ask for a declaration of war from
Congress, which he got on May 13. With war declared, new arguments had to be mustered.
War, after all, did not necessarily mean conquest and expansion along a Napoleonic model. Both
pro and anti-war advocates attempted to control and describe the conduct of the war using the
Napoleonic rhetoric that they had used for so long. 288
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As their armies prepared to invade Mexico, Americans debated the strategic conduct of
the United States’ first major war of expansion. As they did, they used a method best described
as argument by anecdote. Both sides appealed to the military authority of Napoleon through a
short story or a saying. These stories usually came from what they had read about Bonaparte in
their volumes of anecdote books and from Napoleon’s Maxims of War, which had conveniently
been published in the United States for the first time in 1845. Yet, Americans could not even
agree on the military lessons of Bonaparte. For some, the most effective national strategy would
limit American objectives and fight an aggressive defensive war within the bounds of Texas.
This, said one commentator, was the “humane” method preferred by Napoleon for breaking up a
mobs: “fire balls first to let the enemy learn our seriousness and feel our power, then burn blank
cartridges afterwards, if necessary, to stimulate his haste in retreat.” 289
Other, more aggressive, armchair generals argued that such a policy was foolish—and
frankly un-Napoleonic. Rather than fighting a limited conflict on the frontiers of Texas said an
author writing as “St. Mark,” the United States ought to “fight with Mexico as Napoleon fought
with Europe, by striking at her capitals.” Most other commentators agreed with this assessment.
One however, added a frightening additional component. An article in the National Aegis
opened with a quote from Napoleonic biography in which Bonaparte orders his artillery to fire
on his Russian and Austrian forces as they flee across a frozen river from the Austerlitz
battlefield. The impact of the shots breaks the ice and drowns thousands of enemy soldiers. This
anecdote, he claimed, showed that the United States should adopt a harsh military policy in its
war with Mexico to terminate the conflict quickly. “War is war, the world over,” he concluded
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darkly. “Napoleon had his way and we have ours for carrying it forward, but ours, no less than
his, aims at one simple object—conquest and destruction.”290
Recruiting of citizen soldiers to carry out these strategies was less difficult than agreeing
on the methods themselves. During the during the War of 1812, recruitment had been a
challenge for the national government especially in New England where anti-Bonapartist
sentiment was deepest. The government faced no such problem when it came to recruiting
young men to invade Mexico. For example, the state of Tennessee had 30,000 men lined up at
the recruiting stations to fill a state quota of 3,000. Pennsylvania and Ohio had to turn away
whole companies of men because they could not arm them fast enough. Even anti-expansionist
Whigs complained that their young men had been caught up in a Democratic war. Historians of
the war have long noted with surprise the incredible enthusiasm of the volunteers and have
offered a variety of explanations for it. Most, like Richard Winders, list a sense of patriotism,
hope of excitement, and some form of social or material advancement. 291
It bears remembering how closely each of those reasons for enlistment were tied into the
glorious war narratives woven by Scott and other Napoleon biographers during the two decades
leading up to the war. Love of nation, for example, was held out by Scott as Bonaparte’s
greatest virtue, and American youths had largely gotten their notions of war being an exciting
adventure from military histories of Napoleon. Only months before war was declared,
Americans were treated to J.T. Headley’s best-selling, Napoleon and his Marshals. Headley
readily admitted that his critics would "object to books of this kind as fostering the spirit of war

290

Hartford Times (Hartford, CT), August 23, 1845; for a similar take see Barre Gazette (Barre, MA), May 15,
1846; National Aegis (Worcester, MA), May 20, 1846.
291
C. Edward Skeen, Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812 (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky,
1999), 31-36; Richard Winders, Mr. Polk’s Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War (College
Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1997), 70-71; Steven Woodworth, Manifest Destinies, 157; Paul Foos, A Short,
Offhand, Killing Affair, 45-59; Amy Greenberg, A Wicked War, 113-115.

197

by stimulating a love of glory.” But, he shrugged, if history was to be “abjured of battles” it
would be very boring indeed. 292
Watching the Massachusetts regiments marching off to the war, the editor of the Boston
Evening Transcript tried to understand their motivation. Many of them, he concluded,
“remember the campaigns of Napoleon, and the honors bestowed upon his brave soldiery, may
be expecting promotion according to their fearlessness in the war, their daring exploits, and what
might seem to be their dauntless courage in defying death.” “The romantic and chivalrous
among them,” the editor went on, are “filled with ideas of glory” and “expect to rise…from rank
to rank crowned in each affray with new distinctions—a brilliant rise from a short battle!” The
editor was not wrong—he was seeing the results of reading countless Napoleonic biographies
and military histories. As they marched off to invade a sovereign republic, the volunteers carried
muskets on their shoulders and dreams of Napoleonic greatness in their hearts. The fact that so
many of them did so itself was a pro-war argument by enlistment. 293
As the war intensified, the arguments on the home-front that surrounded it shifted their
focus to matters of national expansion policy rather than simple military strategy. Both sides
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used continued to use the bifurcated Napoleon as their standard for national conduct, and both
continued to come to different conclusions about the legacy of Bonaparte and what it meant to
the future of the United States. The great debate began shortly after war was declared and was
powerfully illustrated by an article in the New Bedford Mercury.
On June 5, 1846, the Mercury printed a letter to the editor together with the editor’s
reply. The unnamed correspondent wrote passionately in favor of both the annexation of Texas
and the war with Mexico. He briefly cited international law to justify American actions on the
border. Yet, he doubted that the editors would take that authority and so he quoted an even
higher authority: God—and Bonaparte. “When Napoleon was crowned King of Italy,” he
wrote, “upon putting on the iron crown of Charlemagne, he is purported as saying emphatically,
‘God has placed his crown upon my head, and woe to the man that touches it.’” “God,” the
correspondent continued, “has given us Texas to the Del Norte, and woe to the foreign nation,
prince, or potentate that should interfere with it.” 294
The Mercury’s editor quickly responded. “How unhappy the illustration drawn from
Napoleon,” he wrote back, apparently shocked that that his correspondent did not rightly
understand the history of Bonaparte. “That iron crown of Lombardy was to him a crown of
thorns—it bore him to the ground and crushed him. So will this Texas be a thorn in the side of
the union.” The editor continued with a condemnation of invoking God into a debate on national
expansion. “Impious and shortsighted man,” he wrote, as if to Bonaparte directly, “how short
was the time you wore that crown…you died in exile without crown or hope.” The editor
concluded forcefully, “we are told that God has given Texas to the Rio Bravo as he gave Italy to
Napoleon! Sad parallel! May it never be carried out.” Both men brought Bonaparte into the
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debate on expansion expecting the other to acknowledge his authority, yet they could not agree
on what the legacy of Napoleon actually meant. 295
A similar exchange took place a little over a year later. This time, an anti-expansionist
writing as “an Old Famer” fired the first shots in the National Intelligencer. “An Old Farmer”
was gravely concerned about the phrase “Manifest Destiny,” which, since 1845, had come to
epitomize the ideology of the American expansionist. Even the iconic phrase itself had
Napoleonic overtones when one considers how closely “destiny” was associated with Bonaparte
through the work of Scott. The Old Farmer admitted that might have been “the 'manifest destiny'
of Bonaparte to conquer half of Europe,” however, he continued, “it was also his 'manifest
destiny' to die a miserable exile on the rock of St. Helena.” Instead of national delusions, he
continued, it would be far better for the United States to adopt the policy of the San Marino.
This tiny, ancient republic nestled in the mountains of Italy had, when offered additional territory
and artillery by Napoleon, politely accepted the cannons but refused the territory because they
did not wish to “engage in the miserable folly of attempting to govern people without their
consent.”296
Three days later, a delightfully sarcastic reply by an author only identified as “X”
appeared in the Baltimore Sun. “We are told,” he began, “Napoleon had a great respect for the
Republic of San Marino.” That may have been true, he continued, but this was so only because
it was such a small and insignificant place that it probably did not even appear on most French
maps. It was really a silly notion, “X” snorted, to expect the United States, a great nation to
draw lessons from a republic with an army of “twenty-four soldiers commanded by a Lieutenant,
Captain by brevet, and two corporals.” Indeed, “X” concluded, “I have strong doubts whether
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the army of San Marino will ever cross the Alps…[as] they were crossed by Napoleon unless
they are provided with Austrian or French passports.” In other words, for “X” the lesson of the
story of San Marino was to be more like the great Napoleon and less like the insignificant San
Marino. Both the “Old Farmer” and “X” took the exact same story of Napoleon and came to
completely opposite conclusions about what it meant to American foreign policy. 297
While Americans fought each other in the papers, the war dragged on. In September
1846, American forces under Zachary Taylor seized Monterrey. In early 1847, another
American army under Winfield Scott took the port of Vera Cruz, and, by June, they had fought
their way inland to the outskirts of Mexico City. Despite losing every battle, Santa Anna’s
government steadfastly refused to come to the negotiating table. With the end result still in
doubt, some anti-expansionist Whigs continued to make their arguments using the political
image of Bonaparte. In one particularly amusing example, one wrote dourly, “we might mourn
over the violation and destruction of our constitution by a Napoleon whose right hand was
destiny—but it would be too much—too much to see it destroyed by a Polk.” Showing their
increasing adeptness with Napoleonic rhetoric, however, many others looked for ways to force a
conclusion to the war by appealing to the military authority of Bonaparte. Like William Ladd
had done ten years earlier, they did this most successfully when they asked their audience to
consider the less glorious aspects of Bonaparte’s military career. 298
The first such articles appeared in the summer of 1846, but gathered strength in October
of that year as Americans learned of the tenacious Mexican resistance in Monterrey. “A war
with a Government and a war with a People are two very different things,” warned the editor of

297

The Sun (Baltimore, MD), August 9, 1847.
John S.D. Eisenhower, So Far from God: The US War with Mexico (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1989), 254-283, 302-311; Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia, PA), December 7, 1847; Steven Woodworth,
Manifest Destinies, 235-275.
298

201

the North American. He cited Bonaparte’s early successes in Italy as an example of the former,
and his disastrous occupation of Spain as an example of the latter. Six months later, the National
Intelligencer elaborated on this basic theme. “In Europe, Napoleon conquered other countries
because the population made no resistance after the regular army was defeated,” the editor
explained. “The two hostile armies met as prizefighters, and the country was the stake which
belonged to the victors.” On the other hand, “an invading army is unable to conquer any nation
where all the people are hostile and opposed to them. Spain is a memorable example of this.” In
America’s present war, he wrote grimly, it was important to remember that in the case of Spain,
“Napoleon had possession of her capital and all her strongholds, with 300,000 veteran troops, the
country compact and not one fifth the extent of what we propose to overrun.” 299
Some of Napoleon’s other campaigns offered similar opportunities for anti-expansionists
to score rhetorical points. In a speech to the Lowell Institute, one anti-expansionist asked his
audience to consider seriously the “natural difficulties to be overcome in our war against
Mexico.” It was protected by impenetrable mountains, deadly diseases, and unbearable heat.
“Man cannot war against nature,” he stated flatly, and not even the greatest general of them all
was exempt from this maxim. “Napoleon could scatter the Mamelukes like chaff before the
wind, but fled from the burning sands of Egypt and from the desolation of the pestilence” he
argued. “Of the 500,000 men who went to war with him against the climate of Russia,” he went
on, “but 40,000 came staggering back.” He left his audience with a sobering thought. “Mexico
has the mountains of Switzerland, the snows of Russia, and a sicklier sunshine than ever bathed
Napoleon’s banners.”300
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Even the eventual taking of Mexico City in the fall of 1847 did little to mollify the basic
anti-expansionist argument. Why should it have? As the anti-expansionists pointed out, Joseph
Bonaparte had sat on the Spanish throne in Madrid for years without ending the insurgency. In
the most famous anti-expansionist speech of the conflict, a weary and saddened Henry Clay—he
had lost a son in the war—pointed out that even Napoleon and his “colossal power,” had been
unable to subjugate the Spanish people into a foreign system of rule. Others reminded anyone
who would listen that Napoleon, after all, had taken Moscow in 1812 before encountering the
Russian winter and the Russian Cossacks. Amy Greenberg argues in her book, A Wicked War,
that while anti-expansionists were unable to prevent the war, they were ultimately successful in
forcing Polk to accept a more moderate peace treaty than he would have liked. If so, it was their
appropriation of the military Napoleon that was largely responsible for the victory. If Greenberg
is correct, by 1848, anti-expansionists had managed to convince a significant number of
Americans that while they had gone to war in search of a glorious Austerlitz victory, they were
on the brink of a falling into an interminable, bloody, Spanish insurgency. 301
On the other hand, claiming victory for the anti-expansionists is probably taking things
too far. A look at the evidence shows that anti-expansionists were probably hurt by their own
dire rhetoric because none of their grim prophecies came to fruition. The Mexicans did not burn
their capital and start a guerilla war, and though some guerilla bands did form they did not prove
as effective as the anti-expansionists had led Americans to believe. Disease and desertion did
plague the American forces, but in the end, a smaller United States army marched hundreds of
miles into Mexico across sun-burned deserts and treacherous mountains to take an enemy capital
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without losing a battle. This almost certainly had as much to do with Mexican political and
economic chaos as it did with the prowess of the American soldier, but expansionists did not
realize that, nor did they care. After all, the war was not only about territorial expansion. It was
also about taking up the mantel of Napoleonic glory. In both cases, the expansionists had much
to celebrate. By the closing months of the war, even the anti-expansionists had to appropriate the
neo-greatness argument. 302
Thanks to the proliferation of Napoleonic literature in the 1820s and 1830s, a significant
number of Americans were in awe of the military exploits of Napoleon and expansionists found
that favorably comparing American victories to those of the great hero was an easy way to score
rhetorical points. At one 1847 Independence Day gathering in Virginia, an orator gave a speech
that was typical of hundreds more given on the same day across the nation. “The daring and
impetuous charge at Palo Alto, the dreadful storming of Monterey, and the heady fight along the
terrible pass of the Cerro Gordo,” he began, “bring forcibly to mind the desperate valor displayed
at Jena, Saragossa, Wagram, and Areola.” “Yet, when the disparity of troops and other
disadvantages are considered,” he continued, “the impartial judgment of the world must decide
that the fame of the imperial eagles of Napoleon, splendid as it is, must yield to the far reflected
luster and dazzling glories of American arms acquired in these memorable and brilliant fields of
victory.” Put simply, Napoleon’s legions had passed on the mantel of military greatness on to
the United States.303
Other expansionists celebrated the victory of the United States as a triumph of American
military humanitarianism. One correspondent to the Baltimore Sun likened the American
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invasion to Bonaparte’s reorganization of the Holy Roman Empire. Those who decried the
American invasion, he wrote, had apparently “never read of the French campaign in Germany,
which was a terrible infliction upon the country, but at the same time a means of spreading
liberal principles and improvements in every branch of social life.” If the Mexico lost half her
territory in the war, but gained a republican education from their conquerors, he maintained, “she
would have paid a low price of tuition.” Another expansionist took a slightly different approach
when he asked his audience to contrast the American invasion of Mexico with those of Napoleon
thirty years prior. Whereas Bonaparte had turned the continent into a “charnel house,” and
created an “ocean of blood, rapine, murder and monstrosity from Moscow to Gibraltar,” the
American invasion of Mexico, “illuminated the minds of her people, long held in military
bondage and civil tyranny.” Both writers used different images of Bonaparte to come to the
same conclusion about the American way of war. 304
Perhaps nothing illustrates the success of the neo-greatness argument presented by the
expansionists than the fact that even the anti-expansionists finally made an attempted to make it
their own. One anti-expansionist pleaded with an “immense gathering” of Whigs in New York.
Sounding like countless expansionists, he told the cheering crowd, “our troops have fought
bravely—none ever fought better—they have achieved victories that would have conferred honor
on Napoleon Bonaparte.” He then, however, added an anti-expansionist element by insisting,
“we need no more battles to prove the valor of American soldiers.” The fact that this speech was
made to a crowd of presumably anti-expansionist Whigs is revealing and shows what a difficult
position the anti-expansionists were in by the closing months of the war. Even the bulk of anti-
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expansionists appear to have been comfortable with the United States assuming the military
greatness of Napoleon so long as the physical expansion of the nation was constrained. 305
On May 30, 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo went into effect. Mexico
surrendered her northern provinces, at last giving the United States a claim to having fulfilled
Napoleon’s dream of building a great North American empire. Anti-expansionists had to admit
that they had lost the argument. Perhaps what galled them more than losing was that so many of
the people of the United States did not even seem repentant about their aggressive imperialism.
In fact, they celebrated it. As the volunteers from the Mexican War returned home, they were
feted and honored as the glorious Napoleonic heroes that they had set out to be. It was all too
much for a wag in writing in The Berkshire County Whig who bitterly tried to find humor in the
situation. “The Mexican battles surpass even the famous fights of Napoleon in the opportunities
they furnish for the sudden manufacture of fame, to order,” he quipped. “If half the swords
which have been presented to men who have seen the elephant in Mexico, as a reward for their
deeds of prowess shall be beaten into plowshares at the termination of the war, we may look for
great things in agriculture.”306
Starting in 1815, the common American understanding of Napoleon as a treacherous,
ambitious despot broke down. Starting with his abdication and exile in 1814, Americans began
to separate the political Bonaparte from the military Bonaparte. The tidal wave of printed
material on the Emperor that flooded the American market place solidified this bifurcation of
Bonaparte. The result of this separation of the Napoleonic image was that a large portion of
American population could celebrate Bonaparte as a brilliant military genius and the ultimate
democratic success story, while increasingly ignoring the more unsavory aspects of his reign.
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The debates over the annexation of Texas and the resulting Mexican American War
demonstrated the practical effects of such thinking. Aggressive expansion became increasingly
palatable to the American public as attitudes toward warfare and national greatness were
“Napoleonized” by the work of Barry O’Meara, Walter Scott, and their American successors.
By the time of the Mexican War, even anti-expansionists found that their most effective rhetoric
had to focus on accepting Napoleon as the great authority on military expansion and national
greatness. That they did this with some limited success was remarkable, but their ultimate
failure showed just how far American attitudes about expansion had shifted in just one
generation.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION: THE GLORY THAT WAS NAPOLEON
During the 1850s, Bonapartism reached its peak in the United States. After 1855, visitors
to American bookshops could purchase John S. Abbott’s two-volume History of Napoleon
Bonaparte. This wildly popular biography written by the Yankee minister turned biographer
ended with the revealing sentence, “Napoleon, in death has become the victor over all his foes.
Every generous heart now does homage to his lofty character...His noble fame is every day
extending.” Abbott was only the last of a long tradition of antebellum Bonaparte biographers
who had turned the emperor into a popular military hero. Even more, however, Abbott’s
biography represented Napoleon’s final triumph over William Channing. Not only did Abbott
hold up Bonaparte as a military hero, but he also held up his “lofty character” as worthy of
emulation.307
If they had looked hard enough, a visitor to the shop could also have bought a copy of a
little book called the The Deck and Port Songster, which was an entire volume of laudatory tunes
about the French emperor. Upon opening the book to page sixty-five, they would have found
one ditty titled “Napoleon’s Dream.” The song’s narrator described falling asleep and visiting
St. Helena where he is welcomed by Napoleon. When he finds that the dreamer is an American,
Bonaparte brightens and reminds his visitor of his glorious victories in defense of freedom,
On the plains of Marengo I tyranny hurl’d
And wherever my banner the eagle unfurrl’d
Twas the standard of freedom all over the world!
As the dreamer awakens, he hears Bonaparte’s final words ringing in his, “Liberty soon ov’r the
world shall be seen.”
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The message of this dream could not have clearer to American readers. Napoleon had passed on
his dream of an empire of liberty to the United States.308
Yet, before the United States could expand further, the nation tore itself apart over the
issue of slavery. In mid-1862, the biographer Abbott wrote a letter to his publisher with an offer
to capitalize on the ongoing military conflict. “At the close of this war there will be a million
and a half of young men, who, from their life in the camp, will be particularly interested in
Military History,” he told his publisher. “The Life of Napoleon, in that respect, stands
preeminent.” Abbott wanted to publish a one-volume edition of his previous work that would be
cheaper for young men just home from the war to read. After all, he reminded the publisher,
“Napoleon is popular with the masses.” 309
Abbott was not wrong. Like their fathers before them, Americans north and south
continued to talk about the conquest of the Confederacy in terms of Napoleon. During the first
eighteen months of the war, for example, numerous promising officers like P.G.T. Beauregard
and George B. McClellan found themselves heralded as the next Napoleon by the media and by
their soldiers. Similarly, one officer explained to his local newspaper that the duty of an army
officer was to lead from the front. “Napoleon in person was obliged to lead his bravest men over
the bridge of Lodi, and again at Arcola, and at Waterloo,” he explained in an argument by
anecdote. Furthermore, he claimed, “at the last grand charge of the Old Guard he felt the dire
necessity of leading them himself, and he rushed to their head, but his officers seized him and
forced him back.” “Had they left him to follow his instinct,” the officer mused, “he might have
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turned the fortune of the day.” At the onset of the war, at least, Civil War soldiers expected their
officers to be the Napoleon they had read about in Scott and Abbott’s biographies. 310
They also expected their Napoleonic campaigns to be like those they had read about in
countless military histories. Upon reading about a massive Union army closing on Richmond in
early 1862, a Confederate diplomat in Brussels wrote an encouraging letter to his Secretary of
State that drew on a familiar figure. “If any of our fellow citizens…should be disposed to
entertain anxiety toward the final result,” he began, “let them fresh courage in recalling to mind
the disasters incurred at Moscow by the greatest captain of modern times.” His letter went on for
another three pages describing in detail the awful calamities that had befallen the French army in
Russia, which he had learned from a recently published memoir. Sounding like an antiexpansionist of ten years earlier, he finally concluded, “It is daily becoming more and more
evident…that a fate yet more terrible is awaiting the would-be conquerors of the Confederate
States, under the burning sun and in the death bringing swamps of the South.” 311
Yet, by mid-point of the war, references to Napoleon had lessened considerably. As
Gerald Lindermann has described in his seminal work, Embattled Courage, a variety of factors
were to blame. Probably the biggest cause was that the romantic ideas about military life that
young men had learned from Scott and others did not hold up to the reality they experienced
during the war. During the winter of 1864-65, one soldier woke up to eighteen inches of snow
and noted in his diary, “Wading through the deep snow reminds me of a picture that I have often
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seen, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte before Moscow.’” Yet, he continued wearily, “duty must be attended
to, no matter what the weather may be.” This soldier, and many more like him found that the
reality of military life was not as grand as they had been led to believe. 312
It was not just camp life that did not live up to expectations. Virtually all of the officers
who had been labeled as the new Napoleon fell woefully short of expectations. George
McClellan, whose campaign against Richmond in 1862 had occasioned the letter to the
Confederate Secretary of State mentioned above, was turned back and he was eventually relieved
of his command. Despite initial success at the First Battle of Bull Run, P.T.G Beauregard was
defeated nine months later at the Battle of Shiloh, and then personal conflicts with Confederate
President Jefferson Davis relegated him to backwater theaters for the remainder of the war.
Additionally, the generals who did the most to bring the war to a successful conclusion seemed
to have little to do with the popular perceptions of Bonaparte. Ulysses S. Grant and William T.
Sherman won their victories through a dogged determination not to lose rather than by a
glorious, nation-shattering, Austerlitz-style victory. Indeed, those generals who attempted such
things usually ended up simply destroying lives for no good cause. By the end of the war,
Americans had created a new pantheon of their own military heroes who had little to do with
Bonaparte. Americans had, in a sense, outgrown the need to measure their military greatness
against Napoleon.313
The civilians at home, especially in the defeated South, also found a divergence between
their Napoleonic rhetoric and the reality of their war. One chaplain from Sherman’s army
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explained the disconnect in a letter written shortly after the famous “march to the sea.”
“Everybody recollects how summarily General Sherman and his handful of invading Yankees
were to be disposed of, after leaving Atlanta,” he wrote. “Trees were to be cut down, bridges
were to be burned, all forage for man and beast was to be destroyed, the country was to be
desolated and the difficulties that beset Bonaparte on his famous and disastrous visit to Moscow,
were to have been repeated in the State of Georgia in the year of grace 1864.” Such, he said, was
the program espoused by so many, “Governors, Generals, editors and all.” Yet, none of the dire
rhetoric had come to pass. In fact, he concluded, the march had been a quite “agreeable
journey.” Overblown Napoleonic rhetoric forced southern civilians to recognize that the reality
of Union conquest was much different than what they had read in their books about Napoleon.
Despite their rhetoric, Southerners had not proven themselves greater than Bonaparte. 314
The other reason that the expansionist rhetoric of Bonaparte fell out of favor was that
there was no military expansion between 1850 and 1898. The Gadsden Purchase was obtained
from Mexico through treaty in 1853 and Alaska bought from the Russians in 1867, but that was
no conquest. That was simply a business transaction. From the view point of the twenty-first
century, historians now see the destruction of the plains Indian tribes as a conquest, but this was
not how nineteenth century Americans looked at it. There was little martial glory in conquering
native peoples, unless you lost spectacularly—as George Custer found in 1876. It was not until
the Spanish American War of 1898 that another “real” war of conquest broke out which again
allowed Americans to prove their valor. By then, however, most young American men
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compared their valor to their fathers’ fights at Gettysburg and Antietam and not to Napoleon’s
Italian campaigns. 315
The curtailment of Napoleonic rhetoric was truly the end of an era for the United
States—indeed, in some ways it signaled the end of the first phase of American expansion.
Between 1800 and 1850, Napoleon, the ultimate symbol of imperialism, had become a dominant
political and social measure of aggressive American expansion. He first entered the lexicon of
expansion in 1802 when Americans found that Spain had retroceded their territory of Louisiana
to France. Most Americans saw having an aggressive France on their western border as an
unacceptable national security risk. They appropriated the language of natural and ancient
boundaries, which Napoleon had popularized during his initial campaigns in Italy, to discuss
their own national expansion. Many Americans argued that a preemptive military strike on New
Orleans was justified to prevent Napoleon from obtaining a geographic position from which he
could strangle western commerce or, even worse, use economic persuasion to dismember the
union. Other Americans, however, warned that a theory of expansion based on natural borders
or a preemptive military campaign would make the United States no better than Bonaparte’s
France. Congress ultimately passed a bill authorizing President Jefferson to use military force to
take New Orleans, but fate intervened in April 1803.
The failure of France to quell the slave revolt on the island of Saint-Domingue and
anticipation of another war in Europe led Bonaparte to try and sell the entire territory of
Louisiana to the United States. This touched off a new round of debates about the legitimacy of
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republican expansion and military occupation. Anti-expansionists argued that signing a treaty
with the ambitious and aggressive Bonaparte was not only unwise and compromising the
national integrity, but also probably illegitimate. Despite the anti-expansionist rhetoric,
Congress approved treaty by large margins. This, however, led to new questions about how the
territory was to be administered. Many Jeffersonians and some Federalists argued that an
uncompromising military occupation was justified to alleviate the dangers posed by a hostile
Louisiana population still loyal to Bonaparte’s France. Federalists pointed out that this type of
occupation was no better than how Napoleon treated his “sister republics” in Europe. Once
again, the pro-expansionists were successful in their arguments. With the Louisiana question
settled, they contented themselves by celebrating the differences between the allegedly peaceful
expansion of the United States and the aggressive conquests of Napoleon.
Between 1805 and 1815, the anti-expansionists regrouped and struck back on the
unresolved issue of Florida. They found an effective rhetorical tool in painting the Jeffersonians
as stooges, or, worse, allies of the Emperor Napoleon. This was particularly effective due to the
general American distaste for Napoleon’s imperial aggrandizement in Europe, as well as concern
over a possible Bonaparte connection to the Aaron Burr conspiracy closer to home. Americans
were particularly disturbed by Napoleon’s usurpation of the Spanish monarchy in 1808. Using
this rhetorical device, anti-expansionists were able to block passage of the $2 million act in 1805.
In 1811, they cast great doubt on the Madison administration’s occupation of the West Florida
republic and a year later, they forced the administration to call off its attempts to start a coup in
Spanish East Florida. Though they were unable to prevent the War of 1812, rhetoric that tied
Madison to Bonaparte and aggressive expansion in Florida helped create a unified, national antiexpansionist—though not anti-war—movement which greatly hampered the conduct of the war.
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In 1815, Napoleon abdicated and almost immediately Americans began to bifurcate his
legacy. They separated the political image of the emperor from the military image of the
general. This allowed them to celebrate the democratic, military hero, while claiming to detest
the ambitious and treacherous despot. These images were so powerful that anti-expansionists
proved unable to mount an effective argument to counter Andrew Jackson’s aggressive invasion
of Florida in 1818. Following Bonaparte’s death in 1821, Americans read a tidal wave of printed
materials about the emperor that largely reinforced this bifurcation. Best-selling sympathetic
works written by Barry O’Meara and Walter Scott simultaneously softened the emperor’s image
and turned him into the standard of martial and national greatness. Some Americans, led by
William Ellery Channing, responded to these books by calling attention to the difference
between greatness and goodness and questioning their romantic image of war, but the tide had
clearly shifted. When the questions of Texas annexation and then the Mexican War came to the
fore of American expansion debate between 1835 and 1848, anti-expansionists found themselves
on the defensive. Ultimately, they were able to put together an argument that may have helped
to prevent the conquest of all Mexico. However, they were only able to do this by working
within the new framework of Napoleonic greatness established by their opponents. By the end
of the war, the image of Napoleon stood triumphant as the accepted American measure of
national and military greatness.
In 2003, President George W. Bush ordered the American military to invade Iraq to
prevent the government of Iraq from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. This socalled “Bush Doctrine” of preemptive war was lambasted by commentators as being a radically
new shift in foreign policy. While the wisdom of the policy can certainly be questioned, it was
not new. In fact, it was virtually the same rational given by militant expansionists two-hundred
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years earlier for seizing New Orleans before Napoleon could take possession. Even opposition
to the war was also virtually the same as it had been in 1803. Some pleaded for time to give
diplomacy a chance to work, while others decried the creation of an American empire and asked
where such aggressive imperialism would end. In 1803, war had been adverted, but the United
States was not so lucky in 2003. Four years later, the American military remained engaged in
frustrating counterinsurgency operations as they attempted to rebuild a war-torn Iraq amid bitter
sectarian violence. In August of 2007, historian Richard Bulliet published an opinion piece of
the New York Times. In the article, he suggested that the president might take a lesson from one
of the great military captains in history and abandon his middle eastern campaign before it
proved disastrous. The title of his essay was, “Bush and Napoleon.” Even after two-hundred
years, Americans still compared their expansion to that of Napoleon Bonaparte. 316
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